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THE AGENDA OF THE WORKSHOP
Christian Joerges
In its Directive on Product Liability (25 July 1985) and 
Council Resolution on a new approach to technical 
harmonization and standards (7 May 1985), the Community 
initiated the Europeanization of both product liability 
law and general safety legislation. The Community's 
initiatives are essentially motivated by its efforts to 
achieve completion of the internal market. Accordingly, 
the Directive on Product Liability provides for regular 
reports from the Commission to the Council on the 
implementation of this Directive which may include furfner 
suggestions on the part of the Commission. In the area of 
product safety policy the Commission intends to de^ejop 
new legal provisions which should supplement the new 
approach to technical harmonization and standards by a 
general duty of safety and serve as a framework for the 
harmonization of general safety legislation.
Product liability law and product safety legislation are 
interrelated in many respects. Quite understandably, the 
compensation of the injured party and a fair distribution 
of the risks inherent in modern production technologies 
are commonly regarded as the primary objectives of product 
liability law. Moreover, it is a commonly held belief that 
such sanctions will at the same time provide incentives 
for producers to comply with safety prerequisites. 
Furthermore, there are areas of systematic convergence 
between liability and safety laws; liability for defective 
products rests on failure to comply with safety standards 
(Art. 6 of the Directive) whereas compliance with 
mandatory safety requirements excludes liability (Art. 7). 
Product safety legislation regulates the marketing of 
products and/or provides for means to respond to dangers 
which become apparent after products have been put inro 
circulation. By enacting such legislation, the Community 
and the Member States undertake an obligation to carry out 
their duty to protect health and safety interests of 
citizens of the EC. However, the provisions pertaining to 
such safety legislation may be equally enforced by 
awarding damages under product liability laws. Judicial 




























































































product liability law may be used as guidelines in the 
administration of safety legislation.
The workshop addressed these issues in the following way: 
the first group of contributions dealt with the regulatory 
functions of product liability and product safety law 
thereby including a discussion of the impact of product 
liability insurance. The second and the third group gave 
reports on the implementation of the Product Liability 
Directive and product safety legislation already in force 
or in preparation. The final session discussed 
institutional problems and perspectives of a 





























































































PART ONE: THE REGULATORY ISSUES
THE REGULATORY FUNCTIONS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW1
Gert Briiggemeier
In its 1985 evaluation of a three-year model experiment on 
the cataloguing of accidents arising from consumer goods, 
the EC Commission estimated that every year in the EC such 
accidents caused over 30.000 fatalities and some 40 
million cases of personal injury. What contribution 
then can product liability law make towards the prevention 
of these incidents, the reduction of the resultant cost 
for individual national economies, as well as the 
prevention of physical and psychological burdens to those 
concerned and their families? What is the best framework 
for the substantive content of liability, and in this 
respect wherein lie the limits of effectiveness of civil 
product liability law? These questions will be examined in 
this contribution at the start of the conference on 
European product liability policy, and the complex problem 
will be discussed principally against the background of 
developments in West German product liability law. 
Comparative legal discourse is intended only to underline 
a certain homogeneity of development trends in modern 
product liability law in advanced industrial societies. 12
1. A more extensive version of this paper has been
published in German: Briiggemeier, Produkthaftung
und Produktsicherheit, Zeitschrift für das gesamte 
Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR), vol. 152, No. 
6 (1988) 511-536.




























































































I. Product liability law: 
compensation
Loss prevention through
The rules governing product liability or producer's 
liability cannot be categorised definitively. The main 
reason for this is that in this field three traditionally 
strictly separate spheres of law overlap: contract law, 
tort law and strict liability law. A further complication 
arises from the fact that all three spheres of law are 
themselves disposed to dynamic development, so that 
nowadays their strict separation causes even more 
difficulties. The law of contract regulates the exchange 
of goods and services and safeguards the expectation of 
performance. Loss attributable to breach of contract is 
punished by the classical legal remedies and the 
obligation to compensate, which basically has as its 
object performance of the contract {legitimate 
expectation/Erfiillungsinteresse) . The law of tort serves 
to protect life, limb and property. Traditionally its main 
field of application concerns accidental loss and 
negligence. Nevertheless, under tort law protection of 
integrity has long been applied - both within and without 
privity of contract - contractually and quasi- 
contractually, whereas vice versa, contractual performance 
is today increasingly assured under the law of tort - 
"ineffective" products, "chronic defects" 
(weiterfressender Mangel). Strict liability means the 
réintroduction of older common law remedies for the 
causation of damages (Kausalhaftung) under altered 
circumstances. Since the enforcement oi the negligence 
doctrine in civil compensation cases in the 19th century, 
strict liability appears as an appropriate, although 
narrowly defined, exceptional regulation for a modified 
absolute liability, especially in relation to the new 
technical risks of industrial society. Today strict 
liability can be regarded as the keystone to liasbility in 
a "risk society".
The predominant function of contract, tort and strict 
liability law was traditionally to provide compensation 
for loss attributable to damage. The extent of 
compensation was determined in different ways, according 
to the specific field: legitimate expectations or 
detrimental reliance in contract law, integrity interest 
in the law of tort, and limited amounts concerning 
personal or property damage in strict liability law. But 
as early as 1888 the Austrian economist Mataja gave a 
superb critique of this compensatory reductionism of 





























































































"No legislation in the world can remove loss that has 
already occurred; law stands powerless before it as a 
'fait accompli'. Concerning the risk of loss 
therefore, legislation can pursue only two aims: it 
can strive 1) to work as far as possible towards 
prevention, and 2) to direct actual loss towards those 
persons who appear, according to the demands of 
justice and the national economic interest, to be the 
most appropriate to bear the onus."
For a long time this had no consequences for legal 
doctrine. It required the impetus of economic analysis of 
law in the USA in the 1960s, and increasingly in the FRG 
since the late 1970s, in order to bring about a preventive 
policy orientation in the liability discussion. Today, 
meanwhile, it is widely accepted that the function of 
liability law is the prevention of loss by the threat and 
enforcement of compensation, for those "responsible" for 
the individual case. In other words, liability is 
concerned with the control of conduct with the aim of 
preventing loss. The substantive content of liability - 
especially the prerequisites of compensation, the amount 
of damages to be awarded, the determination of those 
entitled to compensation - should be largely oriented 
towards this functional purpose. Accordingly, from the 
economic analysis of civil law it has emerged that this 
cannot mean that prevention of loss must be pursued at all 
costs. The focus should rather be on minimising loss. This 
should not be a question of avoiding certain losses and 
permitting others. The determination of avoidable loss is 
attempted through modifying and further developing the 
basic approach of the 'learned hand' formula. According 
to this, avoidance of loss is expected to occur when the 
cost of loss avoidance multiplied by the probability of 
loss is less than the foreseeable loss.
This approach to loss control via the formulation of 
expectations concerning the conduct of those who 
potentially cause or determine danger has a clear relation
3. V. Mataja, Das Recht des Schadensersatzes vom 
Standpunkt der Nationalôkonomie, 1888, p. 19.
4. Cf. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 2nd ed., 
1977, p. 122; Schafer/Ott, Lehrbuch der 
okonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts, 1985, p. 97; 





























































































to the classical tortious liability in negligence cases. 
Incidentally, the American Justice Hand did not apply the 
above formula in 1940 for defining the notion of 
negligence within the liability law.
This concept, of pursuing societal optimization of losses 
through the definition of expectations on conduct, can be 
directly transposed into contract and tort compensation. 
In contract law, the compensation obligations are intended 
to promote due fulfilment of the terms of the contract. 
The disputed concept of "effective breach of contract" can 
be integrated without much difficulty into the general 
principles of law concerning defective performance. First 
torts, then accidental loss have, since the economic 
analysis of civil law was first introduced, always been 
its central field of application.
In contrast, strict liability seems to be closed to such 
functional orientation towards loss prevention through 
conduct control. When strict liability includes absolute 
liability, this implies liability also for unforeseeable 
and therefore unavoidable loss even where the conditions 
of normal precautionary expenditure have been fulfilled. 
Economic analysis focusses on the qualitative difference 
of strict liability from tortious liability by emphasizing 
that here it is no longer a question of conduct control 
regarding the level of due care, but of determining the 
level of activity. A car driver who is subject to a strict 
liability can only control the additional liability risk 
by limiting his driving activity, even if he drives with 
due care.
This controversy between negligence liability (conduct 
control) and strict liability (activity control) is most 
pronounced in relation to the discussion on the optimal 
structuring of product liability. The familiar test case 
runs: liability for development risks. Development risks 
are design/construction defects in a product which, when 
first marketed, would not have been recognisable under the 
current state of technological knowledge (and science). 
The international discussion on product liability has a 
distorted view of a solution to this problem due to its 
unrelenting fixation on the concept of product 
defectiveness. Product defect is at the heart of the 
originally mentioned complex tangle of contract, tort and




























































































strict liability law embracing this area of liability. 
French and US contract law have developed a wide-reaching 
indemnity for objectively defective products (and 
consequential loss) going beyond the narrower contractual 
relationship. German sales law, however, with its aedilic 
form of legal remedies (privity of contract), independent 
of fault, concentrates on a subjective concept of 
defectiveness; the replacement of the loss attributable to 
the defect and upon the narrow contractual relationship. 
The law of torts neither recognises an objective nor a 
subjective concept of product defect, but one related to 
conduct. Product defect here always means a source of 
danger arising from (human) failure in the production 
process or in the organisation of this process, for which 
the person held responsible for the defect is liable in 
damages if this misconduct is avoidable. The extension of 
strict liability for damages to cover development 
"defects" means, in fact, liability for the consequences 
of an activity, not for misconduct. Liability for the 
consequences of an activity in practice however, as has 
repeatedly been emphasized especially in the American 
discussion, makes the manufacturer an insurer of the 
victim of his product.
The contrast between product-related and conduct-related 
approaches - emerging above all in the relevant judgments 
of the highest courts of the American states - is however 
misleading in the context of the arguments about liability 
for development risks. In the US, until now, only the 
warranty liability - by definition tortious, but in 
reality of contractual origin - of the manufacturer for 
objective manufacturing defects ("flaws") is product- 
related. Liability for design and instruction defects is 
conduct-related (objective) negligence liability. 
Liability for development risks is in contrast neither 
product- nor (mis)conduct-related, but liability based on 
process or activity. Ten years ago Simitis” accurately 
pointed to the possible alternative ways of the developing 
of product liability law in the future: either a 
changeover to strict liability "sans phrase" for products 
and production processes (possibly with exoneration for 
the manufacturer in cases of product misuse by the injured 
party) and therefore in practice a changeover from
6. Simitis, Produzentenhaftung: Von der strikten
Haftung zur Schadenspravention, in: Festschrift K. 




























































































liability to a no-fault insurance; or alternatively, by 
adherence to product defect as the basis for liability, 
which in practice amounts to a comprehensive tortious 
liability of the manufacturer for objective negligence.
The second alternative has won through in the US 
concerning both the factual development of product 
liability law in the individual states and incipient 
legislative reform at federal level (as yet unsuccessful), 
and in Europe - both in the national legal systems of the 
Member States of the EC and on the EC level itself. The 
economic analysis of liability law based on conduct 
control and loss optimization also clearly tends in this 
direction. It is true that the German protagonists of 
economic analysis of civil law speak of strict liability 
taking into consideration the negligence of the injured 
party as being the most efficient liability rule. On 
closer inspection however, this strict liability is 
revealed as practically identical to, or at least no 
longer distinguishable from, an objective negligence 
liability. The US development in product liability lawy 
is, as indicated above, characterized by incongruent 
concepts of defectiveness: for objective manufacturing 
defects (flaws) liability lies primarily under contract 
law and - since abandoning the privity of contract 
provision in I9601 - "strict" tort law or strict 
liability law respectively. As regards design and 
construction defects a conduct-related approach was taken. 
The decisive issue is whether, on the basis of a 
risk/utility test, greater safety measures could 
legitimately be expected of the manufacturer or not. In
7. This applies especially to the main representative 
of the Chicago school, R.A. Posner; cf. Economic 
Analysis of Law, 2d ed. 1978, p. 122 ff.
8. Cf. Schafer/Ott, Lehrbuch 1985, p. 107 ff.; M. 
Adams, Okonomische Analyse der Gefahrdungs- und 
Verschuldenshaftung, 1985, p. 86.
9. Cf. for many Prosser/Keeton, On the Law of Torts,
5th ed. 1984, p. 677 ff.; Priest, The Invention of 
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundation of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. 
Legal Stud. 461 (1985); A. Pfeifer, Produktfehler 
oder Fehlverhalten des Produzenten, 1987, p. 116 
ff.





























































































the former case there is a product defect, and vice versa. 
Until now there has been no case of liability for 
develpment risks in the USA - with the sole exception of 
asbestos. The state-of-the-art defence has been 
admitted here unchanged, i.e., the argument of proven 
orderly conduct means no strict liability.
This inventory shows that the function of liability law is 
unanimously seen - implicitly by court practice and 
explicitly in the modern doctrine of product liability 
law, especially in the economic analysis of civil law - as 
conduct control in the direction of loss prevention and 
loss optimization. In addition, the conduct-related tort 
law approach offers an appropriate liability law solution 
to the problem of development risks via the development of 
duties of post-sale control and post-sale reaction.
II. Efficiency prerequisites in product liability law
A functional concept of product liability aimed at loss 
optimization requires an additional framework of 
conditions in order to be effective. Liability can develop 
its indirect or preventive effect only if the attributable 
losses caused in the individual cases can also be claimed 
in full by the injured parties and be enforced effectively 
against the tortfeasors.
If we accept that, in substance, a liability rule between 
objective negligence (with or without easing the burden of 
proof) and strict liability is the most efficient form of 
product liability law, considerable gaps still remain. 
Causing the death of a person who has no maintenance 
obligations still remains practically unpunishable in 
civil law. To this end the liability law under the West 
German Civil Code regarding prevention of injury can only 
provide, de lege lata, what in practice is an insufficient 
impetus to the most important object of legal protection - 
the preservation of human life. In this regard M. Adams 
has proposed making ("for a logical second") the person 
killed into a legal entity with his own indemnification 
claim based on an allowance for the lost chances in life, 1
11. Cf. the much-discussed decisions of the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey: Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp., 237 A.2d 539 (1982); Feldman v.




























































































and.passing this claim on to heirs, who could then assert 
it. Bavaria intends introducing a bill into the German 
Bundesrat according to which, in cases of homocide, the 
right to claim compensation for pain and suffering could 
be accorded to near relatives. These certainly seem to 
be steps in the right direction, that of effecting 
indirect conduct control through liability law. Above and 
beyond this, the economic analysis of civil law with its 
broad concept of loss (any impairment of use) tends 
towards an immense expansion of indemnifiable loss, which 
will meet with (justified) reserve from civil lawyers and 
will also have few chances of success politically.
With regard to procedural success of claims for 
indemnification, the expansion of the burden of proof 
gains special significance. Here, as is well known, the 
decisions of the VI Civil Division of the Federal High 
Court of Justice (BGH) has done pioneer service. However, 
the fact that it was not..the 'fowl-pest' decision of 
1968, but the 'apple-scab' decision of 1981 which 
initiated the real "evidentiary revolution" in product 
liability, is still not given adequate support, which 
remains equally valid for the FRG. On the basis of the 
unfortunate separation of internal and external due care 
(cf. E. Deutsch, Juristenzeitung (JZ), 1988,pp. 993-996), 
the Federal High Court elucidated in 1981 that shifting 
the burden of proof applies also to the external duty to 
exercise due care, and certainly in cases of defects in 
manufacturing, design, (original) instructions and 
organisation. If, however, the manufacturer cannot prove 
observation of the required (external) care, the 
(redundant) moment of internal care is also indicated. The 
Federal High Court has made an explicit reservation solely 
in respect of the post-marketing duties of control and 
reaction. Here, the injured party continues to bear the 
burden of proof for evidence of breach of external due 
care by the producer.
In other words, in the framework of producer liability, 
according to para. 823 I of the Civil Code, the injured
12. Adams, Gefâhrdungs- und Verschuldenshaftung, 1985,
p. 178.
13. Cf. Vorndran, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (ZRP) 
1988, 293
14. BGH 26 Nov. 1968, BGHZ 51, 91.




























































































party needs only prove that he has been injured to his 
interest as he is protected under tort law by the product 
in the state in which it left the manufacturer. That means 
the burden of proof for the alleged product defect lies no 
longer on the injured party, but on the producer to prove 
that the defect did not exist. This shows that in 
practice, substantively and procedurally, the West German 
producer liability goes further concerning design and 
instruction defects than American law. This effect is to 
some extent compensated for by the fact that American 
civil procedure only requires as evidence what is 
described as 'preponderance of evidence', whereas German 
practice adheres unerringly to the so-called "full proof" 
(evidence of probability bordering on certainty) in the 
sense of para. 286 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It 
should be mentioned, if only for the sake of completeness, 
that bringing an action under product liability is still, 
with regard to preparation and in particular the gathering 
of information, despite easing the burden of proof, an 
enormously time-consuming and expensive process. In legal 
circles this circumstance has occasionally given rise to a 
call for the introduction of the American pre-trial 
discovery procedure into German civil law procedure.
In order that the producer cannot avoid paying 
compensation by limiting his liability, especially by such 
means as limited liability under company law, recently the 
possibility has often been considered of introducing 
compulsory liability insurance. Such mandatory insurance 
combines two advantages. On the one hand, this ensures to 
a considerable extent that the injured party is in fact 
compensated. The risk to him of limiting corporative 
liability and, within limits, the bankruptcy of the 
damaging party, is removed. On the other hand, the 
producer is aware of the possible social costs of his 
activity, ab initio, even if only indirectly through the 
liability insurance premiums. In this way, the preventive 
effect of liability law is taken into account. The 
objection is sometimes raised that compulsory insurance, 
in the sphere of product (and environmental) liability, 
means that the state's duty of safety regulation is 
transferred to insurance companies, by means of the plant 
inspection and control measures necessary for estimating 
risk, in a way comparable to that of the 
Berufsgenossenschaften in German mandatory accident 
insurance. Insofar as this is true, it could by the same 
token be asked whether this might not be a sensible way of 
effecting state functions through privatization. Austrian 
legislators have followed this innovative direction in 




























































































national product liability law. The possibility could also 
be considered of making it a company law obligation for 
partners and management boards of limited liability 
companies to take out liability insurance for their 
company. If this duty were neglected, the partners or 
management board members would be personally liable. In 
this way, a claim for indemnity by the company could be 
dealt with separately by the creditors of the company.
Finally, a particularly relevant point remains to be 
mentioned when assuming the desirability of "strict" 
product liability and collateral easing of the burden of 
proof, the increased risks of which should be covered by 
insurance. The preventive effect of such liability 
ultimately depends on the current insurance market being 
competitive. Ideally, the rate of insurance should reflect 
exactly the degree of care and the extent of risk 
contained in the policy-holder's activity. The holder 
would be rewarded through a premium structure if he 
observed the socially desirable standards of safety and 
similarly penalised if he neglected those standards. The 
further insurance premium policy departs, in the existing 
insurance market situation, from these ideal conditions, 
the more it loses its loss-prevention effect under product 
liability law, and the more important the familiar moral- 
hazard effect becomes. In the extreme case of employing a 
uniform premium for all partners responsible for damage 
common in West Germany, for instance in professional 
liability insurance for doctors - liability law is limited 
exclusively to the function of damage and indemnification 
settlements. It no longer offers incentives for observance 
of the socially desirable degree of care. Finsinger's 
analyses in particular have demonstrated serious lacks in 
the state-regulated insurance market in West Germany, 
which is accordingly characterized by considerably less 
price competition than for example in the United 
Kingdom. State control of profits means that profits of 
the West German insurance companies are limited to 3% of 
turnover. Profit maximization under these circumstances 
means an increase in damage claims and administrative 
expense for the insurance companies - a strategy which 
conflicts directly with the loss-prevention policy. The
16. J. Finsinger, Versicherungsmarkte, 1984;
Finsinger/Kay/Tapp, A Comparison of Insurance 





























































































realization of the EC internal market, freedom of services 
and deregulation of the insurance market could make 
decisive steps in the direction of rendering product 
liability law an effective incentive mechanism for 
bringing safer products onto the market.
Liability law is and remains nevertheless only one element 
in the structurally tripartite product safety law: 
preventive regulation of marketing prerequisites, 
responsive post-marketing control and liability under 
civil law (if necessary complemented by penal sanctions). 
Product liability law provides its own control mechanism 























































































































































































PRODUCT LIABILITY AND INSURANCEJôrg Finsinger
1. Objectives of product liability
Product liability serves primarily two objectives:
-Prevention of accidents rather than punishment of
producers
-Satisfaction of the demand for insurance rather than the 
provision of fair compensation
Where tort law deals with fault and negligence, punishment 
may be appropriate. Indeed under US common law, courts can 
make the tortfeasor pay punitive damages in addition to 
compensation. However, as legal debate is increasingly 
influenced by economic analysis emphasizing efficiency, 
the incentives applied by different legal frameworks 
become the focus of scholarly research. After all, meting 
justice without improving incentives for efficient
behaviour, would hardly be more worthwhile than exacting 
revenge. In particular, where modern society creates 
unforeseen risks hidden in commodities, or integrally 
associated with their mode of transportation and
prevailing wherever energy is produced, it seems
appropriate to look for rules enhancing.7efficiency by 
preventing accidents rather than punishing
Traditionally, damage payments seek to provide fair 
compensation. Given that few accidents result from wilful 
intention to do harm, it is by no means obvious how the 
notion of fair compensation should be defined. However, it 
seems "fair" to require compensation awards to satisfy at 
least the demand for compensation by the victims. Clearly, 
the demand for compensation is nothing but the demand for 
insurance.
17. Punitive damages therefore should be analysed as an 
instrument to induce prevention of accidents. 
Clearly, when accidents are caused by product 
defects and when it is not always possible to 
attribute the accidents to defects, it seems fair 





























































































2. The demand for insurance
An individual is said to face a risk, when he is 
confronted by events which are not certain, but which 
occur within a "certain" range of probability. Some 
countries take a lenient approach to risk others do not. 
Suppose an individual is wealthy in one state but poor in 
another. Clearly, he faces the risk of be{com)ing poor. If 
the individual dislikes the risk confronting him, he is 
willing to pay something to increase his wealth in the low 
wealth state. He is willing to give up some wealth of the 
high wealth state, in order to increase wealth in the low 
wealth state i.e. he wants to make a more even 
distribution of wealth over 'loss' ,and 'no loss' states.
In the high wealth or 'no loss’ state the individual has a 
lot of money and hence the utility of an additional unit 
of money is small relative to its utility in the low 
wealth state. A rational, risk-averse individual will try 
to make arrangements, such as the transfer of money from 
the high wealth state to the low wealth state until the 
utility of an additional unit of money - this is the 
marginal utility of money - is equal in both states. The 
demand for such transfers of money is the demand for 
insurance.
If an object is damaged or lost there is a demand for 
repair or replacement. Speaking in terms of the marginal 
utility of money, damage or loss increases the marginal 
utility of money, i.e. money is needed more than in the 
'no loss' state, it is needed for repair or replacement.
Money obviously does not help when repair or replacement 
is not possible. An additional unit of money in the 'loss’ 
state therefore may buy just as much utility as in the 'no 
loss’ state. Hence, there is no demand for insurance.
Consider the extreme case of losing your child. Clearly, 
the loss cannot be undone; replacement is not available at 
any price. Now, consider your need of money. Children are 
quite expensive to bring up. When your child was alive you 
had to make money sacrifices in order to be able to pay 
for his clothing, his school or university etc. The 
marginal utility of money was high. After his death you 
can spend all this money on consumption. It is likely that 
the marginal utility of money is lower, you can buy most 
of what you want and whatever you could buy with more 
money would be worth less. Consider again, the 'no loss’ 
(or the happy) state in which your child lives healthily. 




























































































want to pay a premium and thereby reduce the amount of 
money to spend on consumption in exchange for the promise 
of a "compensation" in case your child dies. On the 
contrary, you would want to buy the opposite arrangement 
to insurance, you want more money while your child is 
alive in exchange for the promise to pay a premium at the 
death of your child.
CONCLUSION: The loss of replaceable goods, or damage which 
can be repaired, requires compensation, when compensation 
is meant to satisfy the demand for insurance. The loss of 
irreplaceable commodities does not necessarily require 
compensation.
3. insurance through strict liability
Strict liability corresponds to compulsory and uniform 
insurance. If all consumers were equal, then there would 
be a uniform optimal insurance arrangement for product 
risks. In the absence of moral hazard, such a contract 
would provide full insurance for repairable or replaceable 
commodities. For other .commodities, partial or no 
insurance would be provided. If, however, consumers are 
not equal, then the optimal insurance arrangement depends 
on the characteristics of the consumer e.g. his 
"propensity" to take care, the ability to take preventive 
efforts, the distribution of losses etc. It follows that 
the uniform insurance arrangement applied by strict 
liability cannot be optimal. Nor can the payment of 
uniform insurance premiums by consumers who present 
different risks create an optimal situation. But under 
strict liability the insurance is inseparable from the 
purchase of an article and hence the insurance premium is 
contained in the purchase price.
In most cases the consumer has some control over product 
risks. He can make sure that the product is put only to 
its proper use. Also, he can avoid certain dangerous 
situations. Last but not least, he can use a product less 
frequently. If the consumer is fully insured, he may tend 
to be less careful as long as compensation is guaranteed. 
There are three, albeit far from perfect, ways of 
maintaining the incentives to act carefully: (1) 
contributory negligence (2) co-insurance (3) deductibles.
18. In exceptional cases over-insurance is optimal. Cf. 




























































































4. Two objectives - one instrument
Product liability serves two objectives: (1) it provides 
incentives to reduce product risks and (2) it provides 
compensation for victims. There are two objectives but 
there is one instrument for their application: the 
liability rule. Appropriate incentives for producing safe 
products .way entail imposing strict liability on the 
producer. y Optimal compensation, however, is equivalent 
to the full loss only in exceptional cases. In general, 
the consumer should bear part of the loss to maintain the 
incentive to take care. Furthermore, in the case of 
irreplaceable or irreparable commodities, optimal 
compensation may not be possible. It is impossible to 
satisfy both objectives at the same time. There is a 
trade-off between the two. If the welfare of an economy 
depends primarily on appropriate incentives for accident 
prevention, then product liability rules should first of 
all create these incentives.
Generally speaking, liability rules with optimal 
incentives for the production of safe goods provide more 
insurance than is demanded. In this sense, optimal 
prevention means over-compensation. Over-compensation 
causes substantial misallocation only when moral hazard 
problems arise. But moral hazard can be reduced by co- 
insurance or deductibles. The optimal liability rule, 
therefore, should always shift part of the r^sk to the 
buyer of the product. It has been argued'1 that non­
material damages and, in particular, compensation for pain 
and suffering should not be paid or paid in limited 
amounts and that this part of the loss should be 
shouldered by co-insurance. Although European legal 
systems provide relatively low awards for non-material 
losses and pain and suffering, and although the associated 
transaction cost savings are obvious, it may well be the 
case that the incentive to save lives has become 
insufficient. A solution to this problem might be sought 
in a separation of liablity into prevention incentive
19. For a detailed analysis, see 
economic assessment of the 
Directive and the product 
Federal Rupublic of Germany,
Finsinger and Simon, An 
EC Product Liability 
liability law of the 
1988, Section 3 and 4.




























































































(penalty) and compensation for non-material losses. non­
material losses, pain and suffering and death, may only 
partially be compensated, but a penalty equal to the 
uncompensated damage should be imposed on the producer. 
For instance, a high penalty on death could be imposed. 
This penalty, however, would not be paid out to the 
relatives of the victim.
5. Insurance of product liability risks by the producer
This section enumerates some criteria for determining the 
insurability of a risk.
(1) Difficulty of estimating the probability of an 
accident.
(2) Adverse selection: If the insurer cannot distinguish 
high and low risk, he will find that at any premium 
predominantly bad risks will want to be insured. As 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown, a Cournot- 
Nash market equilibrium may not exist under these 
circumstances.
(3) Moral hazard: Insurance reduces the incentive to take
care. The incentive to take care can only be
maintained to the extent that the insurer monitors the 
care exercised and increases premiums whenever care is 
reduced. To some extent, incentives to take care can 
be maintained by loss-sharing arrangements. Co- 
insurance and deductibles are examples of such 
arrangements, leaving some of the risk with the 
insured. However, the incentive to take care will 
still be smaller than in the absence of insurance.
(4) The difficulty of estimating the probability of making 
a claim.
(5) No sudden changes in the legal system: The insurer 
must be able to clearly recognise what constitutes an 
accident and how liability for it is determined.
These criteria shed some light on the consequences of 
requiring producers to buy insurance. In fact, in Spain 
and Italy insurance will be compulsory for product risks. 
Clearly, compulsory insurance will guarantee the 
compensation of victims. But, it may interfere with proper 





























































































(1) There is substantial information asymmetry in the area 
of design and development risks. The producer will 
always know substantially more than the insurer about 
such "idiosyncratic" risks. To the extent that 
insurers cannot monitor the safety of new designs or 
developments and therefore cannot calculate 
appropriate premiums, moral hazards and adverse 
selection problems will arise. As a consequence, new 
products might only be insured at high premiums. In 
some cases new products will not find insurance at 
all. Also, established firms in an industry will more 
easily obtain insurance. Small and young firms may be 
at a disadvantage. Clearly, in a perfect competition 
insurance market such barriers to entry would not be 
present. But the adverse selection and the moral 
hazard problems are severe enough to rule out that a 
market for product liability insurance would be 
perfect.
(2) Moreover, compulsory insurance requires that a basic 
insurance contract is specified by the government. 
This contract, amongst other things, specifies the 
basic types of risk insured as well as the minimum 
cover. The insurer can go beyond the contract, but he 
cannot offer less than the contract. This lack of 
flexibility does not cause misallocation when a 
standard risk is concerned as, for instance, when 
third party car insurance is compulsory. When a highly 
complex risk such as the product risk is concerned, 
the limitation on tailoring special contracts for 
special circumstances creates a potential for market 
failure. The insurance market will be less perfect 
than it otherwise would be in the presence of moral 
hazards and adverse selection. Thus, the problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection are compounded.
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THE INSTRUMENTS OF PRODUCT SAFETY POLICY AND THE PROCESS 
OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Christian Joerges
Product Safety Policy which first took on clearer form in 
Western industrial states during the sixties in the 
context of the various consumer movements, has since lost 
much of its former attractiveness. For several reasons 
the critique of market failures which once supported a 
dynamic search for regulatory cure has given way to a 
critique of regulatory failures and a movement towards
deregulation. Admittedly this general shift in attitudes 
"has created a favourable climate for the Community's 
attempt to bring about the completion of the internal 
market in the mystical year 1992. This is so for a very 
simple reason: Product safety legislation creates
barriers to trade: any deregulation in this area tends to
facilitatethe free movement of goods within the 
Community; more precisely, the Community's internal market 
objective can best be achieved via deregulation.
A closer examination of the complex field of product 
safety policy reveals, however, that the coupling of 
market integration and deregulation suggests a far too 
superficial picture of the Community's tasks and its 
actual policies. The following overview will try to show 
that the process of European integration does in fact have 
a specific impact on the regulatory patterns of product" 
safety policy which at first sight seems very much m  
line with the demands for (movement towards! deregulation. 
But the argument'will also be made that, at the same time, 
the inteqraU o B proces~g~Teads~~tg~T~~revlval oITtTie issues 
Crf^product safety poTTcyand 
T te g r r le f ^ r ^ L a c t iv i t ie s . I.
ommunity in new
I. Product safety through product liability
The controversies about product safety policy are to be 
attributed largely to the fact that, in practice, the 
guaranteeing of safety by governments tends to be 
reflected in regulatory measures, with the result that 
advocates of "juridification of the safety issues" tends 
to be countered by the general objections of governmental 
intervention and paternalism. Such debates, interesting 
and fundamental as they may be, are often highly academic. 
Their practical relevance depends on how one defines the 




























































































advocates of an interventionist safety policy have to take 
account of the numerous bottlenecks produced by safety 
regulation." The number and variety of potentially 
dangerous" products, the speed of technical development, 
the unpredictability of behaviour by product users and the 
range of their interests in protection excludes, de facto,
positive regulation_in relation to aTT potential product
hazards. On the other hand, objections to governmental 
measures do not necessarily mean that political 
responsibility for guaranteeing product safety is rejected
out of hand. Instead.__it. is asserted that this .task
should otimarilv be approached using non-interventionist 
instruments, namfj1 y "»ari<oi--nriantoH" requlatoiy
techniques which work indirectly, particularly liability 
law and "information policy measutaaj. or at least, in so 
far as such techniques seem inadequate, self-regulatory 
mechanisms - more specifically, product standardisation 
through non-governmental standardisation organisations 
are in principle preferable, since they seem able to 
exploit the professional competence of private individuals 
or undertakings and thus seem in general superior to 
"interventionist" solutions.
1. The economic analysis of product liability
The argument that safety issues should primarily be dealt 
with by "indirect" mechanisms such as product liability 
law assigns a regulatory function to that law. This 
outcome has been developed above all through economic 
analysis of liability law. According to the general 
assumptions of this approach about rational action by 
manufacturers and consumers and about the function of 
legal rules, product liability law is (econonomically) 
rationally structured if it guides individual profit- 
maximising behaviour in such a way as to produce 
societally optimal welfare, i.e. if it tends to lead to 
expenditure on accident avoidance which corresponds to the 
general conceptions of social utility held by members of 
the society. It is undisputable that this control task 
cannot simply be left to individual (contractual) 
negotiation processees. Firstly, reliance on the 
rationality of contractual mechanisms, in which safety 
requirements are "negotiated", seems unwarranted. 
Admittedly, the manufacturer may clarify his safety 
expenditure to the consumer by corresponding price 
differentiation. But the purchaser’s decision in favour 
of a more hazardous alternative ought to be considered 
"rational" only in so far as he can at all have an insight 
into the hazards of the product concerned. Secondly, 
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would have to cover all those concerned, who are 
endangered by product risks - including innocent 
bystanders. But i£ the transaction cost of individual 
agreements are prohibitively high, the law itself must 
determine the optimal welfare allocation of product 
hazards. Accordingly, it must lay down whether at all the 
manufacturer is to be held liable, whether his liability 
should depend upon his negligence or should be 
"unconditional". The term "unconditional" itself requires 
explanation which calls for a further decision about the 
regulatory functions of liability law. If all "social" 
costs arising as a consequence of the production of goods, 
are reflected in the price of goods, then "unconditional" 
liability must take the form of an "absolute" duty of 
accountability, extending equally to development risks 
which are "objectively"-.unforeseeable at the time of 
marketing the product.— . If instead, the sanctions of 
liability law are to be used to guide the behaviour of 
manufacturers without punishing their willingness to 
innovate, then liability law must be orientated towards 
the possibility of manufacturers taking action, thus 
"unconditional" liability takes the form of a defect 
liability, starting at the moment a product is marketed
and/or permitting a 'state-of-the-art1 defence. y
I refrain from a discussion of these alternatives and from/} s & i/ ( . , , r
an economic analysis of the European Product Liability 7 ^
Directive. Both issues are being extensively dealt with/ 
in the contributions of G. Biiggemeier und J. Finsinger. , /  ,
Instead, I point to some of the reasons why product 
liability law- cannot be conceived of as a substitute for a / /
positive PHMiucfc safety policy. ~~—  .
First, as J. Finsinger emphasizes, there is a wide range 
of "irreplaceable" goods, for which compensation is not 
necessarily appropriate but rather preventive action. The 
exact delineation of such areas involves value judgements 
and requires political decisions. Likewise, the exclusion 
of liability for certain risks (as provided for in the 
case of development risks by Art. 7(e) of the Product 
Liability Directive) does not automatically relieve the
21. See the exhaustive account in the LL.M-thesis of 
Reinhard Wiehe, Nachmarktkontrolle aurch
privatrechtlich-indirekte Steuerung. Eine
okonomisch orientierte Betrachtung, European 




























































































Member States and the Community from regulatory burdens. 
General encouragement of innovative efforts does not mean 
that experiments in every field of technological 
development, however risky, have to be allowed.
2. Integration policy issues
Instead of going any further into the limits of product 
liability law, I would like to emphasise one dimension of 
the Europeanization of product liability law which is 
usually neglected in the legal analysis of the 
achievements and shortcomings of the European Directive, 
namely its interrelationship with the unification of 
product standards! It is true— to say that different 
stability criteria of Member States do not constitute 
barriers to trade within the meaning of Art. 30 of the 
Treaty. The specification of product safety duties by the 
courts, however, is relevant over and above private 
liability law. The courts, in assessing the defectiveness 
of products, de facto control not only the production 
process of the individual manufactuer concerned but also 
the industry-wide standards taken by manufacturers as 
guidelines for their products. Additionally, one cannot 
rule out that national administrations adopt decisions of 
civil courts as guidelines to the level of product safety 
required by liability law for the purposes of their 
administrative practice. To be sure, such considerations 
are for the moment speculative. Nor are they meant to 
suggest that harmonization of liability is an 
indispensable condition for completing the internal market 
- a brief survey of divergencies within the product 
liability laws in the United States would alone be enough 
to discredit such a hypothesis. However, it does not seem 
too outspoken to assume that the Community, which has only 
harmonized, very imperfectly, mandatory product safety law 
and is no longer even aiming at perfect harmonization, 
will develop interests in the uniform interpretation of 
standards and liability law, and, therefore react 
sensitively to judicial criticism implicit in the results 
of European standardization. Community law even now has 
mechanisms for preventing wayward interpretation of 
directives (or disparate mechanisms to ensure uniformity 
in the interpretation of directives). Pursuant to Arts. 
169 and 170 EEC Treaty, the Commission, and any Member 
State respectively, can impugn an interpretation of the 
product safety duty which is contrary to the objectives 
of the Community under Art. 6 of the Directive before the 
ECJ; national courts may, and are required to, bring 
questions of interpretation before the ECJ, pursuant to 




























































































will only be used selectively. If interest is to be shown 
in uniform legal criteria for the level of product safety, 
then the available legal means are scarecely sufficient to 
enforce that interest.
II. Data collection
Once it has been recognized that product liability law 
and other "indirect"^Instruments of pfoduct~~bafeLy— policy - 
such as inroTfflation~ provisions cannot be Txhausnvp. the 
need~to discuss~and draft' "positive" regulatory measures 
for product safety policy becomes irrefutable. One first 
step towards a rational product— safety— pnli ry~ is The 
establishment of a data collection system providing public 
authorities with information as to the number _anc causes 
or product-related" injuries. The United States has been a 
pioneer nr~aeveTOpiTfg such a systematic survey (t^| 
National Electronic Injury Surveyance System, NEISS)Z 
and the American,experience has been put to use by both, 
European states1̂ and the Community.
The Community's activities have, however, always taken a 
course of_.extreme caution. The Council Decision of 13 
July 1981^ was restricted to carrying out a pilot 
experiment, which left it Member States to decide the 
nature of their participation, and was really taken 
seriously by only three states. The Council's subsequent 
Decision of 23 April 1986 on the "European Homg and 
Leisure Accidents Surveillance System ("EHLASS") was
22. On the development of the NEISS, see the 
documentation from the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, The National Electronic Injury 
Surveillance System: A Description of its Role in 
the US Consumer Product Safety Commission, April 
1986.
23. On the British HASS system, see the references in
Ch. Joerges/J. Falke/H.-W. Micklitz/G. Briiggemeier, 
Die Sicherheit von Konsumgiitern und die Entwicklung 
der Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden 1988, 119-120; on the 
Dutch PORS cf. J.H.A. Bruggers/W.H.J. Rogmans, 
Registratie van ongevallen in de privesfeer- een 
inventarisatie van relevante registratie
systeemen, Veiligheidsinstituut, Amsterdam 1982.
24. O.J. no. L 229, 13 August 1981, 1.




























































































termed a "demonstration project". For a period of five 
years, data are to be collected throughout the Community - 
again with the Federal Republic of Germany playing a 
special role. The project's declared aim is an assessment 
of the data "aimed at preventing accidents". Whether the 
Community will ultimately be successful in establishing a 
European information system on a durable basis and making 
use of it to further its product safety policy is at 
present hard to predict.
It is certainly extremely difficult, to resolve all the 
complex technical and organisational problems of setting 
up a Community accident information system. This is not 
sufficient, however, to explain the Council's dilatory 
attitude. The difficulties of coming to a decision at 
Community level should instead be seen more in the context 
of the tension between product safety policy and internal 
market policy. The safety policy priorities resulting 
from an assessment of accident data stored in information 
systems, and the priorities that determine a European 
harmonization policy and standardization work in the 
interests of completing the internal market, stem from 
different contexts and converge only haphazardly. The 
conditions for consensus at European level are equally 
diverse. The controversies of its significance for 
national accident information systems involve different 
"safety philosophies" and regulatory traditions, which 
undoubtedly also embrace economic interests. They also 
bring forth the relationship between state and economy in 
general, in relation to public policy. Against this, when 
it comes to harmonizing national regulations which 
obstruct internal Community trade or working out European 
standards, those directly affected always present 
themselves to state their case. They may feel danger to 
their market shares at home, or hope that easier access 
may bring them new advantages on foreign markets. Safety 
policy decisions are unavoidable even in such bargaining 
situations. Yet a safety policy consensus cannot resolve 
economically-based conflicting interests, and a compromise 
formula to reconcile such conflicts may lead to 
concessions on safety policy questions. These 
considerations are not meant summarily, but more as 
initial pointers to the complexities of the integration 
process in the area under study here: product safety 
policy can become established as a European policy area 
only if it manages to demonstrate its contribution to the 
achievement of the European market. But this is precisely 
why product safety policy gets enmeshed in dependency on 




























































































balancing of the conflict of economic interests between 
economic and governmental actors.
Ill. Pre-market control
Accident information systems are concerned only with the 
possibilities of rendering product safety policy 
"rational". The most important legal instrument to date, 
which is also supposed to make up for the regulatory 
shortcomings of liability law, is preventive product 
safety regulation. Since such regulation acts by 
definition as a barrier to trade, the achievement of a 
common European market requires the harmonization of 
pertinent regulations or at least a mutual recognition 
national provisions.
Accordingly, the Community has, since the adoption of its 
programme on overcoming technical barriers to trade of 
19692 , engaged in the harmonization of pertinent 
legislation. This programme has, however, only been 
partly successful in a number of fields. By the seventies 
it had already become obvious that the objectives of a 
common European market necessitated a new harmonization 
policy - the now famous "jiew approach to technical 
harmonization and standardization" responded to that”Treed-.-
1. National developments in product safety legislation
It is worth noting that this shift in the Community's 
integration policy has been accompanied and' furthered by 
internal developments of product safety policy both within 
and without the Community. The development of the 
American Consumer Product Safety Act 1972 provides an 
outstanding example. When this legislation was enacted, it 
was assumed that safety requirements of consumer goods 
were to be brought under control primarily through 
mandatory standards for specific products. In 1981 the 
American legislator asked the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission to rely primarily upon voluntary safety




























































































standards - not a single mandatory safety standard 
has been issued since then. This shift in regulatory 
philosophy is very much in line with the self-regulatory 
tradition dominating in Germany, in particular with the 
so-called 'reference technique' used in paragraph 3(1) of 
the law on technical appliances (Gesetz iiber technische 
Arbeitsmittel, GSG) of 1968. But the regulatory 
bottlenecks, which contributed to the emergence of self- 
regulatory schemes, can be observed even in those fields 
where public pre-market controls are firmly established 
and, in principle, regarded as indispensable. Thus, 
according to German pharmaceutical law, the licensing 
procedure belongs solely to the competence of the Federal 
Office of Health (Bundesgesundheitsamt) as the overall 
Federal authority (paragraph 77 AMG). But this agency is 
obliged to consult a licensing commission, which comprises 
representatives of the medical profession, including the 
pharmaceutical industry (paragraph 25(6) and (7) AMG); in 
fact, the ''recommendations" of these committees determine 
official action2 . Foodstuffs Law (paragraph 26 LMBG) 
refers to the guidelines of the foodstuffs register, which 
contains "substantive" criteria for the manufacturing, 
nature and other characteristics of foodstuffs; these 
criteria are worked out by a commission where once again 
government representatives sit alongside business people 
and scientific experts. These examples of corporatist 
arrangements underlying public regulation are certainly 
not a specific German invention.
It would, however, be erroneous to interpret these 
roughly described tendencies as indicating or confirming a 
general trend towards "deregulation". The emerging 
regulatory patterns are more complex. Thus, the German 
reference to standards technique starts from the 
assumption that "voluntary" standards will comply with 
the general safety duty imposed on manufacturers by the 
general clause of paragraph 3(1) GSG and uses indirect 
regulatory techniques by which such compliances are
27
27. See E. Klayman, Standard Setting under the Consumer
Product Safety Amendments of 1981 - A Shift in
Regulatory Philosophy, George Washington Law Review 
1982, 96 et seq.
28. See D. Hart/A. Hilken/H. Merkel/O. Woggan/G. 
Glaeske, Das Recht des Arneimittelmarktes in der 





























































































controlled. According to the standardization Agreement 
(Normenvertrag) between the Federal Republic and the 
German standardization Organisation (DIN) of 1975, DIN 
has promised to "take the public interest into account", 
to give "preferential treatment" to requests for standards 
coming from the Federal government, and to incorporate 
representatives of the Federal government, or of 
governmental agencies, in its standardization committees. 
In the new 1974 version of the basic standard, DIN 820, 
DIN undertook to observe procedural principles aimed at 
guaranteeing balanced involvement of "interested circles"; 
likewise in 1974, a consumer council was set up as an 
institution. Whether the norms thus produced meet the 
safety requirements of paragraph 3(1) GSG, is determined 
according to the general administrative provisions under 
the GSG, by the inclusion of standards in the annexes to 
those administrative regulations. Their inclusion is 
formally decided by the Federal Minister for Labour and 
Social Affairs, whose decisions are prepared, as regards 
substantive content, with the respective cooperation of 
the Federal Institute for Labour Protection and the DINs 
"Commission on Safety Technology". Clearer governmental 
post-sale control arises from the control power of the 
trade supervisory offices (Gewerbeaufsichtsamter), with 
jurisdiction in individual federal states (Lander) which 
in accordance with paragraphs 5-7 GSG verify observance of 
para. 3 GSG, call for submission of expert reports and may 
issue banning orders.
2. European harmonization policy
National debate and controversy concerning the advantages 
and drawbacks of national product regulation - on issues 
of "functional" delegation of lawmaking competence to 
private organisations and of indirect and/or ex post facto 
monitoring of these by government - have centered upon 
the suitability of legal regulatory strategies from a 
safety policy viewpoint. By contrast, relevant Community 
documents on Community legislative~1 n vc 1vemenF'Tn'product 
safety have primarily been concerned with the internal 
market policy implications of a given requIato~rv approach. 
The "regulatory crises" which led to the shifts in 
regulatory philosophies had its counterpart on the 
European level in "harmonization crises" which the 
Community tries to cope with by its new harmonization 
policy. It can be easily observed as the common rationale 
of the attempts of the Cassis de Dijon doctrine to replace 
positive harmonization by mutual recognition, to restrict 
new directives to the harmonization of "essential safety 




























































































majority principle by the new Article 100a(l); and at the 
attempts to strengthen the executory powers of the 
Commission.
The new harmonization policy has not totally replaced the 
"traditional" approaches. Especially in such highly 
sensitive areas as pharmaceutical law, the Community 
retains to the idea of "positive" harmonization - and 
struggles with the shortcomings of this approach. But new 
harmonization policy affects areas which were once 
undisputed candidates for "positive" harmonization, such 
as foodstuffs and it aims at_establishing a new regime in 
the area of labour protection"2 . The primary "targets" 
of the new approach are, however, technical "goods which 
lend themselves to cooperation with standardization 
organisations, and it is"in this area where the Community 
has already been quite successful. The first directive 
giving effect to the" new approach - namely the directive 
on Simple Pressure Vessels'* , and also the Toy 
Directive2* were able to draw on preliminary work already 
completed. As regards,,the proposal for a General 
Directive on Machinery i, the Commission has broken new 
ground: the range of application of this directive is 
similar to that of the German GSG, covering both work 
materials and consumer products (Art. 1).
3. Shortcomings
The starting-point of my observations was that the 
influence the Community exerts on product safety policy 
will primarily be guided by its dedication to the 
achievement of the internal market. This objective 
certainly requires the adoption of a harmonization policy 
which lifts the burden from the Community's legislative 
process. However, it remains doubtful, whether the new 
regulatory patterns the Community is trying to set~upwITl
29. Cf. the document COM (86) 87 final, 22 April 1986 
on a proposal for a council directive on the 
harmonization of member states' legal provisions on 
permitted additives in foodstuffs and the proposal 
for a framework directive on organizational 
measures connected with the workplace, OJ C 141/1, 
30 May 1988.
30. 0. J. no. L 220, 8 August 1970, 48
31. 0. J. no. L 187, 16 July 1988, 1.




























































































suffice to achieve its inl-prnal_market objectives. Three
deliberations_  seem to mitigate against such hopes: First. 
the strategy of (the nationalization) of product safety 
policy By majority decisions of the Council and by
stTenghCening the (executory) poaeits__Q_f._ the Corru-iission
ciasnes with Member “States' interests in not lettinq 
responsibility for product safety out of their hands. The"
restriction of..the " majority principle of Art. 100a by
virtue of paragraph 4 of this provision, and the outcome 
of the debate on the form of the new version of Art. 145 
EEC, are general indications of resistance to this 
strategy; whereas the failure of the Commission's original 
proposal for a directive on additives in foodstuffs points 
to very specific resistance. Secondly, the increasing 
presence of bureaucracy in "de-governmentalization" (if 
this a possible term for "Entstaatlichung"/Deregulierung) 
in product safety law through the technique of reference 
to standards suffers from an inherent legal weakness. The 
relevant directives and draft directives lay the basis 
for community-wide rights for open markets in relation to 
goods complying with European standards or recognized 
national standards. They leave untouched the right of 
Member States to verify the safety of products themselves 
on the basis of "essential safety requirements" laid down 
in Community law and to take measures against products 
that in their view do not meet these requirements. 
Difficulties arise where the Commission regards action by 
one Member State against product hazards as justified. 
Should a safety defect be attributable to shortcomings in 
standards the Commission may refuse to recognise this 
standard. However, it is at present uncertain, whether 
the Community can take any further action, e.g. ask Member 
States to ban products not complying with its 
interpretation of the Community's safety requirements. The 
Toy Directive provides that Member States should "take all 
expedient measures to withdraw such (hazardous) products 
form the market or prohibite or restrict their being 
brought to market" (Art. 7 (1)), and the draft machine 
directive has a similar provision (Art. 7 (1)). But these 
provisions can hardly be interpreted as obligations to 
introduce new possibilities of action within Member 
States, and even if they were so interpreted, would be 
much too imprecise to guarantee, even approximately, 
uniform administrative practices in safety law. Last but 
not least, it seems doubtful whether the "functional" 
delegation of legislative competence to the European 
standardization organisations will in fact overcome the 
obstacles to arriving at a European consensus. Such 
obstacles do not simply arise from the idiosyncracies of 




























































































differences in the perception of economic interests. Such 
conflicts of interest do not fade away by the delegation 
of standardization activities to private organizations.
IV. Follow-up market control
Liability law only indirectly affects product safety - and 
Fhesp effects are limited and hard to predict. Preventive 
product . safety law necessarily remains imperfect and 
provisional; imperfect since hazards can never be 
calculated exactly in advance; provisional, because" The 
riSR-benefit assessments-̂  reflected in technical" safety 
measures must remain open— 1<5 re-evaluation in changed 
circumstances or in the light of new knowledge. Still 
more so, governments must stay in a position to assert 
their responsibility for product safety if they delegate 
tasks of preventive safety regulation to non-governmental 
agencies. The device, which responds to these regulatory 
needs, is follow-up market control.
1. Functions
The regulatory functions of "follow-up market control" 
differ from one product area to another. In 
pharmaceuticals law, which in principle provides for 
preventive controls, their purpose is essentially to 
verify the justification of predictions incorporated in 
the licensing decisions, taking new knowledge into 
account. By contrast, in the law on technical work 
materials, they are rather intended to make up for the 
lacunae in protection by drawing up preventive standards, 
and where there are no standards, to lay down initial 
specifications of the general safety duty. But the 
practical conditions for effective response to hazards of 
marketed products also differ considerably. In the 
pharmaceutical sector, the number of producers is limited 
and channels of distribution easy to follow; the medical 
profession can be approached and through them also often 
those affected. In the foodstuffs sector on the other 
hand, those causing health risks are enormously harder to 
identify; distribution channels can hardly be controlled, 
and consumers involved can be reached, at most, by means 
of more or less speculative notices. The area of 
technical work materials and consumer products is 
extremely heterogeneous. Action on medical equipment, 
complicated plants, or high-value consumer goods which, as 
is the case with cars, are sold through closed
distribution systems and in any case subject to regular 




























































































for the enormous range of technical consumer products as a 
whole. Even if manufacturers can be identified, it is 
hard to trace distribution channels, and determination of 
all product users involved is inconceivable.
2. Follow-up market controls and internal market policy
However unquestionable the demands for continued adoption 
of safety standards and for the possibility of government 
response to recognised hazards may seem, follow-up market
control__remains in Europe a poor relation of product
satety~TawT But this does not mean that"a need for action"' 
has not "accrued at European level. There are two 
arguments in favour of European iniatives which take 
precedence over national developments: firstly, the
Community must be aware that it will be regarded as having 
responsibility for hazards to the extent that it is 
successful in imposing its policy on opening national 
markets; secondly, it must expect that freedom of action, 
at present open to national authorities, will lead to new 
(subsequent) market segmentation because the competent 
authorities in Member States will interpret the general 
safety clauses in the new directives differently, and 
respond with different actions.
For specific medical requirements within the meaning of 
Directives 75/319EEC and 81/851/EEC: animal diseases and
residues in foodstuffs and fresh meat within the meaning 
of Directive 64/432/EEC, for foodstuffs and - since the 
Council Decision of 2nd March 1984'i - for consumer goods
as a whole, there are Community information systems. The 
obligation on competent authorities in Member States to 
notify measures directed against "serious and immediate" 
health risks means only that information is passed on by 
the Commission, not that there will be a uniform 
Community-wide response. The need for action at European 
level seems most urgent in the area of application of the 
new approach to technical harmonization and standards. 
The safety objectives of the new directives all affect 
very broadly defined product categories, and have been 
correspondingly vague. The various "general" product 
safety duties differ in emphasis and are hardly sufficient 
for the formation of a consistent European safety 
philosophy. The new îraft directive on machinery, with 
its comprehensive scope, thus represents considerable




























































































progress. Admittedly, the wording of this draft presents 
interpretation difficulties that go beyond even those 
usual with general clauses.
Undoubtedly, the capacity of general safety clauses to 
provide orientation remains limited, however well the 
wording may have been thought out. But that makes their 
regulatory function all the more important. General 
clauses guarantee powers to act that have to compensate 
for absence of direct, detailed product regulations. 
Follow-up market control is the most obvious expression of 
this form of governmental guarantee of the safety and 
health of citizens. If the assumption that, as the new 
harmonization policy takes hold, follow-up market controls 
will acquire increasing importance, is true, then the 
Community must, by providing for anticipatory 
harmonization of law on follow-up market controls, 




























































































PART TWO: PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AFTER THE EUROPEAN
DIRECTIVE
PROJET D'APPLICATION DE LA DIRECTIVE SUR LA 
RESPONSABILITE DU FAIT DES PRODUITS EN FRANCE^
Henri Temple
A l'heure où nous écrivons ces lignes, la France n'a 
toujours pas adopté la Loi qui la mettrait en conformité 
avec la directive n° 85/374/CEE du 25 juillet 1985 
relative au rapprochement des dispositions législatives 
des Etats membres en matière de responsabilité du fait des 
produits défectueux. La France est donc, avec quelques 
autres Etats, en infraction avec les règles communautaires 
puisque elle aurait dû adopter, avant le 30 juillet 1988, 
les nouvelles dispositions législatives. A l'heure où nous 
écrivons, cependant, rien ne permet de penser que le texte 
pourrait être adopté avant la fin de l'année 1988, mais au 
contraire tout laisse craindre un nouveau report à la 
session parlementaire du printemps 1989. En effet, il 
semble que plusieurs tendances s'affrontent au sein même 
du gouvernement au sujet de la position que le Droit 
Français devrait adopter en ce qui concerne la question 
capitale des risques de développement.
De plus de nombreuses voix s'élèvent tant du côté des 
secteurs industriels que dans le monde des assurances, 
pour souligner que la France ne devrait pas être un des 
rares pays d'Europe à retenir la responsabilité du 
fabricant ou du distributeur même lorsque ce dernier 
arrive à prouver que le défaut était imprévisible en 
l'état des connaissances scientifiques qui prévalaient au 
moment de la conception et de la première 
commercialisation du produit.
34. Cette étude a été faite en fonction de l'état du 
projet de loi en Septembre 1988, à iour en Novembre 
1988.




























































































Force est de reconnaître que la proximité de l'échéance de 
1993 et de la mise en place d'un marché européen unique 
conduit les principaux opérateurs économiques à provoquer 
de véritables courses de lenteur quand il ne s'agit pas de 
courses à reculons. Chaque Etat, en effet, hésite à 
pénaliser ses secteurs de production ou de services par 
rapport à ceux des pays concurrents en leur faisant subir 
le poids plus lourd d'une réglementation plus sévère.
Tout se passe donc comme si les pouvoirs publics français 
souhaitaient connaître la législation adoptée par les 
autres membres de la C.E.E. avant de proposer le projet de 
loi à l ’Assemblée Nationale.
L'actuel projet de loi, qui emprunte une bonne partie de 
ses éléments aux travaux de la Commission dirigée par le 
Professeur Jacques GHESTIN, a subi de nombreuses 
modifications mais semble, à l'heure actuelle, à peu près 
stabilisé si l'on excepte la question des risques de 
développement. Pour décrire l'actuel projet nous 
exposerons :
I LA PHYSIONOMIE JURIDIQUE GENERALE DU PROJET.
II LE DOMAINE D'APPLICATION DU PROJET.
II LES CONDITIONS DE LA RESPONSABILITE.
IV AUTRES DISPOSITIONS DU PROJET.
I LA PHYSIONOMIE JURIDIQUE GENERALE DU PROJET.
A. Le non-cumul des nouvelles et anciennes dispositions.
Les nouvelles dispositions concernant la responsabilité du 
fait des produits défectueux prendront place dans le Code 
civil, dans des articles nouvellement créés : Articles 
1387 et suivants jusqu'à 1387-17.
Pour éviter toute confusion et tout problème de 
délimitation, le texte du projet prévoit (article 1387-17) 
que lorsqu'il y aura lieu d'appliquer le système de 
responsabilité du fait des produits aucun autre système de 
responsabilité du Code Civil ne pourra être appliqué. Il 
s'agit donc d'une sorte de non-cumul du nouveau système 
avec les systèmes antérieurs qui sont maintenus mais qui, 
désormais, seront appelés à jouer un rôle beaucoup moins 
important, du moins en ce qui concerne la responsabilité 




























































































Les nouvelles règles sont conçues comme le système de 
droit commun, les anciens systèmes ne venant compléter, en 
tant que de besoin, le nouveau système que lorsque celui- 
ci ne règle pas une question.
Il faut toutefois noter une exception au caractère 
primordial et non-cumulable des nouvelles dispositions : 
ainsi les articles 1792 et suivants du Code Civil qui 
concernent la responsabilité des constructeurs pourront 
recevoir une application conjointe à celle des nouvelles 
dispositions. En revanche, la mise en jeu d'une nouvelle 
disposition exclut formellement le recours conjugué aux 
articles 1641 et suivants qui concernent la garantie des 
vices cachés et la responsabilité pouvant résulter de ces 
mêmes vices; de même est formellement exclue la mise en 
oeuvre de la responsabilité du fait d'autrui ou de 
certains aspects de la responsabilité du fait des choses 
(article 1384 du Code Civil).
On a voulu couper court à toutes les questions d'exégèse 
et toutes les difficultés qui pourraient résulter à propos 
du choix du texte applicable.
B. La____ responsabilité____sans faute étendue aux
professionnels.
L'exposé des motifs qui accompagne le projet insiste sur 
l'idée d'instituer une responsabilité sans faute du fait 
des produits défectueux envers les victimes; bien entendu 
il s'agit de l'idée maîtresse de la directive qui est 
ainsi réaffirmée.
Une autre idée maîtresse du texte est celle qui conduit à 
faire disparaître la distinction entre responsabilité 
civile contractuelle et responsabilité civile délictuelle.
Un dernier choix fondamental a conduit les auteurs du 
projet à étendre son domaine d'application, sans 
distinguer selon que la victime est un consommateur ou un 
professionnel. Certes, le projet français s'écarte sur ce 
point de la lettre de la directive mais les auteurs du 
projet ont souhaité éviter d'instaurer des systèmes de 
responsabilité trop complexes. On a donc recherché la simplification.
Les auteurs du projet ont été amenés, dans cette ligne de 
conduite, à étendre le domaine d'intervention de la future 




























































































Code Civil concernant la garantie des vices cachés dans le 
contrat de vente.
Il LE DOMAINE D'APPLICATION DU PROJET.
Le projet français s'applique aux dommages provoqués par 
certains produits défectueux et détermine les personnes 
qui en supportent la responsabilité. On définira donc le 
dommage, le produit, le défaut et les personnes 
responsables.
A. Le dommage.
Le projet (article 1387-1) concerne les dommages qui 
résultent d'une atteinte à la personne ou qui sont causés 
à une chose autre que le produit défectueux lui même. On 
observera donc que le projet français va au delà de ce qui 
est prévu dans la directive.
D'une part, en effet, il ne se limite pas au seul dommage 
physique visé par l'article 9 de la directive. 
L'expression "atteinte à la personne" peut s'appliquer 
aussi bien au dommage moral (pretium doloris), préjudice 
esthétique ou fonctionnel subi par la victime directe, 
qu'aux dommages indirects (ou par ricochet) subis par les 
proches de la victime (conjoint, parents).
D'autre part, le projet concerne les dommages qui sont 
causés à une chose autre que le produit défectueux lui 
même. Comme dans la directive, le projet français ne 
distingue pas entre chose mobilière et chose immobilière 
mais à la différence de la directive (article 9), le 
projet ne se restreint pas aux seules choses qui sont 
normalement destinées et principalement utilisées pour la 
consommation privée de la victime. En d'autres termes, les 
biens professionnels sont compris dans le champ 
d'application du projet. Il s'agit d'une variante
importante par rapport à la directive; elle est motivée 
par un souci de simplification.
B . Le produit à l'origine du dommage.




























































































Comme la directive, le projet (article 1387-2) ne vise que 
les produits mobiliers, même incorporés dans un autre 
meuble ou un immeuble, mais, comme la directive le permet 
(article 15 a), on englobe dans le projet français les 
matières premières agricoles, les produits de la chasse et 
de la pêche.
C. Les défauts du produit.
Le produit est défectueux lorsqu'il n'offre pas la 
sécurité à la quelle on peut légitimement s'attendre 
(article 1387-3). Le projet est donc un démarquage de 
l'article 6 de la directive et, comme cette dernière, il 
estime que la défectuosité ne saurait être retenue par 
comparaison avec la mise sur le marché postérieure d'un 
produit plus sûr. Pour apprécier la défectuosité, c'est à 
dire l'absence de sécurité à laquelle on peut légitimement 
s'attendre, il doit être tenu compte de toutes les 
circonstances notamment la présentation du produit, 
l'usage que l'on peut raisonnablement en faire.
D. Les personnes responsables.
Le projet désigne principalement le producteur comme 
personne responsable des dommages causés par les produits 
défectueux. Peu importe que le producteur ait été ou non 
lié par contrat avec la victime. Le producteur est défini 
par l'article 1387-5 du projet comme celui qui fabrique le 
produit fini, ou la matière première, ou les parties 
composantes de ce produit ainsi que toute personne qui se 
présente comme un producteur en apposant son nom ou sa 
marque sur le produit. En outre, sont assimilés au 
producteur les importateurs sur le territoire de la
C.E.E.;sur ce point le projet français ajoute, par rapport 
aux dispositions de la directive, le vendeur, le loueur ou 
tout autre fournisseur aqissant a titre professionnel *Il
(article 1387-6).
Il est à noter une très légère différence dans la 
rédaction du projet français avec le texte de la 
directive. A propos des actes d'importation, le projet 
français vise "tout professionnel" qui importe alors que 
la directive mentionne "toute personne qui importe".
Enfin, reprenant le principe de l'article 5 de la 
directive, l'article 1387-7 du projet français institue 





























































































III LES CONDITIONS LEGALES DE MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA 
RESPONSABILITE.
Le projet français s'aligne ici sur la directive en ce 
qu'il donne la même définition du défaut et du dommage, et 
en ce qu'il pose l'exigence de la preuve, pour engager la 
responsabilité du producteur, du dommage, du défaut et du 
lien de causalité entre le défaut et le dommage.
Quatre points particuliers méritent d'être soulignés:
A. Concept de la mise en circulation.
En effet, la responsabilité du producteur n'est engagée 
que si le produit est mis en circulation, c'est à dire, au 
terme de l'article 1387-4 du projet, lorsque le 
professionnel s'en est "dessaisi volontairement". Comme 
dans l'article 6.2 de la directive, le projet français 
(1387-3) interdit la référence à la mise en circulation de 
nouveaux produits plus sûrs pour apprécier la défectuosité 
du produit qui est à l'origine du dommage. L'absence de 
mise en circulation sera, nous le verrons, une cause 
d'exonération de la responsabilité du professionnel.
Quant au maintien sur le marché du produit après que s'est 
révélé un défaut ou un danger, il engage pleinement la 
responsabilité du professionnel, même si l'on se trouve 
dans l'un des cas d'exonération de la responsabilité 
initiale ou hors les délais d'action. Cette disposition 
pourrait convenir aussi bien dans l'hypothèse des risques 
de développement (voir infra B) que dans l'hypothèse où un 
produit plus sûr étant mis sur le marché, le produit 
concerné apparaît dés lors comme dangereux par 
comparaison.
B. Exonération de responsabilité.
1/ Sur ce terrain, la question capitale est le sort que le 
projet français réserve aux risques de développement. Un 
débat intense semble à l'heure actuelle diviser le 
gouvernement et opposer certains ministères aux 
représentants des professionnels. Quoiqu'il en soit, dans 
l'état actuel du projet, le professionnel peut s'exonérer 
de sa responsabilité en invoquant le risque de 
développement, c'est à dire en établissant que l'état "des 
connaissances scientifiques et techniques au moment où il 
a mis le produit en circulation n'a pas permis de déceler 
l'existence du défaut". Cette disposition est très 
critiquée par les organisations de consommateurs car elle 




























































































réparation au profit des victimes; ces dernières semblent 
bien dans l'état actuel du projet ignorées....
2/ Les autres causes d'exonération de responsabilité sont 
les suivantes :
Lorsque le producteur établit que le défaut résulte 
d'une conformité du produit avec des règles impératives 
émanant des pouvoirs publics (1387-9, cf.article 7d de la 
directive). En revanche, la conformité du produit aux 
normes ou l'obtention d'une autorisation administrative 
laisse entière la responsabilité du producteur.
- Le professionnel est encore exonéré s'il prouve qu'il 
n'avait pas mis le produit en circulation ou encore que le 
défaut n'existait pas au moment où il a mis le produit en 
circulation.
3/ Sa responsabilité sera réduite ou supprimée si le 
dommage provient d'une utilisation anormale du produit tel 
que le professionnel n'était pas tenu de prévoir cette 
utilisation (article 1387-11).
En revanche, la responsabilité du professionnel n'est pas 
réduite à l'égard de la victime lorsque le dommage résulte 
pour partie de la défectuosité et pour partie du fait du 
tiers.
C. Seuil et plafond de responsabilité.
Le projet français exclut tout à la fois les seuils (dont 
on sait les divergences de traduction: la directive en 
français parlant de "franchise" et en anglais de 
"threshold" c'est à dire "seuil") et les plafonds de 
responsabilité. Le projet français ne se conforme donc pas 
à l'article 9 b de la directive C.E.E.
D. Délais.
Comme dans la directive, la responsabilité du 
professionnel est éteinte dix ans apres la mise en 
circulation du produit qui a cause le dommage. Toutefois 
s'il s'avère que le professionnel a commis une faute 
lourde ou si le demandeur a engagé une action en justice 
au cours de cette période la responsabilité n'est pas 
éteinte.
Quant à l'action en réparation, elle se prescrit par un 
délai de trois ans a compter de la decouverte du défaut et 




























































































héritiers (articles 1387-14 et 1387-15 du projet 
français).
IV AUTRES DISPOSITIONS DU PROJET.
Le projet français est un projet ambitieux qui s'efforce 
d'harmoniser l'introduction des règles provenant de la 
directive avec le corpus traditionnel du Droit Français 
(cf.I). Le projet, pour faciliter l'application du nouveau 
droit de la responsabilité, exclut les cumuls de textes; 
encore fallait-il harmoniser l'introduction des nouvelles 
dispositions avec celles qui, dans le Code Civil, 
concernent la garantie des vices cachés dans le cadre du 
contrat de vente. On sait que les articles 1641 et 
suivants du Code Civil resteront encore en application en 
ce qui concerne la réparation des dommages affectant le 
produit défectueux lui même. Mais, à l'occasion de la 
réforme, le gouvernement a estimé souhaitable de modifier 
légèrement les articles qui concernent la garantie des 
vices cachés; c'est ainsi que la future loi établit une 
présomption, au profit de l'acquéreur, de l'existence du 
défaut au moment de la vente du bien défectueux dés lors 
que le contrat de vente comporte une garantie 
conventionnelle (cf article 1641-1). La nouvelle 
disposition règle une difficulté traditionnelle de preuve 
qui pesait sur l'acquéreur, ce dernier devant, dans 
l'actuel système, établir que le vice était antérieur à la 
vente.
Une autre précision est donnée par l'article 1648 réformé 
par le projet: le "bref délai" au cours duquel l'acquéreur 
devait agir dès la découverte du défaut est fixé, 
impérativement, à un an à partir de la constatation du 
défaut. Enfin (but not least), il faut saluer l'article 
1713-1 du projet qui étend les règles de la garantie des 
vices, au delà du contrat de vente, au contrat de louage 




























































































PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATION IN GERMANY
Rolf Sack
I. Procedural state for the implementation of the EC 
Directive
The EEC Product Liability Directive, adopted in 1985, 
provides for it to be implemented into national product 
liability law by Member States, by the end of July 1988 
at the latest. This date, however, was not met by the 
German Federal Republic.
In March 1987, the Federal Ministry of Justice presented a 
draft of a new Product Liability Act, which was followed 
in February 1988 by a draft of the Federal Government.
In April 1988 the "Bundesrat" (Federal Council), which can 
be considered a second Parliament, representing the states 
(Lander) of the Federal Republic of Germany, gave its 
consent to all essential points of the draft. However, it 
criticized the inclusion of a ceiling clause, limiting the 
producer's total liability for damage resulting from death 
or personal injury to the amount of 160 million DM.
In July 1988, the Federal Government made a counter­
statement. At the beginning of November 1988, the draft 
of a Product Liability Act received its first reading in 
the German Federal Parliament, and the German Product 
Liability Act is expected to enter into force at the end of 1989.
II. The problems of implementation
The legal discussion about the implementation of the EEC 
Directive into German law, focussed on certain problems:
1. Part or full regulation of product liability law?
A major problem was that the Directive governs only the 
most central aspects of product liability law. It was 
discussed whether the new German Product Liability Act 
should be restricted exclusively to implementing the 
Directive into German law or whether the new Product 
Liability Act should comprehend the entire field of 
product liability law.
The Federal Government preferred the former of the two 
alternatives. The rules laid down in The Draft Product 




























































































Directive, with the exception of the numbering of 
sections. For those areas of product liability which fall 
outside the purview of the EEC Directive and The Draft 
Product Liability Act, traditional German product 
liability law remains applicable.
2. Options
A second problem concerning the implementation of the EEC 
Directive in German law arose in relation to the so-called 
'options', i.e. those regulations of the Directive which 
do not necessarily have to implemented into municipal law. 
The German draft does not implement any of these proposed 
options. More precisely this means:
a. The draft of the German Product Liability Act does 
not regulate liability for development risks.
b. The German draft does not apply to primary 
agricultural products and poultry.
c. In accordance with Section 16 of the Directive, the 
German draft restricts the total liability for 
damages resulting from death or personal injury to 
the limit of 160 million DM, i.e. approximately 70 
million ECU.
This limitation of liability is supposed to apply equally 
where several persons are injured. Thus, if the entire 
damage exceeds the financial ceiling, all claims will be 
subject to proportional reduction. The Federal Council did 
not consider this regulation feasible, as successive 
damages may occur over a period of several years. The 
Federal Council therefore proposed to grant compensation 
according to the chronological order in which damages are 
reported, until the financial ceiling of 160 million DM is 
reached. All further claims for compensation, exceeding 
this financial ceiling, will not be compensated under the 
new Product Liability Act.
This limitation was considered to be acceptable because 
Section 10 of the draft, restricts liability only under 
the Product Liability Act; consequently any additional 
rights, which an injured person may have according to the 
existing regulations of product liability law, will not be 
affected by the prospective legislation.
The Federal Government, however, did not approve this 




























































































provided for a financial ceiling for liability without 
fault, for instance Section 88 of the German Drugs Act.
3. Damage to property with a threshold lower than 500 ECU
A further problem concerned the implementation of Article 
9 of the Directive because of the term "Selbstbeteiligung 
von 500 ECU", "déduction du franchise de 500 ECU", which 
excludes an action in damages "with a threshold below 500 
ECU" .
The first question was: does Article 9 of the Directive 
impose a general exclusion on all claims for damages below 
the threshold of 500 ECU or do claims made in accordance 
with traditional liability remain outside the ambit of 
this article? The wording of Article 9 tends to point 
towards the first alternative; however, the purpose of the 
Directive - to improve consumer protection - results in 
the second alternative being chosen, thus allowing for the 
provision of compensation for damages below the threshold 
of 500 ECU under traditional product liability law.
The above outcome gives rise to another problem: how to
negotiate damages exceeding the sum of 500 ECU. Does 
liability under Article 9 of the Directive in such cases 
comprehend the entire damage, or is it necessary to 
distinguish between a part of the damage above 500 ECU 
governed by the EC Directive, and a part of the damage 
below 500 ECU, governed by traditional product liability 
law?
There are various reasons in favour of the first 
alternative, in particular to render the law practicable 
and to allow for the rationalization of its application by 
the courts and the insurance companies.
Nevertheless, the Federal Government favoured the second 
alternative. This means the part of the damage which is 
below 500 ECU is ruled by the traditional product 
liability law, whereas the other part of damage exceeding 
500 ECU is ruled by the harmonized product liability law. 
This alternative claims to be in accordance with the 
purpose of Article 9, which has been pursued uniformly by 
the Member States of the EC.
4. Damages to other parts of the product
A further problem presented by Article 9 of the Directive 
is that compensation should be awarded for damage to 




























































































This begs the question of compensation in the case of a 
defective component part where its defectiveness resulted 
in a damage to or the destruction of the entire product.
For example: a company bought a large production unit. A 
small safety element of this unit was defective. Since the 
safety elements did not work, the entire unit was 
destroyed.
The German Federal Court of Justice, which had to decide 
the case, argued that the defective element destroyed 
property other than the element itself. Article 9 of the 
Directive can also be interpreted to the same effect since 
Article 2 provides that for the purpose of the Directive 
"product" means all movables, even if incorporated into 
another movable or immovable.
The Federal Government was requested to provide a clear 
regulation of the liability for damages to a product 
caused by a defective component part of that particular 
product.
Ill. Questions outside the scope of the product liability 
law
1. Limits of liability in relation to death and physical 
injury
The EC Directive and the German Draft Product Liability 
Act leave a wide scope of application to traditional, non- 
harmonized product liability law.
a . The upper limit for liability
Traditional liability law will be applicable in the case 
of death or personal injury for that part of the claim 
which exceeds 160 million DM.
b. Damages for pain and suffering, and other non- 
material damages
Moreover, there is no provision in the German Draft for 
compensation for non-material damages resulting from death 
or personal injury and therefore compensation can only be 
granted under the provisions of the traditional product 
liability law.
2. Material damage
As is the case with liability for death and personal 




























































































property is also only partially regulated by the Directive 
and the German Draft Product Liability Act.
a. Article 9 of the Directive and the draft only protect 
property, of a type ordinarily intended for private 
use or consumption, and used by the injured person 
mainly for his own private use or consumption.
Damages to property used for commercial or professional 
purposes, however, remain solely regulated by the 
traditional German product liability law.
b. Damage to property below a threshold of 500 ECU
In so far as the Directive and the German draft provide 
for compensation for damages only above a threshold of 
500 ECU, below this threshold the injured person is 
protected against damages only by the traditional German 
product liability law.
c. Damage to other parts of the product
If a product is damaged or destroyed by a defective 
component part, the extent to which traditional German 
product liability law applies depends upon the scope of 
application of the harmonized product liability law. This 
has already been stated.
Alternatively, if damage to a product is not caused by a 
defective component part, but by a defective combination 
of component parts without defects, only traditional 
German product liability law can apply, for instance:
A high-speed sports car was equipped with tyres not suited 
to this type of car. When travelling at full speed an 
accident occurred due to the unsuitability of the tyres, 
destroying the car. In this case it is beyond doubt that 
the car-owner can be protected only by traditional German 
product liability law.
3. Development risks
The draft of the German Product Liability Act does not 
provide for compensation for damages caused by so-called 
development defects. It is only in the very important 
field of drug liability where strict liability is provided 
for development defects in special provisions of the 
German Drug Act.
For damages caused by development defects of products 
other than drugs the manufacturer in future can be held 
liable only under the regulations of traditional product 





























































































With regard to development defects, however, the 
difference between the strict liability and the liability 
for fault under traditional German law is not very 
important, as courts have established far-reaching duties 
of care. Thus, even subsequent to sale the manufacturer 
has a so-called "Produktbeobachtungspflicht", the duty to 
keep his products under observation; he has a duty to 
collect carefully all information about risks and defects 
of his products which, because of the state of scientific 
and technical knowledge at the time the products were put 
into circulation, were not such as to enable the existence 
of the defect to be discovered. If risks and defects are 
discovered subsequent to their manufacture, the 
manufacturer not only has to improve the design, the 
manufacturing process or the instructions for use of new 
products, but he also has to warn consumers of the unsafe 
nature of products already marketed. Under certain 
circumstances he even may be obliged to recall unsafe 
products.
4. Defects appearing subsequent to sale
Development defects, inherent in a product at the time of 
sale, must be distinguished from product defects, which 
did not exist at the time the product was put into 
circulation. Such defects are characterized by the fact 
that they are caused after the sale by a third person 
changing a product. The Honda case, decided in 1986 by the 
Federal Court of Justice, provides an excellent example of 
these kinds of defect. Subsequent to motorbikes being put 
into circulation by the manufacturer, the handlebars of 
the motorbikes were equipped with encasements by a third 
person. This alteration caused a dangerous destabilization 
of the motorbikes when travelling at high speed.
The Court held that the manufacturer - in this case Honda 
was liable for damages resulting from the alteration 
by another person
if the alteration was made in order to add necessary 
accessories or
if the manufacturer equipped his product with devices 
for future accessories or
if the manufacturer in exercising due care should 
reasonably be expected to be aware of the danger 
caused by alterations of his product.
In such cases, the liability of the manufacturer is 
disallowed by Article 7 of the Directive and by Article 1 
of the draft of the German Product Liability Act. The 




























































































product liability law under the provisions mentioned 
above.
5. Cut-off period
Traditional product liability law is also applicable 
beyond the expiry of a period of 10 years running from the 
date on which the manufacturer put into circulation the 
actual product which caused the damage, as provided in 
Article 11 of the Directive. Traditional product liability 
law provides a cut-off period of 30 years. For claims made 
subsequent to the expiry of the cut-off period, the 
European product liability law is no longer applicable, 
but the injured person has a further period of 20 years to 
bring an action for the same damage under traditional 
product liability law.
6. 'Purely economic damages'
Finally, I shall mention another problem of product 
liability, for which neither the EC Directive nor the 
German Draft Product Liability Act provides a satisfactory 
solution, as regards incurring liability for "purely 
economic damages". Such damage does not result in any 
injury to a person or any item of property whatsoever. An 
example of this is the well-known "Pr}fzeichen"-Fall, the 
"test marks" case, which was decided in 1974:
A producer of plastic water pipes labelled them with test 
marks of a testing institute, sold these pipes to a 
wholesaler, who himself sold them to an engineering 
company. This company had been commissioned to lay new 
water pipes for a water supply system. Shortly after the 
work had been done several water pipe bursts occurred. The 
underground engineering company had to lay new pipes and 
claimed damages from the producer of the pipes, because 
the pipes had not the quality which was warranted by the 
test marks. If the pipes had met the quality requirements 
for using the test marks, the water pipe bursts would not 
have happened.
The Federal Court of Justice dismissed the action, because 
the damage was a mere economic damage, not resulting from 
an injury to a person or to property.
This result of the decision was not considered 
satisfactory by most commentators in Germany.
The EC Directive and the draft of a German Product 
Liability Act do not lead to a result different from that 























































































































































































ITALIAN LEGISLATION IMPLEMENTING THE DIRECTIVE
Gustavo Ghidini
I. The EEC Directive on producer's liability was 
incorporated into Italian law, by Decree of the President 
of the Republic, 24/5/88, No. 224. The text of the 
Decree, in terms of its structure at any rate, adheres 
closely to the form of its Community counterpart, and as 
such is considered to be a faithful execution. For this 
reason, it is apposite to examine only those points in the 
Decree which derogate from the Directive, based on the 
powers given to national legislative bodies. Such powers 
were conferred essentially in relation to the following 
points:
a) The extension of the new regime to damages caused by 
unprocessed perishable agricultural goods.
b) The same extension applies to cases where the state of 
scientific and technical knowledge, at the time a product 
is marketed, does not reveal a latent defect in the 
product (ie. development risk - rischio di sviluppo).
c) It fixes a upper limit of not less than 7 million ECU 
for the producer's total liability for damages resulting 
from death or personal injury caused by the goods having 
the afore-mentioned defect.
2. With regard to the first point, the Italian legislator 
did not derogate from the terms of the Directive, which 
excludes natural agricultural produce from its ambit. The 
Legislative Committee formed by the Minister of Justice 
(on which I also had the privilege of sitting) had taken 
the view that the use of chemical products in agriculture 
could in some cases cause safety problems. It maintained, 
however, that the perishability of fresh agricultural 
goods and their mode of distribution normally make it 
impossible to identify the producer; therefore if the new 
regime were to be extended to these products, the legal 
problems could almost only be resolved in the unlikely 
event of the retailer's admission of liability. This 
could not form the basis of rational arguments on which to 
found liability. It would simultaneously bring undue and 





























































































On the other hand, the term 'processing' (trasformazione), 
was defined, was used to subject many agricultural 
products to the rigorous regime of objective liability. 
The term includes not only processes which modify the 
nature of the product, but also its packaging and any 
other industrial treatment which make it difficult for the 
consumer to make checks, or create an undertaking in 
relation to its safety.
3. As regards the so-called 'development risk', no 
derogation was made as is permitted under the Directive, 
thereby excluding liability for technical development 
risks which are unforeseeable in the light of the state of 
the scientific and technical knowledge available at the 
time of manufacture.
4. The Italian legislator rejected the idea of fixing a 
financial ceiling for the producer's total liability for 
damages resulting from identical products sharing the same 
defects.
The reason lies, therefore, in the impracticability of the 
ceiling provided by the Directive itself. In fact, 
consider the case where available funds are not sufficient 
to make a global compensation: to be able to make a 
proportional reduction in compensation due to each party, 
one would have to notify the parties and administrate the 
victims' claims proportionally. This could take the 
following forms: a brief period could be fixed, at the 
expiry of which claims for the recognition of parties' 
rights must have been presented, the claims of those who 
incur damages beyond the date would be precluded, and the 
principle laid down in the Directive by which a ten year 
limit is imposed on making a claim for compensation would 
be violated; alternatively, the attribution of damages 
could be postponed beyond the ten year deadline, leading 
to an absurd and unacceptable result. If, on the other 
hand, claims could be settled on a continual basis, this 
would imply a contradictory situation, where successive 
claimants could be awarded payments, judicial decisions 
and out of court settlements between the tortfeasor and 
third parties, with no sufficient guarantee of protection 
of the interests of other injured parties. 5
5. Article 3 of the Decree is of paramount, importance 
particularly to multinational undertakings (and in this 




























































































undertakings). This provision equates the liability of 
the producer to whoever imports, or acts as the importer 
of, a product into the Community for sale, hire, or for 
any other form of distribution whatsoever.
The introduction of importers' liability clearly has the 
aim of achieving effective parity in competition between 
internal EEC products and those emanating from non- 
Community States - in the latter case it is more difficult 
to enforce a claim for damages: this is also the case - 
but not exclusively so - in relation to possible specific 
problems of effective identification of the producer 
responsible (this is often the case with consumer goods 
imported from certain areas of South East Asia.
6. The definition of a defective product, under Article 5, 
therefore, is of particular significance for both producer 
and importer who market products, especially concerning 
the presentation, information, instruction and warning on 
the use of a product. I am convinced, that the legislator 
has recognised, that the ability to identify risks 
stemming from the use of the product, plays an important 
role not only in evaluating the possibility of the 
victim's contributory negligence, but this is more 
important in determining the degree of risk below which 
the product can be considered socially acceptable and non­
defective. Of course, this consideration has to be 
integrated with others concerning the likelihood that the 
product could fall into the hands of inexperienced 
persons, or be used in a way which needs a lesser degree 
of care by the user, the likelihood of injuring third 
parties, and so on.
7. Here I must make a little digression. Unfortunately, 
the legislator did not accept the Commission's proposal in 
relation to an extremely important direction which I hope 
other national legislators may take. The Legislative 
Commission, then, had confirmed the position taken in the 
Directive, by which a product could not be held to be 
defective merely by the fact that a superior product 
appeared on the market. In addition, it had specified 
that the same rule applied even where the new product had 
the same price as its predecessor. This is how the 
important part of the provision was framed, since in the 
case of a product costing considerably more than the 
improved product, the rule in question is obvious, and can 
apply where products appear contemporaneously on the 




























































































products conforming to all the safety requirements which 
one reasonably expect, and they cannot be considered 
defective, despite the existence of more sophisticated 
products which offer an even higher level of safety, such 
that the product lasts longer, or is serviced less often 
or performs better.
8. I now return to the original arguments. Article 6, 
para, d merits closer scrutiny in consideration of the 
reasons for excluding liability. Here, pursuant to the 
position taken in the Directive, liability may be excluded 
in cases where it is due to a product conforming to a 
compulsory legal standard, or binding stipulation. The 
basis for this exception, presumably rarely applied, is to 
be found in the principle according to which the sanction 
of compulsory behaviour is forbidden. It follows that 
liability is excluded only if the legal standard or rule 
allows the producer no choice. This exclusion does not 
even apply, however, when the producer is limited to 
imposing a minimum level of safety, or leaves his choice 
to alternative means, some of which incur the defect. It 
need hardly be stated, since it is established law (jus 
receptum) that the existence of authorisations or 
administrative controls can in no way exempt a person's 
liability.
9. Still in connection with Article 6, paragraph f 
provides that the producer or supplier of component parts 
or primary materials is not liable for defects entirely 
due to the way in which the finished product is assembled, 
or where the latter is acting in conformity with 
instructions given by the producer.
It is obvious, and therefore does not need to be explained 
in great detail, that in the case of a defective component 
part one also has to regard the finished product as 
defective, consequently liability falls to the 
manufacturer. The reverse is the case for a component 
part if it is not defective, and the defective product 
threfore does not incur the liability of the producer.
10. The moment when a defect comes to light and proof of 
defect can also present considerable difficulties. The 
Decree, which follows the Directive in this respect, has 
burdened the producer with the onus of showing that the 
defect did not exist at the moment when he put the product 




























































































existed, ab initio, is rather onerous, given that its scope of application can extend to events which can also 
be tested years later; but its rigour is attenuated by the 
rule, according to which it is stated that, to overcome 
the presumption it is not necessary to provide an
irrebuttable proof ("piena prova") that the defect came to 
light subsequently. It is sufficient to demonstrate by 
referring to the circumstances of the case, that on the 
balance of probabilities, this is most probably the case. 
This reference to probability seems to constitute a new 
development concerning the onus of proof under Italian 
law. Nevertheless, the position chosen under the
Directive, and welcomed by the legislator, seems adequate 
in substance.
11. For cases of joint liability under Article 9, the 
principle of joint liability applies (responabilit{ 
solidola), inspired by Article 2055 Civil Code. As 
regards indemnity actions against those held jointly 
liable, the question of who should compensate the damage 
is answered by the principle that the manufacturer is best 
placed to shoulder the objective liability, with express 
reference to the degree of risk attributable to each 
person. The aim of the principle attributing risk to each 
person held jointly liable was to indicate its relevance 
not only in relation to the material conditions 
determining risk, but also to the calculability of damage 
attributable to each party concerned.
12. FINAL REMARKS
I believe that the success of the law's protective aims 
can only be achieved by their existing connection with 
insurance schemes. I would like to point out that:
a) nothing has been amended or improved as far as time and 
costs of litigation are concerned;
b) the threshold of LIT 750,000 (ECU 500) below which the 
producer is not liable, will discourage a great number of 
requests for indemnification (even in cases where they are 
related to safety problems).
In this perspective, one doubts whether the law 
implementing the Directive will achieve the goal of 
increasing litigation while diminishing accidents.
This could only be achieved if national legislation 
encouraged (for example by fiscal means) compulsory 




























































































from facilitating and accelerating the award of damages 
(as is evidenced in practice) such insurance schemes could 
contribute, although indirectly, to the prevention of 
accidents. Indeed, the amount of the premium should be 
'tailored' according to the level and quality of each 
industry's safety controls, thereby encouraging the 




























































































THE CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTE 1984 AND THE EUROPEAN 
DIRECTIVE 25 JULY 1985
Ignatio Quintana Carlo
I. The Situation prior to the Directive: The Consumer
Protection Statute 19/7/84
Liability for damage caused by defective products is 
provided for by Spanish law in Chapter VIII of the 
Statute. This is undoubtedly the most unsatisfactory part 
of the Statute, since its incorporation into the body of 
existing law reveals a non-committal approach to the 
problems which the legislator intended it to resolve. 
Besides, and this is the central problem, one cannot 
determine the legislator's intentions with any degree of 
certainty. Moreover, if one makes use of interpretive 
techniques and parliamentary debates, one can still 
maintain that in the case of indemnity or compensation for 
damage or loss suffered by the consumer, the Statute 
creates a special system of liability which is 
characterised by the following elements:
1. The Statute contains a general principle in Article 25, 
by which it is stated that the consumer has the right to 
be compensated for any damage produced in the consumption 
of a good, product or service, except where such damage is 
due exclusively to the fault of the victim or the 
person(s) for whom he is answerable under civil law. It 
is a principle which, suffice to say, distorts the 
coherency of the system of liability, and which we are 
going to treat simply as a declaratory statement 
translated into legislative form. On the other hand, it 
is perfectly consistent with the consumer's fundamental 
right 'to indemnity or reparation for the damage 
incurred'. Since this right is guaranteed under Article
2, it is quite logical that Article 25, which opens 
Chapter VIII dedicated to 'guarantees and liability', 
reiterates the condition that damage or loss suffered must 
be 'proved' (a necessary prerequisite to all indemnity 
actions). Furthermore, its origin must not lie in the 
exclusive fault of the consumer or the person for whom he 
is answerable. This breaks the causal link between the 
damage claimed and the use of a product or service, in 
which case any possibility of incurring the producer's 





























































































2. In general, the legal system under which liability is 
incurred, applies without distinction as to damage 
resulting from the use of a defective product or the use 
of defective services. The Statute is distinguishable 
from other national laws governing product liability and 
the Community Directive 25/7/85, in that it only applies 
to damage caused by defective products as is indicated by 
its title.
3. The Spanish Statute also sets up a special sub-system 
in Articles 26 and 27, as opposed to the general fault- 
based system laid down in the Civil Code, providing for 
the liability of the producer of goods or services, where 
the burden of proof falls on the producer; in this case 
the producer has to show not only that he has complied 
with the relevant standards established by law, but also 
that he has shown all due care in relation to the nature 
of the product or service marketed. The producer is 
therefore subject to a system of subjective fault-based 
liability, where the burden of proof is reversed; ie. the 
user does not have to show culpable or fraudulent conduct 
of the producer or manufacturer of goods or services, 
unless the latter can show not only that he has complied 
with all the standards and requirements established by law 
(such as the presription of technical health standards), 
but also that he has taken all due care in the marketing 
of a good or service. Moreover, both criteria have been 
adopted by recent case law in relation to the 
interpretation of Article 1902 Civil Code concerning 
delictual liability.
4. Additionally, under the terms of Article 28, the 
Statute establishes what can be termed a 'special sub­
system', whose scope of application is paradoxically much 
wider and where the number of actions brought are greater 
than under the sub-system laid down in Articles 26 and 27. 
According to the terms of this special sub-system, the 
manufacturer or provider of services can be held liable 
for any damage or loss arising from the correct use or 
consumption of goods or sevices, which by their very 
nature are required to be fit for their purpose or are 
required to be so by law. This is the case when the said 
products and services must be of a pre-determined standard 
and quality as regards their level of purity, efficiency, 
and safety, or where there are technical, professional and 
qualitative controls to be met, before those products and 
services are marketed to the consumer.
Among the goods and services which come within the terms 




























































































and cleaning products, health services, gas and 
electricity, household and domestic appliances and lifts, 
transport services, motor vehicles, toys and products 
intended for the use of children. This list, which is by 
no means exhaustive, illustrates the fact that the ambit 
of this special sub-system has a much wider application in 
practice than the more general system.
To give full effect to the system of objective liability 
and allow producers to cover its economic consequences 
through the corresponding insurance contracts, the Statute 
completes the system of objective liability under Article 
28; firstly, by fixing an upper limit for damages or 
compensatio of 500 million pesetas, and secondly, by 
setting up a compulsory insurance scheme and compensation 
fund, applying to certain specific sectors, covering the 
risk of poisoning, injury or death resulting from the use 
of defective products or services. For the moment then, 
the bringing into effect of compulsory insurance and 
compensation fund rests on the favourable development of 
the law.
II. Comparison between the Spanish Law and the Directive
The current provisions of the Spanish Statute on liability 
for damages caused by defective products which differ 
significantly from the Directive are the following:
a) the Spanish Statute covers damage suffered by the final 
consumer, whereas the Directive includes every person who 
suffers injury from a defective product, independent of 
whether he is the final consumer (including bystanders), 
producer, or worker if free from fault.
b) the Statute covers not only damage caused by movables 
(including natural agricultural products, fish or poultry 
products), but also immovables and services; whereas the 
Directive covers only damage arising from defective 
products excluding perishable agricultural goods, 
immovables and services.
c) the legislation does not cover damage resulting from 
the use of primary materials in the production process.
d) according to the Spanish legislation, there is no 
exemption similar to the one laid down in Article 9 of the 




























































































e) the Statute contains no general definition of the term 
defective product, nor does it provide for all the so- 
called exemption criteria laid down in the Directive 
(amongst which is the concept of 'development risk1).
f) the time limits within which an action may be brought 
incurring the producer's liability is one or five years, 
depending on whether liability is delictual or contractual 
respectively, unless is otherwise provided by law; whereas 
the Directive establishes a single time limit of three 
years.
g) the Statute fixes an upper limit for indemnity actions 
of 500 million pesetas, whilst the Directive sets a lower 
threshold of 70 million ECUs (more than 9000 million 
pesetas), and this is only applicable in the case of 
injury to health.
As one can see, there are considerable discrepancies which 
require immediate legal reform. This will be difficult 
given that Chapter VIII of the Statute establishes a lower 
limit which exceeds the ceiling fixed for liability based 
on defective products: the Statute does not make any 
distinction between damage caused by defective products 
and defective services.
Ill. Proposed Reform
The Directive, 25th July 1985, on liability for damage 
caused by the use of defective products was due to be 
incorporated into Spanish law by 30th July 1988, in order 
to comply with the terms of Spain's Act of Accession to 
the EEC; one therefore requires an interpretative statute 
to give effect to Articles 392 and 395 of the Act 
supplementing Spain and Portugal's Treaty of Accession to 
the European Community:
"From the moment of accession, the new member States 
will be considered addressees having received 
notification of directives and decisions, such as 
defined by Article 189 EEC Treaty, all such 
directives... and decisions having been notified to 






member States will take all the necessary 
from the moment of their accession to 
the provisions of the directives and 
defined in Article 189 EEC Treaty, unless a 




























































































Annexe XXXVI or other provisions of the present Act." 
(Art. 395)
Since there is no provision in the Annexe which relates to 
the Directive, 25th July, 1985, it is obvious that Spain 
has not complied with the time limits for its 
implementation within the transitory period.
Despite the fact that three years have elapsed since the 
signing of the Act of Accession, the incorporation of the 
Directive into Spanish law is still keenly debated, and it 
therefore seems unlikely that it will take effect in the 
immediate future.
This delay can be explained, but not justified, by the 
following factors:
1. the fact that Spain did not figure as a member of the 
EEC until the 1st January, 1986, and that since that day 
it has been concerned with the urgent task of modifying a 
large body of existing law in order to harmonise it with 
the objectives of the EEC legislation.
2. the fact that, from a purely legal standpoint, Spain 
already has legislation dealing with liability for damage 
caused by defective products, mentioned earlier, which 
took effect in 1984.
There are currently two drafts, however, proposing 
different approaches to the incorporation of the 1985 
Directive into Spanish law:
a) The first draft has been advanced by Prof. Rojo 
(appointed by the Ministry of Justice) who has drawn up 
his draft on the basis that the 1985 Directive is not a 
minimalist legislative document, but rather a rigid 
document laying down the essential bases on which future 
legislation would have to be founded (for example, the 
proposed Directive on the safety of products). This 
explains why the draft departs from the Directive in so 
few instances. General Spanish law, as distinct from the 
1984 Consumer Protection Statute, is converted into a 
specialised civil jurisdiction since it abrogates the 
provisions governing liability for the use of defective 
products or services.
The rare instances of the draft's departure from the 




























































































1. the extension of the term 'agricultural good' to 
include in its ambit 'natural products such as the rearing 
or breeding of animals, fish and poultry'. (Art. 2.2)
2. the inclusion of electricity and gas within the meaning 
of 'product'. (Art. 2.3)
3. the extension of the general definition of manufacturer 
to persons who extract or harvest primary materials or 
agricultural products, respectively. (Art. 4.1. 3)
4. the creation of a system of strict liability for the 
manufacturers of pharmaceutical products (similar to the 
provisions of the German ProdHaftG). For the said 
manufacturers there is no possible exemption from 
liability for 'development risks'. (Art. 6.3)
b) The second draft is the work of Prof. R. Bercovitz. It 
remains closer to the existing legal framework in Spain, 
his view being that the Community Directive was 
minimalist in nature, and as a result it could be 
incorporated into the existing Spanish legislation, whilst 
at the same time preserving many of the norms which form 
Chapter VIII (Articles 25-28) of the Spanish Consumer 
Protection Statute, 1984.
In this draft, the principal areas of divergence from the 
Directive are the following:
1. the introduction of the legal term 'producer' in place 
of the word 'manufacturer', with the idea that this term 
is better suited to include those incurring liability (for 
both manufacturers and those who obtain or procure goods 
by any other means); and because it follows the official 
Spanish translation of Article 3 of the Directive.
2. the introduction of a new concept of 'consumer'
(distinct from the one given in Article 1.2 of the 1984 
Statute, whose scope is restricted to the 'final
consumer') excluding whoever acquires, distributes uses or 
consumes goods or services from its ambit, provided that 
they are not final consumers. This has the aim of 
integrating them into the processes of production, 
preservation, commercialisation or hire to third parties; 
ie. for both commercial and industrial producers. The new 
draft extends the notion of consumer or user to whoever 
suffers damage. (Art. 26.1 a). 3*
3. it extends the regime of liability for damages




























































































caused by the provision of defective services (Art. 25.6). 
In this respect, it claims to retain the current framework 
provided by Chapter VIII of the Statute. The author is 
aware that the draft's application of legal definitions, 
intended for defective products, to the provision of 
defective services will need to be flexible to accomodate 
the nature of the service provided on an individual basis 
and take account of the diversity of possible services. 
This adaptation would be best left open to interpretation 
through legal opinion and case-law.
On the one hand, this solution seems to run the risk of 
uncertainty concerning the regime applicable for damage 
allegedly due to the employment of defective services; 
additionally, it seems to be complicated by the fact that 
the norms set forth in the draft are going to be in 
conflict with the other already existing norms laid down 
by the Spanish Statute in relation to the provision of 
particular services (transport, insurance etc.); 
furthermore, it conflicts with the current system of 
liability for damage resulting from defective services, 
created by the Statute (see above, 1.). Moreover, this 
presents risks, since the application and concrétisation 
of the relevant legal regime for services is going to 
depend mainly on less developed case-law, legal opinion 
and legal tradition than in other European countries (and 
non-European countries) concerning the general notion of 
consumption.
4. the absence of time-limits for calculating the 
producer's liability established in Article 11 of the 
Directive. The reasons to be adduced for this are, on the 
one hand, that the time-limits are introduced by the 
Directive without any consideration of 'development risks' 
as one of the reasons for exempting the producer from 
liability, and therefore attenuating the system of strict 
liability; one the other hand, the limits could prove 
insufficient, in many cases actually creating instances of 
a genuine 'lack of protection' (as is the case with 
construction materials and products first used a long time 
after their manufacture); finally, the total computable 
damage does not always come to light immediately, and in 
many cases, it is fair to allow a period of time to elapse 
before determining which damage must be compensated. 5
5. it includes the principle of damages for pain and 
suffering (Art. 27.1 a), in accordance with the final 
paragraph of Article 9 of the Directive, which envisages 





























































































6. it adopts the upper limit of 70 million ECUs fixed in 
Article 16 of the Directive. In addition, it remains the 
case that the government may use the limit to complement 
the terms of Article 18 of the Directive.
7. it removes the lower threshold of 500 ECU set out in y 
the Directive.
8. it reinforces the position of the victim, by the 
creation of shared liability when the victim brings a 
joint action, as is currently the case in accordance with 
the general provisions of the law. (Art. 27.2).
9. it makes it easier for the victim to recover damages by 
requiring that a case be brought before a single 
jurisdiction: when one of the defendants is successfully 
brought before the civil jurisdiction, then the remaining 
defendants may be joined and be summoned before the said 
jurisdiction.
Linked to this point, and by way of conclusion, there 
remains the question concerning the current status of the 
drafts.
According to the information which I received in late 
September, 1988 from the National Consumer Institute - an 
autonomous body within the Ministry of Health and Consumer 
Affairs - attempts are being made to reach a consensus 
between this Ministry and the Ministry of Justice, in the 
hope that a unified text can be placed before the Council 
of Ministers, and thereafter before the Parliament, for 
approval.
This text will be based essentially on the draft prepared 
by Prof. Rojo and will be published in the form of a new 
statute, rather than a revision of existing law. There 
remain, however, two fundamental questions which require 
further consideration:
1. A total or partial abolition of Chapter VIII of the 
existing Statute by the proposed legislation, which is 
essentially the same - with slight changes - will mean 
that it only applies to defective services.
2. whether or not the concept of 'development risks' 
should be permissible as a defence. Here there is a 
conflict between the Ministry of Justice, which feels that 
there should be allowances for such derogation, and the 




























































































there should be no derogation, bearing in mind the level 
of protection which the consumer currently enjoys pursuant 
to the 1984 Statute.
How agreement is to be achieved on the above points is 
dependent on the propitious harmonisation of Spanish law 


























































































































































































1. Four reports in the 1970s (two United Kingdom, two 
European) recommended that producers should be 
strictly liable for personal injury or death caused 
by their defective products. The EC Directive on 
Liability for Defective Products adopted on 25 July 
1985 provides that producers shall also be liable for 
damage to property.
2. Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 implements 
the EC Directive and had to be brought into force by 
July 1988.
3. Although the Directive is intended to remove trade 
barriers between Member States and for this purpose 
to harmonise their law, it contains three options:
(a) agricultural products may be excluded; the Act 
excludes them;
(b) a 'development risks' defence may be included; 
the Act includes this defence;
(c) a ceiling of maximum liability may be included; 
the Act has no such ceiling.
B. THE PROVISIONS OF PART I
1. Strict Liability: s.2
Strict liability is imposed, so that it will no 
longer be necessary for the victim to prove 
negligence on the part of the producer who will be 
liable whether or not he knew or could have known of 
the defect. S.2 (1) states that 'where any damage is 
caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product, 
every person to whom sub-section (2) below applies 
shall be liable for the damage'.
2. Product: s.l (2)
This means any goods, including components or raw 
materials, electricity (but not game or agricultural 





























































































3. Producer: s.l (2) and 2 (2)
Generally distributors and retailers will not be 
caught by this Part of the Act, but it is important 
to note that its scope covers not only producers in 
the sense of manufacturers of end products but other 
businesses too. The following businesses are caught:
(a) producers who have manufactured, won or abstracted 
the product; or carried out an industrial process 
affecting its essential characteristics, where not 
manufactured etc.
(b) importers of products from a place outside the 
Member States of the EEC;
(c) anyone who holds himself out to be the producer by 
putting his name, trademark or other distinguishing 
mark on the product ('own label' goods);
(d) suppliers, including wholesalers and retailers, 
if: -
i) the victim requests the supplier to identify the 
producer, importer or 'own labeller'; and
ii) the request is made within a reasonable period 
after the damage occurs, and it is not reasonably 
practicable for the victim to identify the others; 
and
iii) the supplier fails to comply with the request or 
to identify his supplier within a reasonable 
period.
4. Defective: (s.3)
This means that 'the safety of the product is not 
such as persons generally are entitled to expect'. 
There are three relevant factors:
(a) the manner and purposes for its marketing; its 
get-up, instructions for use and warnings;
(b) what might reasonably be expected to be done with 
it;
(c) the time when the product was supplied. (No 
inference is to be drawn from the fact that later 
products are safe). 5
5. Damages: (s.5)
(a) Death or personal injury.
(b) Loss or damage to property (including land).
But note that this is ignored unless:
i) the property is of a description ordinarily 
intended for private use, occupation or
consumption, and was intended by the victim 
'mainly for his own private use', etc.;
ii) and the loss exceeds 275.





























































































Although Art. 4 of the Directive requires the victim 
'to prove the damage, the defect and the causal 
relationship between defect and damage', the Act does 
not mention the point as it goes without saying: 
such proof is always required.
7. Defences (s.4)
(a) The defect is attributable to 'compliance with any 
requirement' (statutory or EC).
(b) The defendant never supplied the product to 
another.
(c) Supplied not in the course of business and not with 
a view to profit.
(d) The defect did not exist when he supplied it.
(e) Development risks: 'the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge at the relevant time was not 
such that a producer of products of the same 
description as the product in question might be 
expected to have discovered the defect if it had 
existed in his products while they were under his 
control'. Art. 7(e) reads '... was not such as to 
enable the existence of the defect to be 
discovered'. The current wording was initially in 
the Bill, amended in the House of Lords to follow 
Art. 4, but amended in the House of Commons to its 




i) constituted a defect in a product ('the 
subsequent product') in which the product in 
question had been comprised; and 
ii) was wholly attributable to the design of the 
subsequent product or to compliance by the 
producer of the product in question with the 
instructions given by the producer of the 
subsequent product.
N.B. The onus of proof here is on the defendant.
8. Contributory Negligence (s.6 (4))
Although strict liability, contributory negligence 
may reduce the damages.
(Consider also 'defect' in s.3 - warnings, expected 
use.)
9. Limitation Period (Sch. 1, para. 1)





























































































10. Cut-off Period (Sch. 1)
Ten years from the time when the defendant supplied 
the product to another.
11. Maximum Liability
None (though Art. 16 gives option of capping 
liability for a product line to 70 MECO).
12. Exemption Clauses (s.7)
Not permitted.
13. In Force (s.50 (2))
1 March 1988.
14. Not Retrospective (s.50 (7))
No liability for defective products supplied before 
Act in force by its producer.
II. CONSUMER SAFETY
A. INTRODUCTION
Part II of the Act implements the general safety 
requirement proposed in the White Paper on 'The Safety of 
Goods’ published in 1984. This Part is enforced by 
criminal sanctions (of Part I which creates civil 
liability only).
Part II also consolidates and reenacts the safety 
provisions hitherto contained in the Consumer Safety Act 
1978 and the Consumer Safety (Amendment) Act 1986.
B. GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENT
1. The Offence
It will be a criminal offence to supply (or to offer 
to or expose for supply) consumer goods which do not 
comply with the general safety requirement (section 
10 (1 ) ) .
2. Consumer Goods
Goods ordinarily intended for private use or 
consumption, except 
growing crops
water, food, feeding stuff or fertiliser 
gas through pipes 




























































































drugs or licensed medicines 
tobacco.
3. The General Safety Requirement
Goods fail to comply with this if they are 'not 
reasonably safe' having regard to
(a) any published standards of safety;
(b) the existence of means to make them safer (taking 
into account cost, likelihood and extent of 
improvement).
4. Defences
(a) Non-compliance with the general safety requirement 
will not result from compliance with any statutory 
requirement or failure to do more than is required 
by the safety regulations or approved standards of 
safety.
(b) Specific defences are -
i) the goods would not to be used in the UK; or 
ii) supplied in the course of a retail business and 
the retailer had no reasonable grounds for 
believing that the goods failed to comply with 
the general safety requirement; or
























































































































































































PART THREE: PRODUCT SAFETY LAW AND THE IMPACT OF THE NEW
APPROACH TO TECHNICAL HARMONISATION AND STANDARDS
QUELLE SECURITE POUR LES CONSOMMATEURS EUROPEENS?
Régine Loosli-Surrans
Digne de grande répréhension est l'affaire qui, se 
proposant d'ôter un certain défaut, amène celui-ci par son 
effet même. (DANTE, Banquet I - III)
Il n'y a pas d'idées prématurées, il y a des moments 
opportuns qu'il faut attendre. (Jean MONNET, Mémoires 
p.502)
Alors que les autorités françaises engagent une campagne 
nationale de prévention des accidents domestiques et 
tandis que le lancement d'une telle campagne au niveau 
européen est à nouveau reporté, dans une période où 
l'Europe de 1992 est sur toutes les lèvres et où les 
cendres de Jean MONNET sont transférées au Panthéon, 
pourquoi ne pas poser, parmi d'autres, la question "quelle 
sécurité pour les consommateurs européens ?
En effet, l'Europe des grands principes de 1992 - comme 
celle des pères fondateurs de 1950 - ne peut se construire 
qu'en résolvant des problèmes concrets et en satisfaisant 
les aspirations quotidiennes de nos concitoyens nationaux 
et européens.
Au premier rang de ces problèmes, figure le nombre 
considérable des accidents domestiques: 80 000 décès par 
an selon les estimations de la CEE et du Bureau Européen 
des Associations de consommateurs (BEUC). Comment agir sur 
les comportements, mais aussi sur les produits et services 
qui sont impliqués dans ces accidents, en respectant les 
habitudes de vie des différents pays, en visant un niveau 
de protection aussi élevé que possible et en poursuivant 
la construction d'un marché unique ?
La difficulté ne saurait être contournée. Si on la veut 
durable, l'édification de l'Europe ne peut se réduire à 




























































































La définition d'une politique de la sécurité des 
comsommateurs implique:
I - UN RAPPEL HISTORIQUE SUCCINT.
II - UN CONSTAT OBJECTIF.
III - UN CHOIX D'ACTIONS PRIORITAIRES.
I. RAPPEL HISTORIQUE
Depuis dix ans, la politique de la CES en matière de 
consommation s'est traduite par une double évolution.
D'une part, la Commission de la CEE a profondément modifié 
ses techniques d'harmonisation ("nouvelle approche").
D'autre part, le premier et le second programme en faveur 
des consommateurs, eux-mêmes fondés sur l'article 2 du 
Traité de Rome, ont énoncé, parmi cinq droits
fondamentaux, celui de la protection de la santé et de 
l'intégrité physique; ils ont été confirmés sur ce point 
en 1985 ("nouvelle impulsion").
A - Le transfert des responsabilités aux juges et aux 
normalisateurs: la "nouvelle approche".
Le premier virage a été amorcé avec la communication de la 
Commission sur l'arrêt dit du "Cassis de Dijon" (1979) qui 
laissait à la théorie de l'équivalence et de la 
reconnaissance mutuelle tout ce qui relevait de la 
"qualité" au sens étroit et ne conservait, à titre 
résiduel, dans le champ des travaux d'harmonisation que ce 
qui relevait de la protection des consommateurs et du 
domaine théoriquement "réservé" aux Etats par l'article 36 
du Traité de Rome, celui de la santé et de la sécurité.
Le second virage, plus radical encore, consistait à 
transférer la responsabilité de cette harmonisation du 
Conseil des Ministres et de la Commission, institutions de 
droit public, au CEN et au CENELEC, organismes de 
normalisation de caractère privé. Ce fut la "nouvelle 
approche".
Tout se passe donc comme si l'élaboration du droit 
économique de la Communauté - hormis ce qui concerne la 
sécurité physique des consommateurs - était confiée aux 
juges tandis que les règles de sécurité seraient désormais 




























































































B - Le contre-poids: la "nouvelle impulsion" de 1985.
Plusieurs objections peuvent être opposées à cette vision 
simplificatrice et donc nécessairement réductrice.
D'une part, on pourra remarquer que la Communauté était 
"au pied du mur", les techniques d'harmonisation 
horizontale et verticale classiques demandant des délais 
incompatibles avec l'évolution rapide des technologies et 
des marchés de produits et services.
D'autre part, on soulignera avec raison que tout texte 
communautaire, fût-il une directive ou même un réglement, 
appelle une interprétation dans douze états membres et que 
le rôle renforcé des institutions judiciaires et de la 
Cour de Justice de Luxembourg n'en est que la conséquence 
logique.
Enfin, on remarquera que la part de privatisation contenue 
dans la nouvelle approche est, au moins en théorie, 
tempérée par deux contrepoids indéniables.
D'une part, c'est le Conseil des Ministres qui, sur 
proposition de la Commission et sous le contrôle du 
Parlement Européen et du Comité Economique et Social, 
définit les exigences essentielles de sécurité dont le 
respect est présumé par la conformité aux normes.
D'autre part, la Commission (DG XI) a publié quelques mois 
après sa note sur la "nouvelle approche", le 23 juillet 
1985, un document intitulé "Nouvelle Impulsion" pour la 
politique de protection des consommateurs qui faisait une 
large part à la prévention des risques de la consommation.
En effet, ce document affirmait que "les produits vendus 
dans la Communauté devraient répondre à des normes de 
santé et de sécurité acceptables" et définissait quatre 
moyens pour parvenir à cet objectif :
1/ Un programme de réglementation définissant clairement 
pour les professionnels (producteurs et fournisseurs) les 
exigences en matière de santé et de sécurité auxquelles 
doivent répondre les produits.
2/ Un programme de mesures de coopération entre les 
autorités nationales compétentes en matière de sécurité 
des consommateur es.
3/ La création de mécanismes communautaires pour la 




























































































4/ Les actions d'information et d'éducation des 
consommateurs sur les comportements permettant d'utiliser 
les produits en toute sécurité.
Plus de trois ans après l'adoption de cette "nouvelle 
impulsion" qui ressemblait à s'y méprendre à un troisième 
programme de politique à l'égard des consommateurs, quel 
constat peut-on dresser ?
IX. LE CONSTAT
L'objectivité du constat impose de reprendre 
successivement chacun des quatre points du programme 
"sécurité" de "la nouvelle impulsion".
A - La réglementation.
1/ Les directives "nouvelle approche".
Plusieurs directives définissant des règles de sécurité 
ont été élaborées ou sont en cours d'élaboration depuis 
1985. On citera parmi les réalisations la directive 
relative aux jouets et la directive relative aux appareils 
à pression. Sont en cours d'élaboration: la directive sur 
les matériaux de construction, celle sur les machines, 
celle sur les appareils à gaz et on parle d'un éventuel 
projet sur les terrains de jeux.
Ces directives et projets de directive posent plusieurs 
problèmes sérieux pour la sécurité des consommateurs.
a/ Des exigences essentielles de sécurité souvent 
insuffisantes ou inadaptées.
Des deux directives "nouvelle approche" déjà adoptées, 
celle sur les appareils à pression est sans doute la plus 
précise, mais elle laisse en dehors de son champ 
d'application les appareils les plus couramment utilisés 
par les consommateurs comme les autocuiseurs.
Quant à la directive relative aux jouets, la définition de 
son champ d'application et la formulation de ses exigences 
essentielles de sécurité sont tellement imprécises que les 
praticiens font déjà l'expérience de ses lacunes 





























































































En ce qui concerne les projets de directives, la 
méthodologie adoptée ne semble pas toujours la meilleure. 
Par exemple dans la directive sur les matériaux de 
construction, les exigences concernant l'inflammabilité 
sont énoncées en quelques lignes.
La dernière version du projet de directive "machines" 
établit une "fusion" entre les exigences essentielles de 
sécurité dont peuvent bénéficier des utilisateurs 
professionnels et celles de nature à protéger les 
consommateurs. Comme si l'utilisateur d'un appareil 
électro-ménager ou d'un petit outillage de bricolage était 
dans la même situation psychologique et matérielle (gants, 
casques, lunettes de protection....) qu'un ouvrier devant 
sa machine-outil.
Cette inadaptation des exigences essentielles à la réalité 
des produits et des comportements peut trouver, sinon des 
excuses, du moins des explications.
En effet, plutôt que de partir du concret pour définir des 
exigences types, on travaille souvent dans l'abstrait ou 
on amalgame les normes existantes.
Or, on ne devrait pas définir les exigences essentielles 
de sécurité sans une analyse préalable et précise des 
produits et des comportements. Le système de recensement 
EHLASS (voir ci-aprés) et les enquêtes nationales et 
études de comportement devraient donc utilement éclairer 
les rédacteurs des exigences essentielles sur le 
déroulement précis des scénarios à risque.
b/ Le décalage croissant dans le temps entre la directive 
et les normes correspondantes.
Le risque est également grand de voir adopter un certain 
nombre de directives "exigences essentielles" assez 
rapidement, alors que, "derrière", la normalisation ne 
suit pas.
La diversité des normes nationales peut alors se perpétuer 
avec les inconvénients qui s'ensuivent pour la sécurité 
des consommateurs et pour l'édification du marché unique 
(cf. jouets, équipements de terrains de jeux, 
autocuiseurs....).
c/ L'absence dans ces directives d'une procédure d'urgence 
harmonisée et le recul qu'elles constituent donc par 




























































































On remarque que, même dans la directive jouets (qui permet 
le retrait du marché des produits dangereux), les 
injonctions, le rappel et les communiqués de mise en garde 
du public prévus par la loi française de 1983 ne sont pas 
envisagés.
Les seules procédures prévues - et encore de manière 
diverse selon les sujets - consistent à provoquer la mise 
à jour pour le futur des normes et, éventuellement, des 
exigences essentielles de sécurité déjà définies.
En définitive/ la "nouvelle approche" semble être une 
auberge espagnole dont les seuls éléments stables sont 
définis par les deux grands choix de la DG III - Marché 
intérieur : privatisation des règles de sécurité par 
renvoi à la normalisation et libre circulation des 
produits.
2/ Les directives "ancien style" de caractère horizontal 
ou vertical.
a/ Elles continuent à être élaborées (cf.directive sur les 
risques de confusion et directive sur les préparations 
dangereuses) ou à être régulièrement amendées 
(cf.directive sur les substances dangereuses). Mais, cette 
élaboration se fait encore souvent sans lien réel avec les 
comportements des consommateurs.
C'est ainsi que, à la suite du décès d'un enfant, la 
Commission de la Sécurité des Consommateurs française a dû 
récemment demander, dans un de ses avis, que 1'étiquetage 
de certaines substances et préparations dangereuses puisse 
comporter la mention "ne pas faire vomir". Jusqu'à ce 
jour, cet étiquetage de conseil n'avait pas été proposé 
par les spécialistes qui siègent à Bruxelles....depuis 
1967.
b/ Parmi les directives déjà adoptées, trop nombreuses 
sont celles qui constituent un recul par rapport au droit 
national et ne sont pas encore correctement transcrites en 
droit national.
On pense, en particulier, à la directive horizontale sur 
la responsabilité du fait des produits pour laquelle le 
projet de loi n'a pas été adopté dans les délais car il 





























































































On pense surtout à la "saga" de la directive sur les 
substances dangereuses et de certaines directives sur les 
préparations (solvants, peintures, vernis) qui, en France, 
n'étaient transcrites que par des arrêtés de 1983 relevant 
du Code du Travail. Il a fallu attendre lus de cinq ans 
supplémentaires la sortie des textes applicables aux 
consommateurs, en vertu du Code de la Santé Publique et de 
la Loi du 21 Juillet 1983 sur la sécurité des 
consomma t eu r s.
Les utilisateurs non professionnels sont donc souvent 
moins protégés que les utilisateurs professionnels contre 
certains produits alors qu'ils en connaissent moins bien 
les dangers.
3/ Une obligation générale de sécurité
Quand bien même les directives relevant de 1'"ancienne et 
de la "nouvelle approche" seraient mieux adaptées et plus 
rapidemment appliquées en droit national, il demeurerait 
indispensable de préparer une directive générale sur la 
sécurité des produits. Pour quelles raisons ?
a/ D'une part, il est hors de question de réglementer tous 
les produits et services et un système de contrôle "a 
posteriori" s'impose particulièrement là où il n'y a pas 
de reglémentation sectorielle.
b/ D'autre part, si certains pays européens se sont dotés 
d'une loi et d'une obligation générale de sécurité à la 
charge des professionnels, le contenu et les conséquences 
de cette obligation varient sensiblement d'un état à un 
autre et beaucoup d'Etats membres sont encore dépourvus 
d'un tel texte.
Les distorsions de la concurrence et du niveau de 
protection des consommateurs qui s’ensuivent sont 
évidentes.
Après le colloque de Brême d'avril 1987, un projet assez 
proche de la loi française du 21 juillet 1983 avait été 
élaboré. Le texte a été considérablement modifié par les 
services de la Commission sur le fond et sur la forme et 
dans un sans qui n'est favorable, ni aux consommateurs ni 
à la clarté du droit.
En toute hypothèse, l'élaboration d'une telle directive ne 




























































































s'est passé pour la responsabilité du fait du produit 
elle ne provoque pas un nivellement par le bas.
B - La coopération.
1/ La coopération entre administrations nationales a été 
assurée, ën 1984, par Ta tenue d 'une conférence 
multilatérale à Montpellier suivie, en 1986 par une 
réunion qui s'est déroulée à la Haye. Ces réunions 
relatives aux techniques de contrôle concernant les 
produits ont été très fructueuses et il est regrettable 
que la conférence qui était prévue fin 1987 en Angleterre 
n'ait pu s'y tenir en raison de problèmes internes à la 
Commission de Bruxelles.
2/ Cette coopération se double de contacts bilatéraux qui, 
pour etre informels, n'en sont pas moins fructueux.
C'est ainsi que la Commission de la sécurité française 
travaille régulièrement en liaison avec ses homologues 
néerlandais, britanniques, belges, portugais, pour 
échanger des informations sur les statistiques 
d'accidents, la règlementation, la normalisation, les 
campagnes d'information, les produits nouveaux....
Cette coopération peut exister aussi au niveau de la 
méthodologie. C'est ainsi que les systèmes d'alerte 
néerlandais, anglais et français (MINITEL de la Commission 
de la sécurité) vont désormais utiliser le même index de 
classement, celui de l'OCDE.
C - La surveillance et le contrôle des risques.
1/ Les notifications en cas d'urgence.
La décision de mars 1984 a crée une procédure
d'information rapide entre Etats membres en cas de danger 
grave et immédiat. Ce mécanisme présente plusieurs
faiblesses.
D'une part, il ne couvre pas plus les produits 
alimentaires et les produits pharmaceutiques (qui font 
l'objet d'un système d'alerte distinct) que les produits 
relevant des directives sectorielles "ancienne approche" 
(ex.cosmétiques) ou des directives "nouvelle approche". En 
effet, celles-ci ne créent que des mécanismes de mise à 




























































































D'autre part, le système fonctionne de manière assez 
chaotique. Les Etats membres ont tendance à notifier les 
mesures visant des produits importés d'autres Etats 
membres ou d'Etats tiers, de préférence à des mesures 
concernant leur production nationale.
Comme aucun contrôle n'est exercé "au passage” par la 
Commission qui transmet les informations, l'exactitude et 
la précision des notifications peuvent souvent laisser à 
désirer (cf.le cas de cette caravane française déclarée 
"dangereuse" en Allemagne parce qu'elle ne comportait pas 
un étiquetage à l'emplacement prévu par la norme allemande 
pertinente...)
De plus, le système de notification ne prévoit aucune 
coordination ni, à fortiori, aucune harmonisation des 
mesures prises par les Etats membres récepteurs de 
l'information et par l'Etat émetteur.
2/ Le système EHLASS
Comme chacun sait, le réseau EHLASS (système européen de 
surveillance des accidents à la maison et dans les 
loisirs) consiste à recenser les accidents domestiques et 
de loisirs dans les salles d'urgence de 90 hôpitaux de la 
Communauté dont 11 hôpitaux français.
Dans notre pays, le système est co-géré par le Ministère 
des Affaires Sociales (Direction Générale de la Santé et 
SESI), par le Secrétariat d'Etat chargé de la 
Consommation.
La Commission de la Sécurité utilise depuis quelques mois 
le double des données nationales à l'appui de ses enquêtes 
tandis que le SESI en assure un traitement plus 
systématique.
Aussi, la France a-t-elle été très surprise d'apprendre, 
il y a peu de temps, que la Commission envisageait de 
supprimer ce recensement au bout de 2 ans alors qu'il 
était initialement prévu pour une durée de 5 ans et qu'il 
commence à peine à porter ses fruits.
Plus récemment, la Commission a, semble-t-il, décidé de 
permettre la survie du système à condition qu'il soit 
décentralisé dans le cadre de chaque Etat membre, ce qui 
aurait nécessairement pour conséquence d'en atomiser les 
résultats, avec d'inévitables divergences d'interprétation 




























































































D - Les actions d'information et d'éducation.
1/ Les actions en faveur de l'éducation préventive
Elles sont encore embryonnaires et fractionnées.
Il est symptomatique que, alors que la CEE annonce depuis 
deux ans le lancement d'une campagne européenne en faveur 
delà sécurité des enfants à la maison, cette campagne ait 
encore été reportée.
Dans ces circonstances, on espère que la campagne 
française servira de "locomotive" à d'autres initiatives 
nationales (notamment avec les supports pédagogiques 
développés avec les associations).
Ces initiatives nationales sont déjà nombreuses comme 
l'attestent les colloques "comparatifs" régulièrement 
organisés par l'association européenne pour la sécurité 
des consommateurs qu'anime Win ROGMANS. Les plus récents 
(enfants, brûlures, terrains de jeux, personnes âgées) 
ainsi que le rapport général établi pour l'OCDE sont une 
mine d'exemples et de références concrètes.
Mais l'absence de mécanismes de coordination ne favorise 
pas les économies et la suppression des doubles emplois.
2/ Essais comparatifs et certification
De plus, le rôle des essais comparatifs et de la 
certification pour intensifier l'information des 
consommateurs en matière de sécurité n'a pas été 
suffisamment étudié et renforcé.
Le colloque organisé en mai 1988 à Bruxelles sur la 
certification, à l'initiative de la DG III, s'est limité à 
une énumération des solutions possibles (certification par 
les tiers, les acheteurs, autocertificationet assurance 
qualité) avec une préférence marquée des représentants de 
l'industrie pour l'autocertification, ce qui ne va pas 
dans le sens de la transparence souhaitée par les 
associations de consommateurs.
En France, le dossier d'une marque nationale de sécurité, 
ressucité il y a un an par le ministère de l'industrie, 
semble retombé dans l'oubli.
En attendant, il ne se passe pas de semaine sans que la 
Commission française de la sécurité reçoive un appel d'une 




























































































sélectionner des produits de puériculture (lit, pousette, 
couffin, chaise haute...) en fonction de leur conformité à 
la norme, du fait de l'absence de toute certification ou 
indication émanant des vendeurs et de leurs catalogues. Un 
récent avis de la Commission française précise que sur 
quatre trotteurs testés, trois étaient non conformes....
III. LES ACTIONS PRIORITAIRES
Des priorités doivent être définies au plan communautaire 
et au plan national avec un objectif final: faire diminuer 
les accidents domestiques et, par là, leur coût humain ^et 
social (dix-sept milliards de francs par an pour les coûts 
médicaux directs en France, selon des chiffres de la 
CNAM).
A - Au plan réglementaire.
1/ La règlementation
La situation est claire: mieux vaudrait définir dans une 
directive cadre une obligation générale de sécurité avec 
les conséquences qui s'y attachent (retrait, mise en 
conformité, rappel, communiqué, ...) qu'énumérer dans 
chaque directive "nouvelle approche", quelques exigences 
essentielles floues et vite dépassées. On y gagnera en 
temps et en clarté et on pourra alors concentrer les 
efforts sur les mesures d'urgence et sur la normalisation.
2/ Les mécanismes d'urgence
Les mécanismes d'urgence doivent figurer dans la directive 
cadre afin d'être utilisés en cas de nécessité par chaque 
Etat membre. Mais il faut également que ces mesures soient 
relayées par celles des différents Etats membres.
Certains rêvent d'un règlement, ou d'une "Commission 
européenne de la sécurité" de caractère consultatif ou 
même d'une agence européenne de la sécurité dotée du 
pouvoir règlementaire.
Sans aller jusque là, trois "étapes" apparaissent d'ores 
et déjà comme concevables et indispensables:
a/ La première consisterait à créer un comité européen 
centralisant toutes les informations sur la sécurité et 




























































































gouvernementaux, mais aussi des représentants des 
consommateurs et des professionnels.
Le Comité exploiterait les résultats du système EHLASS et 
recenserait, entre autres, les informations concernant les 
dangers graves et immédiats (le système minitel établi en 
France par la Commission de la Sécurité et équivalent en 
Grande Bretagne, aux Pays-Bas).
b/ La seconde consisterait à permettre la diffusion au 
niveau communautaire de communiqués d'information du 
public (cf.les retombées de Tchernobyl, le vin autrichien 
à l'antigel et le vin italien au méthanol) même si cette 
solution semble inquiéter la Commission de la CEE qui 
craint de faire l'objet de procédures judiciaires en
réparation à la suite de ses communiqués.
c/ La troisième consisterait à pouvoir généraliser dans un 
bref délai au plan communautaire les mesures d'urgence 
déjà prises au plan national. On reprendrait alors le 
modèle de ce qui se passe déjà en France (et aussi en
Espagne et en Allemagne) entre le plan départemental et le
plan national (mesures de l'article 6 et de l'article 3 de 
la loi du 21 juillet 1983). L'Etat le plus actif pourrait 
ainsi déclencher l'action communautaire tout en gardant la 
liberté de manoeuvre que lui garantit l'article 36 du
Traité de Rome.
3/ La normalisation
Pour éviter une "privatisation" totale de la normalisation 
européenne et une mainmise d'un Etat membre sur les 
mécanismes de normalisation, les mesures suivantes 
pourraient être prises:
a/ Contrôle approfondi du Conseil des ministres sur les 
mandats donnés par la Commission au CEN-CENELEC.
b/ Quota national pour les présidences des groupes de 
normalisation (45% des présidences sont déjà détenues par 
la RFA).
c/ Renforcement de la présence des consommateurs par 
financement de leur participation.
d/ Mise en place de bases concrètes pour la normalisation 
avec exploitation systématique des résultats du programme 
EHLASS lui-même complété par des études approfondies et 




























































































4/ La coordination des méthodes de contrôle
Elle devrait 
niveaux :
être considérablement renforcée à deux
a/ Entre les administrations nationales compétentes avec 
une réunion multinationale annuelle et des liaisons 
bilatérales (cf. ce qui se passe déjà dans le domaine des 
produits alimentaires entre la France et les Pays-Bas ou 
la France et la Grande-Bretagne).
b/ Entre les laboratoires qui interprètent les normes en 
vérifiant la conformité des produits et peuvent créer 
(même involontairement), de nouvelles entraves aux 
échanges par des interprétations divergentes.
Dans ce domaine, un précédent existe er. matière de 
sécurité électrique (directive basse tension) entre 
l'ensemble des laboratoires nationaux compétents.
5/ L'information et l'éducation
a/ l'exploitation opérationnelle et complète du système 
EHLASS devrait etre confiée à un groupe d'experts 
nationaux afin de déterminer les travaux de normalisation 
indispensables, des "cibles" prioritaires et d'évaluer 
l'impact des actions de sensibilisation du public (cf. 
avis récent du CCC).
b/ Les médias supranationaux, notamment télévisuels, 
devraient être moblisés pour lancer des campagnes de 
prévention des accidents domestiques analogues à celles 
menées contre le SIDA, les accidents de la route ou le 
cancer.
c/ Une stratégie concernant la méthodologie et 
l'exploitation des essais comparatifs devrait être 
élaborée au plan communautaire avec un "pool" crée par les 
associations de consommateurs.
d/ Une politique de certification cohérente et honnête 
doublée de mesures de contrôle coordonnées (voir plus haut 
en 4) devrait être définie.
e/ Une réflexion globale sur l'intégration de la sécurité 
dans l'éducation parentale, scolaire et universitaire 
devrait être menée.
f/ Il conviendrait de mettre en place des banques de 




























































































(législation et jurisprudence) qui permettrait de détecter 
et de limiter la résurgence des entraves aux échanges 
résultant de l'interprétation divergente des textes par 
les multiples juridictions nationales.
6/ L'accès à la justice
De même que les groupes défendant les intérêts des 
consommateurs doivent pouvoir mieux agir dans les 
organismes de normalisation face à la sur-représentation 
des professionnels, ils doivent pouvoir accéder plus 
facilement au prétoire, là où s'interprète et se crée le 
droit communautaire. A cette fin, des procédures en 
représentation des intérêts individuels ("class action") 
et en défense des intérêts collectifs devraient être 
introduites dans chaque Etat membre et devant la Cour de 
Justice (où les associations ne peuvent plus se contenter 
de la procédure d'intervention).
7/ L'accès aux documents administratifs
En ce qui concerne la transparence administrative, les 
citoyens de la Communauté devraient pouvoir bénéficier à 
l'égard des institutions de la CEE des mêmes droits que 
ceux dont ils disposent, au moins en théorie, à l'égard de 
leurs institutions nationales. Un texte s'impose dans ce 
domaine. A défaut, seuls les cabinets-conseils ayant 
pignon sur rue à Bruxelles pourront se procurer les 
informations stratégiques et tactiques sur les projets de 
la Commission et du Conseil de la CEE.
B - Au plan national.
Dans chaque Etat membre, des structures permanentes 
devraient permettre de mieux connaître et influencer le 
déroulement des négociations au Conseil, à la Commission, 
au Parlement et dans les organismes de normalisation.
En France, la création récente des "GEM" (Groupes d'Etudes 
et de Mobilisation) du Ministre des Affaires Européennes 
va dans le bon sens. Mais il faudrait leur donner un 
caractère permanent et coordonner en tant que telles les 
actions relevant de la sécurité des consommateurs. Il
Il serait également judicieux d'ajouter un groupe de 
"réflexion européenne" aux quelques groupes de travail 
(jouets/puériculture, équipement/logement, produits 
d'entretien et information/éducation et données 




























































































a créé dans le cadre de sa campagne de prévention des 
accidents domestiques.
CONCLUSION.
La France prendra la présidence du Conseil des Ministres 
de la CEE en juillet 1989. Dans le domaine de la sécurité 
des consommateurs comme dans d'autres, elle devrait 
profiter de cette occasion pour orienter dans un sens 
favorable la réalisation du marché unique - à condition 
d'avoir une vision offensive et non strictement défensive, 
des intérêts positives et économiques et sociaux de la 
Communauté.
Par ailleurs, la CEE aurait tort de miser toutes ses 
chances sur le seul achèvement de ce marché unique , sans 
se soucier des aspirations culturelles et des 
préoccupations quotidiennes de l'ensemble des citoyens 
européens.
Sans une politique européenne de la sécurité, ou bien le 
marché "commun" pourra être morcelé à tout instant par de 
nouvelles formes d'entraves techniques se fondant sur 
l'article 36 du traité, ou bien des produits dangereux 
pourront être importés à tout moment en provenance d'Etats 
tiers ou d'Etats membres de la Communauté.
Sans une politique européenne de la sécurité, les citoyens 
européens n'auront pas le sentiment d'être reconnus en 
tant que tels.
On est alors tenté d'adapter aux circonstances la célèbre 
phrase que Jean MONNET a mise en exergue de ses mémoires 
et de lui faire dire:























































































































































































REACTIONS TO THE NEW APPROACH CONCERNING TECHNICAL 
HARMONIZATION AND STANDARDS IN THE PRG: THE CASE OF,
THE PROPOSED DIRECTIVE ON MACHINES
Josef Falke
Industrial associations, DIN - the German standardization 
organization-, the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
and the governmental parties have given a warm reception 
to the New Approach to technical harmonization and 
standards as laid down in the White Paper, in the 
Resolution of the EC Council from May 1985 and in several 
directives and proposed directives. In particular, they 
welcome the Commission's proposal of increasing mutual 
recognition of certificates through a policy which in 
principle favours self-certification by the manufacturer 
and disposes with compulsory independent third party 
certification. Trade unions, the Industrial Injuries 
Insurance Institutes, some testing institutes, and members 
of the opposing parties and the Federal Ministry for 
Labour and Social Affairs are rather sceptical, fearing 
that the present, relatively high level of worker and 
consumer protection in the Federal Republic could be 
watered down by implementing the New Approach.
The new harmonization policy has been interpreted by some 
interested parties as heralding a far-reaching 
deregulation strategy. Probably the most prominent 
adherent of such an interpretation in the Federal Republic 
is the Scientific Advisory Council of the German Federal 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. It argues, in principle, 
that it falls to the European consumer (not the Member 
State concerned) to decide on the standard of quality and 
safety of products. It concludes, therefore, that where 
governments cannot agree on the harmonization of product 
standards, competition between products manufactured to 
different standards is reasonable and, in the long term, 
the price-performance ratio that best meets consumer 
demand will prevail. However, this is not a valid 
interpretation of the Commission's White Paper or the 
judgement of the European Court of Justice. The statement 
quoted by the Scientific Advisory Council from the White 
Paper is based on the contestable assumption that the 
provisions governing safety in the Member States are 
generally equivalent. The demand that the Community should 
at all times enforce the principle of the free movement of 
goods and promote 'intra-Community competition between 
standards', even where harmonization of product 




























































































in 'safe countries' will be forced to accept the 
disadvantage of additional costs in the face of 
competition from firms operating in 'risk countries'. The 
disadvantaged businesses may respond to these distortions 
of competition by exerting political pressure to ease the 
burden of domestic safety regulations or relocate their 
production in 'risk countries'. Whatever happens, the 
'safe countries' would come under pressure to adopt a 
deregulation policy. Such consequences pose a threat to 
regulatory measures which are in themselves justifiable, 
yet are unacceptable because they remove the decision for 
or against safety regulations from the political decision­
making process and place it in the hands of the strategic 
calculations of individual countries or companies. Any 
lowering of product safety standards is not necessarily in 
the interests of European industry. On the contrary 
companies in Member States with high standards may even 
secure competitive advantages from a general raising of 
safety standards. Furthermore, in view of the political 
sensitivity of safety issues, the Member States cannot 
simply jeopardise their own product safety regulations in 
favour of European legislation. Nevertheless the history 
of the Single European Act and also discussion to date on 
the New Approach point in the same direction: it certainly 
was not 'risk countries' which insisted on the inclusion 
of Article 100 a (4), nor was agreement on the 
incorporation of the 'reference method' into the New 
Approach an indicator that 'safe countries' are prepared 
to accept a reduction in the level of safety provided by 
their standards.
The following remarks concentrate on the proposed 
directive on machines, until now the most important and 
far-reaching directive under the New Approach as regards 
its level of intervention into the established structure 
of worker and consumer safety regulations in several 
Member States, as well as intervention into traditional 
procedures of standardization and certification. In this 
sense each Member State tries to further certain special 
interests; France repeatedly tries to put very dangerous 
machines and prescribed homology on the market and 
evidently is successful with regard to woodworking 
machineries. The United Kingdom has laid more emphasis on 
the certification of processes of production and on 
securing quality than on the certification of certain 
products and is disappointed to find nothing in this 
respect in the proposed directive. The Federal Republic 
will hardly be successful in implementing the accident 
prevention regulations set by the Industrial Injuries 




























































































will mainly concentrate on different positions in the 
Federal Republic of Germany.
According to the New Approach, the essential safety 
requirements shall be worded with sufficient precision to 
create legally binding obligations when transposed into 
national law which can be enforced effectively. They 
should be formulated in such a way as to enable the 
certification bodies to decide on examination whether a 
product conforms to EC requirements in the absence of 
national standards. This demand would seem however to 
conflict with two main elements of the New Approach on 
technical harmonization and standards, namely, the 
limiting of legislative harmonization to the adoption of 
essential safety requirements, and the entrusting of the 
drawing up of the required technical specifications to 
organizations competent in the standardization area. The 
delegation of technical discussions to standardization 
organizations has several advantages. The most important 
are:
- Technical experts can discuss until they arrive at a 
consensus, and draw up technical specifications which 
are supported by all concerned parties provided that 
they have been given a fair chance to participate in 
the standard-setting process.
- The EFTA countries also have an opportunity to take 
part in the standard-setting process.
Essential safety requirements are formulated in a very 
abstract way. They are not formulated with the object of 
enabling the certification bodies or the manufacturers to 
certify products as conforming with the essential safety 
requirements upon examination. All Equipment Safety 
Testing Laboratories, belonging to the Commission on 
Technical Equipment, felt that they were not in a position 
to certify products as being in conformity with the 
essential safety requirements in the absence of standards. 
Why then should a manufacturer be expected to do this in a 
responsible way, particularly since he is judge to his own 
cause? The conformity declaration of the manufacturer does 
not really mean approved safety, but affirmed safety. 
Members of testing institutes and of the Industrial 
Injuries Insurance Institutes criticize that the essential 
safety requirements are neither precise nor concrete 
enough.
On the other hand, representatives of the machine 
manufacturing industry and members of standard-setting 
organizations criticize the catalogue of the essential 




























































































only basic safety aims and a framework for performance 
standards but also technical details, which strictly 
speaking belong to technical standards, and a framework 
for design standards. After an internal hearing within the 
EC Commission on the proposed adoption of a directive on 
machines at the beginning of November 1986, 
representatives of the machine manufacturing industry and 
the standardization organizations decided at the end of 
November 1986 to continue the efforts of the CEN/TC 114 
Committee to draw up general and far-reaching European 
standards on the safety of machines for private and 
professional use, building a European counterpart to the 
German general safety standard DIN 31.000/VDE 1.000. 
Clearly it was decided not to wait for the announcement of 
the proposed directive nor to allude to its presumed 
content.
At the end of 1987 proposals for 1.000 tightly drawn CEN 
and CENELEC standards were already in existence. In the 
long term the completion of the Common Market will need 
standards equal in number to those currently in operation 
in the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Strict standards exist in several Community 
states: 12.000 AFNOR standards in France, 16.000 BSI 
standards in the United Kingdom and 20.000 DIN standards 
in the Federal Republic.
In the present situation the importance of national 
standardization is declining rapidly. As a result European 
standardization is rapidly gaining importance. It should 
not be isolated from world-wide standardization. If, as a 
result of market conditions or timing of available 
standards, the choice for European standardization seems 
to be preferable in a particular technical area, Europe 
should nevertheless be willing to integrate its 
standardization into the world-wide standardization 
process. Apart from original European standardization 
work, Europe should maintain its present effort to 
implement as many world-wide technical standards as is 
possible at European level. In particular in the area of 




























































































European/international standardization is very evident.
Although it is generally recognized that a consensual 
process requires time, it has also become evident that the 
present time schedules for developing standards, which can 
last up to six years, are much too long to respond 
properly to a new demand for harmonized European 
standards.
The European obligation to exchange information about all 
new standardization projects will increasingly lead to 
plans, originally conceived at the national level, being 
discussed at the European level. Independent national 
work, therefore, will have to be confined to cases which 
bear the mark of national particularities.
Standardization work is led by two potentially 
contradictory principles: the precedence of international 
and European standards over national standards, and the 
aim to guard national standards against conflicting 
standards.
The question remains, what to do if there are not a 
sufficient number of harmonized standards. Denmark and the 
Federal Council have suggested that the directive should 
be implemented only to the extent that it can be 
harmonized with corresponding national standards. I 
suppose that this is not a realistic alternative, 
considering the massive political pressure to complete the 
Internal Market by the formal deadline of 1992.
For the present at any rate, at EEC level there are only a 
few harmonized standards in existence. The task of drawing 
up technical specifications, required for the production 
and placing of products on markets conforming to essential 
safety requirements established by the directive, cannot 
be accomplished in a sufficient volume by the time the 
directive is due to take effect. This being the case, the
37
37. The proposed directive on machines and harmonized 
standards in this field is of enormous importance 
to the machine producing industry in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The production volume amounts 
to more than 60 milliard ECUs, nearly one third of 
production is to be exported to other Member 





























































































Council Resolution on a new approach to technical 
harmonization and standards provides for certification by 
a third party. It is difficult to understand that the 
proposed directive relating to machines ignores 
certification by a third party in that case, and provides 
exclusively for certification by the producer himself. The 
Commission argued that only the producer is capable of 
estimating whether the product meets the required safety 
standards. This may be true for new and innovative 
products, but these are comparatively few in relation to 
technical appliances, commonly in use today.
The testing institutes emphasize that it is much easier to 
develop common testing criteria for the prevention of 
certain dangers, and look after their uniform application 
through cooperation between approved testing institutes, 
than to draw up corresponding standards for particular 
products. Standardized verification procedure leaves the 
producer broad freedom to determine his processes of 
construction.
The directive on machines strives to attain total
harmonization. Member States are not only obliged to 
accept all machines which fulfill essential safety 
requirements of the directive, rather they have to change 
their regulations and rules in such a way that only 
essential safety requirements of Annex I are binding for 
all machines, and that the conformity with these 
requirements will be presumed if a machine is affixed with 
the EC mark and an EC conformity declaration is presented. 
The directive does not prevent any Member State from 
maintaining or introducing more stringent protective 
measures provided that these measures should guarantee the 
safety of the workers when using the machines in question, 
and this precludes the machines being modified in a way 
not specified in the directive.
To complement the proposed d 
Article 100 (a) and seeks
of machines, there is a 
pursuant to Article 118 (a), 
machines and worker protecti 
minimum requirements, and 
any Member State from main 
stringent measures for 
conditions, provided that 
modification in the con 
directives supplement each o 
collaterally. The Accident 
by the Industrial Injuries I
irective, which is founded on 
to guarantee the free movement 
further proposed directive 
which aims at the safe use of 
on. This proposal sets forth 
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complementary measures which complete directives on worker 
protection, perhaps with more stringent measures in some 
respects.
Discussions about the extent of divergence of safety 
requirements in the particular Member States in practice, 
and whether this justifies such far-reaching incision into 
the established systems of consumer and worker safety, 
have to take into account the energy and pace with which 
the Commission works on the completion of the internal 
market up to 1993.
The draft directive on machines and the draft directive on 
the construction of personal appliances for safety at work 
are threatening the core of the Accident Prevention 
Regulations set by the Industrial Injuries Insurance 
Institutes. One should attempt to integrate the latter 
provisions with the European standardization work. DIN and 
the Industrial Injuries Insurance Institutes have to 
cooperate more closely than they did previously. One has 
to question whether the Accident Prevention Regulations 
could be preserved as an autonomous body of rules in 
respect of construction requirements for products in the 
long run. The Federal Council has claimed that Accident 
Prevention Regulations set by the Industrial Injuries 
Insurance Institutes could be regarded as standards in the 
sense of Article 5, No. 2 and 3 of the proposed directive.
According to Article 5, sections 3 and 4, national 
standards shall be given the presumption of conformity in 
the absence of harmonized standards. To this end Member 
States shall supply the Commission with the texts of their 
national standards, which they consider to be in 
accordance with one or more essential safety requirements. 
Thereafter the Commission will forward such texts to the 
other Member States, and - after consultation with the 
Standing Committee on Technical standardisation - inform 
the Member State concerned whether or not the standards in 
question shall continue to enjoy the presumption of 
conformity. Considering the wide range of application of 
the directives, one can expect Member States to present a 
wealth of national regulations and standards to the 
Commission. The Federal Ministry for Labour and Social 
Affairs has collected the principal state prescriptions 
and accident prevention regulations pertaining to certain 
kinds of machines, with a view to demonstrating the well- 
established structure and the high level of worker 
protection in the Federal Republic of Germany. This 
preliminary and partial collection is several hundred 




























































































investigate all prescriptions and standards of twelve 
Member States within the time limits set and attest their 
conformity with the essential safety requirements. The 
formal approval of national standards after a preliminary 
material examination according to Article 6 of the 
proposed directive on machines is an unrealistic
procedure.
The United Kingdom and France have tried to compare 
British and French standards for pressure vessels. Their 
efforts did not lead to success after more than half a 
year and will be shelved. Under the Low Voltage Directive, 
which has now been in force for fifteen years, no one has 
tried to transpose this instrument into practice in a 
single case, because all parties concerned are convinced 
that it is not feasible. The sole practical solution is to 
draw up harmonized European standards for all important 
parts of the directive as fast as possible.
The Federal Council and the Parliament demanded additional 
safety requirements for some especially dangerous kinds of 
machines. The revised proposal of the directive on 
machines from June 1988 prescribes a more strict
certification procedure for certain types of machines with 
a higher risk potential. Machines for the processing of 
wood and similar raw materials now come within the scope 
of the directive. They have to be submitted to a type­
testing procedure by an independent and competent testing 
institute, if their construction is not in conformity with 
the safety standards applicable.
The Law on Equipment Safety (Geratesicherheitsgesetz) does 
not determine concrete safety requirements, but defines 
only the protection aims in section 3:
"The manufacturer or importer of technical equipment 
shall put it on the market or offer it for sale only 
if, in accordance with the generally accepted rules of 
technique and the provisions on safety at work and the 
prevention of accidents, the equipment is constructed 
in such a way that users and third parties who employ 
it for the purpose for which it is designed are 
protected against all risks to life or health to the 
extent compatible with the use of the product for 
the purpose for which it is designed."
Technical standards play an enormously important role in 
the technical safety law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. This is primarily because, in all legislation on 




























































































legislation, the quality requirements governing technical 
installations and substances are defined in general terms. 
It is left to the technical standards used in the various 
fields to give substance to these requirements. Three 
Annexes of the General Administrative Regulation to the 
Law on Equipment Safety entail almost 1.700 technical 
rules and standards, whose application leads to the 
assumption that a product is in accordance with the 
generally accepted rules of the technique. If a product 
does not conform to the respective safety standard, the 
producer can attest that the same degree of safety is 
guaranteed in another way. The essential safety 
requirements of the EEC Directives correspond to the 
general safety duty clause of the Law on Equipment Safety; 
harmonized and equivalent approved national standards 
correspond to the three annexes of the General 
Administrative Regulation to the Law on Equipment Safety. 
The proposed directive does not amount to a general 
deviation clause, the observance of the essential safety 
requirements is obligatory. In the absence of harmonized 
standards and approved national standards the observance 
of these essential safety requirements is compulsory. The 
Member States are obliged to transpose the essential 
safety requirements, without any changes or additions, 
into binding national law. As regards the range of 
application of the proposed directive on machines the 
Federal Republic of Germany has to annul the general 
safety duty under section 3 of the Law on Equipment Safety 
in favour of the essential safety requirements of the 
annex and the divergent protection aims in Article 2 (1) 
of the directive.
Member States retain the responsibility, on their own 
territory, of ensuring safety for persons, domestic 
animals and goods with a general public interest such as 
health, and consumer, worker or environmental protection. 
To this end they are not allowed to introduce systematic 
pre-market controls, being restricted to making spot- 
checks only. Article 7 provides: "Where a Member State 
ascertains that machines bearing the EC mark accompanied 
by the EC declaration of conformity, and used in 
accordance with their intended purpose, are likely to 
compromise the safety of persons, domestic animals or 
property, it shall take all appropriate measures to 
withdraw those machines from the market, their putting 
into service, their use or to restrict their free 
movement". The existing competences of the labour 
inspectorates of the Lander have to be extended so that 
they can use this safeguard clause in an effective and 




























































































Equipment Safety, the labour inspectorates have the power 
to prevent the manufacturer or importer from placing on 
the market or offering for sale any technical equipment 
which constitutes a threat to life or health. This measure 
is solely preventive and can only be applied - in a very 
limited way - to equipment already on the market. 
Equipment already in the hands of consumers is not covered 
by the provisions of section 5; the public authorities 
have no power to recall products.
The General Administrative Regulation on the Law on 
Equipment Safety obliges the competent authorities to take 
preventive action,
- if they hear from the user or from public authorities 
occupied with accident prevention tasks that a defect 
in the constitution of a product poses a risk to life 
or health of persons, or
- if there is good reason to assume that an accident is 
caused by a defect in the constitution of a product.
This prescription has not to be changed. Controls of 
factories by the labour inspectorates and by the 
Industrial Injuries Insurance Institutes are likewise 
admissible.
The safeguard clause of Article 7 can be best applied in 
particular suspicious cases, but not for routine and 
laborious detailed work on safety matters. The procedure 
is very expensive and can only be used if an immediate and 
certain danger threatens the safety of persons.
The proposed directive leaves a broad discretion to the 
manufacturer to assess whether he engages a third, 
independent and competent testing institution to prove and 
certify the safety of a product. In the Federal Republic 
of Germany a well-known special seal of approved safety 
exists, which can be awarded to a product only if an 
independent testing authority has confirmed that it 
complies with safety regulations. By means of the GS seal 
the consumer can discern what is a safe product without 
being a technical expert. At present there are 82 testing 
laboratories for special kinds of products, five thereof 
being French testing laboratories in virtue of a bilateral 
agreement between France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Each year they grant permission to use the 
approval mark in more than 20.000 cases. Only a quarter of 
products satisfy the applicable safety requirements at the 
first testing station; on average the testing laboratories 
find 11 deficiencies in safety matters in each object 
tested. This shows how important it is for products to be 
tested by third independent testing laboratories. The mark 




























































































independent party should be distinguished very clearly 
from the EC mark and the declaration of conformity, which 
show the producer's announcement of the conformity of his 
products - without independent testing - with the 
essential safety requirements. Certification by third 
parties should be introduced into the proposed directive 
as a voluntary possibility; the implicit statement to this 
effect in the introduction to the directive does not 
suffice.
The EC mark of conformity shall be only a mark for 
administrative purposes to ensure the free movement of 
goods. As a consequence of related essential safety 
requirements, however, it is seen as a safety mark. 
Mertens criticizes the self-certification emphatically: 
"Self-certification by the manufacturer and the EC mark 
have no bearing on safety. They are a mere formality, 
which leads to considerable, but useless bureaucratic 
expenditure, but certainly not a contribution to accident 
prevention.
With regard to the vagueness of essential safety 
requirements in the annex of the proposed directive, and 
lack of reference to the retaining levels of safety, 
whether assured by producer self-certification or 
information issued collaterally with the EC mark, Mertens 
makes the following remarks. "At best they are a 
subterfuge, where one is supposed to believe that safety 
aspects have been considered in an appropriate measure 
when constructing the Common Market."
The Federal Association of German Industry and the 
Association of Machine Producing Industry support the 
principle of producer self-certification, arguing that the 
producer is liable for damages resulting from the 
defective nature of his products. The producer should take 
all necessary precautions to guarantee the safety of his 
products. Beyond that, he is free to engage a third 
independent testing institute in consideration of 
marketing requirements.
An analysis of the current testing and monitoring 
situation shows that the differentiated system of the 
Federal Republic of Germany has proved itself to be quite 
valuable, on the whole. It is based on a combined system 
of private and state testing bodies, and a set of sector 
and product systems and certainly does not operate less 
efficiently than the centralized systems of other European 
countries. It is of great value to consider the nascent 
efforts of Member States to exchange practical experiences 




























































































authorized testing institutes, and to develop common 
testing principles in the absence of standards or if 
standards are too vague in some respects. There should be 
stronger efforts deriving from the Ministry for Labour and 
Social Affairs to control the testing activities. The 
"Warentest" foundation, whose primary role is to conduct 
comparative tests, can exert certain indirect control on a 
small, but important sector of the activities of the 
testing institutes. Both the Federal Association of German 
Industry and the Industrial Injuries Insurance Institutes 
reject any policy aiming to move away from detailed and 
specific product certification towards a modern product 
monitoring system. They do not see production monitoring 
as an alternative or superior solution to product testing.
There is a large consensus of opinion believing that 
mutual recognition of testing laboratories and 
certifications is not a substitute for harmonized European 
standards. Quite the contrary, the mutual recognition of 
testing laboratories and certifications is a prerequisite 
for fast and far-reaching progress in the development of 
harmonized European standards. It will be difficult to 
make outsiders aware of the differentiated and essentially 
proven system of testing and monitoring bodies in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. It would be helpful to 
standardize the different testing rules in some way, to 
put together administratively different testing institutes 
which belong to a greater organization, and to adopt the 
control activities of the Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs.
Conformity declarations in the form of declarations by the 
producer or a third independent testing body must be based 
on acknowledged testing principles, usually in the form of 
standards. Tests according to general principles without 
safeguarding the capacity to reproduce the test results 




























































































PATTERNS OF DUTCH PRODUCT SAFETY LEGISLATION: THE
COMMODITY ACT 1988 AND ITS RELATION TO THE NEW 
APPROACH
Gerard M.F. Snijders
In September 1988 the Dutch Consumer Safety Institute 
published a report about consumer accidents in the 
Netherlands. The report concludes that every year one in 
ten persons in the Netherlands has to visit a doctor 
because of accidents in or around the home. This number 
does not include sport injuries, nor traffic accidents. 
Neither does the report specify how many of these 
accidents are caused by defective products. One can 
understand that it is very difficult to attempt to give 
such an estimation. However, the results mentioned in the 
report are reason enough to discuss the product safety 
policy of the European Community and the Member States 
during this workshop.
In the Netherlands, product safety is regulated in several 
acts and regulations. Accordingly there is a specific act 
to deal with the safety of cars, and others to deal with 
the safety of medicines, medical devices, pesticides and 
electrotechnical products.
The most interesting act for the participants in this 
workshop is without any doubt the new Commodity Act (or in 
Dutch the new Warenwet). This Act took effect from August 
1988.
The old Commodity Act had been in force since 1935. As was 
the case with most other acts concerning product safety, 
the Commodity Act itself does not contain detailed safety 
requirements. It has to be seen as providing a framework 
for such requirements. These requirements can be laid down 
in regulations formulated by the cabinet and monarch. At 
the moment, about seventy such regulations are in force. 
They are usually divided into vertical regulations, which 
deal with the safety of a specific product or group of 
products, and horizontal regulations which relate to a 
particular aspect of products in general. In such 
horizontal regulations one can find for example 
requirements concerning the labelling of food and the 
addition of so-called 'additives'.
All regulations originally based on the preceding 




























































































new Act, last August, simply gave them a new basis. 
Nothing has changed in the product safety requirements 
themselves; what changed however is the framework within 
which these requirements exist. This framework in itself 
merits discussion, because it lays down the basis for the 
delegation of powers and competences whereby new 
regulations are enacted.
The old Commodity Act was initially intended to provide a 
basis for requirements concerning the safety of food. This 
is clearly evident from the titles of the seventy 
regulations, mentioned above. One finds regulations 
dealing with bread, cheese, beverages, etc. Over the years 
it became clear that it was necessary to formulate 
requirements concerning non-food articles. If, at any 
time, there was no other act that could be used as the 
basis for such regulations, the government decided to 
derive its authority from the Commodity Act. The result is 
that among the Commodity Act regulations one also finds 
examples of requirements concerning cosmetics, crash 
helmets and toys. One of the important differences between 
the old Commodity Act and the new one is departure from 
emphasis on food regulation in the New Act. In other 
words, the new Commodity Act deals explicitly with the 
safety of movables more generally.
Discussion about the content of the new Commodity Act was 
advanced over many years. One of its particularly 
controversial aspects centred on whether the Act should 
contain a clause about product withdrawal and product 
recall. Some parties in parliament pressured its 
incorporation; the minister responsible (the Minister of 
Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs) did not agree with 
them; the result is therefore a compromise, laid down in 
paragraph 21. This paragraph gives the Minister the 
competence to require the distributor of a dangerous 
consumer product to notify his purchasers of its dangerous 
quality. If the distributor refuses to, or does not do so 
in the way specified, then the Minister can decide to 
publish a warning himself. In comparison to the text of 
the old Act, the inclusion of this paragraph in the new 
Commodity Act can be seen as a significant development. In 
practice the distinction will be less important. In the 
course of recent years, the Minister has already published 
press reports to warn consumers about the risks of 
specific 'unsafe' products. The new Commodity Act merely 
formalizes existing practice, by explicitly giving the 




























































































During pre-legislative discussion two other questions had 
to be answered. The first question was whether the 
Commodity Act should be divided into two new acts, one 
concerning food regulation (like the old Commodity Act) 
and a second concerning the safety of non-food articles. 
As has already been observed, this was answered in the 
negative.
The second question asked whether the new Act should also 
provide a framework of requirements for products, the 
nature of use of which could risk having damaging effects 
on the environment. Similarly, the response to this 
question was also negative. It was concluded that existing 
environmental legislation provided a sufficient basis for 
such requirements, and therefore there was no reason to 
extend the scope of the new Commodity Act in this respect.
A new addition to the Commodity Act is paragraph 18, which 
prohibits the sale of unsafe products. This paragraph 
makes a distinction between food and other consumer 
products. Food has to be safe without exception, whereas 
non-food consumer articles may be distributed unless the 
distributor knows (or ought reasonably to know) that use 
of the product in the manner specified for its intended 
purpose(s) can be dangerous.
In the period from 1935 to August 1988, the sale of unsafe 
'commodities' was prohibited in the Netherlands. A 
parallel prohibition was not to be found in the old 
Commodity Act itself, but in secondary legislation 
(municipal regulation). The word 'commodity' included food 
and drinks. It also included some non-food articles, 
indicated in Commodity Act regulations. Non-food articles 
for which requirements in such regulations did not exist 
were not regarded as 'commodities'. So the scope of the 
prohibition under the old act was limited.
The ambit of the previous Act was restricted to the safety 
of goods that were already in circulation, or at any rate, 
to those intended for circulation. This restriction no 
longer exists. So it now is possible to bring an action 
against the possessor of dangerous materials, without 
regard to his possible intentions.
The last difference I want to mention is that, whereas 
under the former Act it was possible to formulate 
regulations concerning the labelling of products, under 
the new Act the scope of the relevant paragraphs is 




























































































the newadvertising in defiance of a regulation based on 
legislation has become a criminal act.
Neither the Commodity Act, nor any other act or 
independent regulation, contains a clause about the 
possibility of referring to standards. Nevertheless in 
many of the regulations based on the Commodity Act, and in 
further regulations based on other acts, the legislator 
made use of this technique. Eight years ago the 
Interdepartmental Commission for Normalization ICN {a 
commission that coordinates the policy of the different 
ministers in this field) published a survey of the 
practice of reference to standards in Dutch legislation. 
In regulations based on the old Commodity Act, the 
commission found about fifty referred standards, most of 
which deal with testing methods. In other regulations the 
commission counted about five hundred referred standards.
One can therefore conclude that reference to standards is 
an important technique employed in Dutch legislation. In 
spite of this however, one has to conclude at the same 
time that a clear reference policy does not exist. In 
Dutch legislation all different types of references are 
used. Thus one can find examples of exact identification, 
undated identification and sometimes of general reference.
In a report published in 1984, the Interdepartmental 
Commission concluded that reference to standards in 
legislation had to be stimulated. The report states that 
it is preferable to refer to world-wide or European 
standards. The Commission did not say anything about the 
question of what method of reference should be preferred.
Later, in 1985, the New Approach to technical 
harmonization and standards came. The Dutch Minister of 
Economic Affairs asked the Social-Economic Council (the 
Sociaal-Economische Raad) to advise him on the question of 
the desirability of this approach. The advice published in 
April 1985 was very positive. However, the Council made 
one important reservation, which states that the influence 
of both employees and consumers on the activities of the 
European standardization institutes (CEN and CENELEC) has 
to be guaranteed. I am afraid that in this area still a 
lot of work has to be done.
What will be the impact of the New Approach cn product 
safety and product safety legislation in the Netherlands? 





























































































In the New Approach I personally see some sort of a 
contradiction. The very contradiction lies in the 
technique of reference to standards in itself, especially 
where the legislator makes use of other methods than exact 
identification. On the one hand, the government considers 
the regulation of product safety as its own task and 
responsibility. The existence of the old Commodity Act, 
for example, demonstrates that some fifty years ago the 
Dutch legislator found it necessary to formulate mandatory 
safety requirements. The new Act shows that this idea has 
not changed. On the other hand, the New Approach forces 
that same legislator to restrict himself to laying down 
general rules (one can define them as fundamental rules), 
with the result that the standardization institutes have a 
very wide discretion to formulate technical detail. In 
fact, to some extent producers formulate the mandatory 
requirements themselves.
Now one might conclude that references in 'New Approach 
directives' are only meant as presumptions of standards, 
nothing more than presumptions. There will always be a 
possibility to prove the contrary. Of course, this is true 
in theory. But will it happen very often in practice? Will 
there be somebody willing to run the risk of burning his 
fingers, by stating that a certain product is manufactured 
in conformity with a referred standard, but is unsafe 
nevertheless? How much damage must be caused, before 
somebody has the courage to start the procedure?
Of course the reference to standards— and with this 
technique, the New Approach— has advantages. It has become 
possible to agree upon new product safety legislation 
relatively quickly. If one refers to European standards, 
one also contributes to the removal of technical barriers 
to trade within the European Community. However, this begs 
the question whether such safety requirements, especially 
when one considers the lack of representation of 
consumers, can be seen as requirements that are safe 
enough. Before the New Approach can be qualified as a 
reliable procedure to formulate safety requirements, the 
quality of the technical standards referred to has to be 
guaranteed.
The New Approach also has positive aspects for Dutch 
product safety legislation. Firstly, this policy may lead 
to more unity in the methods used in applying the 
technique of reference to standards. More importantly 
however, the Dutch legislator will be forced to implement 





























































































To illustrate the problem, I will describe in outline the 
Dutch Medical Device Act. This Act is a very modern 
example of legislation which creates a framework on the 
basis of which rules may be implemented. Within the 
framework, it is possible to stipulate requirements 
concerning the manufacturing and distribution of medical 
devices in a broad sense of the word. In recent years, the 
use of some medical devices has led to serious accidents 
in the Netherlands. Particular examples of this are the 
Daikon shield and the breaking of BjIrk-Shiley heart 
valves. How could these accidents happen in a country with 
such modern legislation? Whilst legislation, which 
provides a framework for more detailed legislation, opens 
the way to employing a strict regulatory mechanism, this 
will not prevent the importing of defective products into 
the medical practice where no use is made of regulatory 
mechanisms provided. Since 1974, the year in which the 
Medical Device Act became operative, it has almost 
remained a dead letter.
The main reason for this is that the Dutch parliament is 
not really interested in the safety of medical devices at 
all. A second reason is the Dutch policy of deregulation. 
For several years now, the government has tried to make 
legislation less complicated and thus decrease the number 
of regulations. One can understand that this is not 
conducive to the promotion of safety requirements for 
medical devices or for that matter any other products.
For the Dutch consumer it was very important that the 
European Community adopted a directive dealing with the 
safety of electromedical equipment, and that it is 
currently working on a draft directive concerning the 
safety of implants such as heart valves, pacemakers and 
insulin pumps.
Unfortunately I am not too optimistic; firstly, the afore­
mentioned directive concerning electromedical equipment 
was published in September 1984. According to its 
provisions it ought to have been implemented two years 
later, in September 1986. Not until April 22nd, 1988, did 
the Dutch government publish a draft for a corresponding 
regulation. As yet, September 1988, the directive has 
still not been implemented in the Netherlands.
Secondly, the New Approach directives may also become dead 
letters. Such directives will refer to standards, which in 
itself is no problem at all, within the context of Dutch 
legislation. But, of course, there must already be 




























































































long as these standards do not exist, the promulgation of 
the directives is superfluous. This tends to suggest a 
level of product safety within the European Community 
which, in reality, does not exist.
I should like to conclude with a final remark. Discussion 
about the New Approach tends to focus on product safety 
legislation. One has to remember that product safety is 
not only a question of legislation, but also one of 
certification.
In the Netherlands (as is perhaps the case in other 
European countries) the safety of certain products is not 
controlled by legislation, but guaranteed by private 
certification institutes. The best example of this is the 
safety of gas apparatus. Dutch consumers are only allowed 
to use gas installations certified by the VEG-Gasinstituut 
in Apeldoorn. This duty is not formulated in legislation, 
but in the individual contracts between consumers and gas 
distributors. Legislation in the field of the safety of 
consumer gas apparatus does not (yet) exist in the 
Netherlands.
This means that, when talking about the impact of the New 
Approach, one also has to pay attention to the position of 
private certification bodies (and their private 
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PRODUCT SAFETY LAW AND THE IMPACT OF THE NEW APPROACH 
TO TECHNICAL HARMONISATION AND STANDARDS
Nuala O'Flynn
1. The removal of technical barriers to trade caused by
different and sometimes conflicting national standards is 
an essential condition for the operation of a genuine 
Single Market. If manufacturers need to adapt their
products several times in order to be able to sell in
different Member States, this clearly increases costs and 
reduces efficiency and can deter manufacturers from 
seeking to sell outside their own Member State, or at 
least outside those which have the same standards. The New 
Approach (with its emphasis on compliance with agreed
standards) should go a considerable way towards remedying 
this situation and facilitating the free movement of
products throughout the Community.
2. At the same time we think it important that, in the 
adoption of standards, the objective should be to adopt 
those which reflect appropriate standards, rather than 
compromising between the highest and the lowest and 
adopting something in between. In this way we consider 
that the interests of consumers will be protected and 
those of industry will also be advanced.
3. This essential element in the New Approach is rightly 
emphasised in the second principle to be observed when 
drawing up a New Approach Directive, viz.:
"the national provisions ensuring ... protection must be 
harmonised in order to ensure the free movement of 
goods, without lowering existing and justified levels 
of protection in the Member States". 4
4. Turning to the operation of the New Approach, more 
specifically to technical harmonisation and standards in 
practice, it is too soon to comment on its effect on 
product safety law at this stage. The Approach was adopted 
in May 1985 and only one directive has been adopted wholly 
under the New Approach - Toy Safety Directive, May 1988. 
However, our initial view is that the New Approach 
provides a satisfactory basis for Community legislation in 
the product safety field. In particular, the limitation of 
New Approach directives to the "essential requirements" is 
intended to result in decisions being reached more quickly 
than under the old approach where detailed requirements 





























































































5. The Single European Act is also likely to have a 
substantial bearing on the effectiveness of the New 
Approach, in particular in the following two respects:
(a) directives will be adopted under Article 100A of the 
Treaty by a qualified majority; and
(b) amendments proposed by the European Parliament are 
required to be considered by the Commission and the
Council of Ministers.
POINTS TO WATCH
Precision in formulating essential requirements.
6. In a New Approach Directive, provision is to be made 
for Member States to ensure that the products covered by 
the relevant directive may be placed on the market only if 
they do not endanger the safety of persons, domestic 
animals or goods when properly installed and maintained 
and used for the purposes for which they are intended (B 
II of Annex II to the Resolution of 7 May 1985). These 
"essential safety requirements" must be worded 
sufficiently precisely to create legally binding 
obligations when transposed into national law and must be 
formulated in such a way as to enable the certification 
bodies to certify straightaway that products conform with 
the requirements even when there are no standards (III of 
Annex II to the Resolution).
7. The requirement of a degree of precision is clearly a 
highly desirable objective because lack of sufficient 
precision in the formulation of the essential requirements 
in the safety area is likely to lead to the requirement 
being transposed into the national law of Member States in 
different ways (and thus to give rise to obstacles to the 
free movement of goods), although once harmonised 
standards are adopted, the position is likely to be 
ameliorated. We hope that it will be possible to achieve 
the objective of drafting the essential safety 
requirements with sufficient precision notwithstanding the 
temptation to draft in general terms, leaving the detail 
to be set out in the relevant standards.
8. The requirement for a degree of precision is also 
important in the light of the presumption which must be 
provided for in a New Approach directive that a product 
which has been properly attested as conforming to the 
essential requirements and has been EC-marked is to be 
entitled to free circulation throughout the Community. In 




























































































(a) industry may be reasonably sure when such free 
movement will be forthcoming and
(b) that consumers will be given adequate protection 
against unsafe products
it is necessary that the essential safety requirement be 
formulated with some precision.
Method of complying with the "essential safety 
requirements".
9. The usual way of complying with the essential safety 
requirement will be by complying with a specified European 
standard. Compliance with the relevant standard will be 
voluntary and it will be possible to show direct 
compliance with the requirement itself by some other means 
although in practice that may be more difficult to do 
because certification by a third party is required in 
order to raise the presumption of conformity with the 
essential safety requirement if the relevant standard is 
not complied with (or if there is no relevant standard).
10. It is therefore clear that the success of the New 
Approach will depend to a considerable extent on the speed 
with which the European standard-working bodies can draw 
up the necessary standards. In addition, they will have to 
react quickly to changing situations and new dangers to 
consumers as they become apparent by amending or adding to 
the relevant standards.
11. In some cases, also, it will be necessary to amend the 
essential safety requirement in the directives themselves 
in order to take account of new dangers or risks which 
have come to light or been created since the directives 
were adopted. This is a matter which the Commission will 
no doubt bear in mind because it is as important that the 
directive under which standards are made reflects and 
takes account of the current position with regard to 
safety as that the standards should do so.
The New Approach directives only cover particular products 
and this will necessarily result in many products not 
being regulated.
12. Apart from the Toy Safety Directive mentioned earlier, 
nine draft New Approach directives are under discussion 
and many of these are concerned with product safety. 
However many products are covered by the New Approach, a 
substantial area will remain uncovered. We therefore think 
that consideration should be given to the question of work 




























































































discussed in the Communication from the Commission on the 
safety of consumers in relation to consumer products dated 
18 May 1987. The United Kingdom, like some of the other 
Member States, has recently (October 1987 - when Part II 
of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 came into force) 
introduced into its law a general safety requirement which 
suppliers of consumer goods are required to meet, breach 
of the requirement being a criminal offence. We do not 
suggest that a Community-wide requirement that consumer 
goods be safe should (or could) be imposed without careful 
consideration and discussion, taking account of the 
interests of all who may be affected, but we think that it 
would be useful to start giving such consideration at an 
early stage in order to ensure that there is a basic 
Community-wide level of protection for consumers in 
relation to unsafe products.
Procedure for withdrawing unsafe products from sale in the 
Community.
13. One matter which is not provided for in the New 
Approach directives, or elsewhere, is a Community-wide 
procedure for withdrawing products which are found to be 
unsafe in one Member State. Such directives must contain a 
safeguard provision (VII 1 of Annex II of the Resolution 
of May 1985) whereby Member States, finding that a product 
might compromise the safety of individuals, domestic 
animals or property, are required to take steps to 
withdraw it from the market or prohibit its sale even it 
has been properly attested. We are of course in favour of 
this provision, since each Member State is responsible for 
securing, as far as possible, that persons on its 
territory do not suffer injury from unsafe products, even 
if they are or appear to have been attested in other 
Member States. But we are concerned about the possibility 
that a product which has been withdrawn from sale in one 
Member State for safety reasons may continue to be sold in 
other Member States. Under the New Approach where the 
Commission considers that the withdrawal was justified it 
must inform all other Member States that "all else being 
equal, they are also obliged to prevent the product in 
question from being placed on the market" (B VII 2 of 
Annex II to the May 1985 Resolution). This has been 
provided for in Article 7.2 of the Toy Safety Directive, 
where it is a requirement that the Commission inform 
Member States that the action taken by the Member State in 





























































































14. The rapid exchange of information on products which 
have been found to be dangerous is essential for 
protecting consumers throughout the Community from the 
possibility that such products might be "dumped" in Member 
States other than the one in which action was originally 
taken. Whilst such an exchange (whether under the 
procedure in the New Approach directives or under the 
system for the rapid exchange of information on dangers 
arising from the use of consumer products set out in 
Council Decision of 2 March 1984) does not automatically 
result in the products being removed from the Community, 
it goes a considerable way towards securing this by 
ensuring that Member States are quickly alerted to the 






















































































































































































PRODUCT SAFETY LAW AND THE IMPACT OF THE NEW APPROACH 




This paper presents a brief summary of the background to 
Swedish consumer policy and the ‘New Approach' of the EC, 
Swedish standardization as well as consumer influence on 
standardization, also taking into account decisions within 
the Nordic Council of Ministers. Present and future 
consumer safety legislation is also summarized as are the 
'guidelines system' and the ongoing work on product 
liability legislation in Sweden. By way of conclusion the 
close connections between present and future Swedish 
product safety policy with the European standardization 
work are underlined, together with planned product safety 
legislation within the Community.
1. Swedish consumer policy and the EC
In Sweden consumer policy deals with problems related to 
the acquisition of goods and services on an open market 
for the consumer's private use. This omits problems 
related to the use of public services supplied by 
government or local authorities, such as health care and 
education. Important features in Swedish m i m u p r  policy 
concern the support given to households by strengthening
their " ..xeSoirrces—  through dlrfTerent__measures. thereby
influencing businesses to adapt their activities in
accordance with ransuingT---xntergsTBT-̂  to___conduct~~
invest i gat ions of goods and services, to ensure that 
dangerous and uriserviewable piuduots disappear rrom the 
market, likewise that the marketin g  activit i e s  and the 
sales conditions of businesses are acceptable / ' that 
consumers g e F ~ a d lq u a h ^ ~ lrnforiTiatr ro ir -a b o u C~E'he"market a n d  
tO'_p‘romo'te education ari3~resear cFTm the consumer tieia.
In a 1988 Bill entitled "Sweden and the West European 
integration" the Government has underlined two issues of 
importance on an international level:
the protection of consumers from dangerous 
products/services;





























































































As regards product safety, the Bill states that 
developments in the EC will be of utmost importance to 
Swedish consumers, not least because of the already 
existing co-operation between EC and EFTA countries 
through the standardization bodies CEN and CENELEC. 
According to the Bill it is natural for Sweden to seek to 
attain the highest possible levels of safety, even if it 
cannot be said in all certainty that Sweden has the best 
safety rules in all areas of consumer products. However, 
the Government thinks it is necessary that Sweden,
preferably in co-operation with other Nordic States, is 
engaged actively in European standardization work, and 
equally that consumer interests are considered.
The Swedish Government is of the opinion that the 
harmonization work in the EC in relation td product safely
may imply that, Tn-sume------respects'; lower safety
requirements will be applied in the Community than those 
Tn' operation at present in Sweden. Because of thisthe 
Government wfsK^^To^acETV'ffly^engage itself in the West 
European co-operation in this field (Government Bill 
1987/88:66, pp. 91 ff.).
When considering the Bill in the Swedish parliament the 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs stated that it is 
important, in connection with the increased co-operation 
with the EC, that Sweden tries to remove technical
barriers to trade as far as possible by harmonizing laws
and other regulations. It is urgent..that Swedish
authorities scrutinize the 'E C rules in diverse are^s Ed 
research existing possibilities for harmonization When 
drafting proposed legislation, existing rules in other 
countries, inclusive of those in the EC, should be taken 
into consideration. With this background the Swedish 
Government has instructed all Government Committees/ 
Commissions in special guidelines to follow the activities 
in the EC and consider possible ways of harmonization 
(Government Guidelines to Committees/ Commissions 
1988:43) .
The above may be seen as background information to the 
impact of the New Approach to technical harmonization and 
standards with regard to product safety in Sweden.
2. The New Approach and Swedish standardization
It has traditionally been the policy of Swedish Government 
to adhere to the concomitant principles that rules and 




























































































requirements regarding health and safety and so forth, and 
that all detailed requirements are to be found by 
reference to standards. The National Swedish Board for 
Consumer Policies applies this method when drafting 
guidelines on product safety, for example.
It is important for Sweden that the EC has chosen the 
approach of referring to standards in order to eliminate 
technical barriers to trade and to entrust the task of 
drafting standards to the European standardization bodies 
CEN and CENELEC. The Swedish standardization bodies are 
full members of these bodies and participate actively in 
the European standardization work. Furthermore it is very 
important that the Governments of the EFTA countries 
adhere to the same principle and programme. In fact, at 
present EFTA concurs completely with the principles in the 
EC New Approach and has entrusted the CEN and CENELEC to 
draft and issue EN standards. As a rule both the EC and 
EFTA authorize the CEN and CENELEC to develop standards in 
a specific field, for example toys. According to the rules 
of CEN/CENELEC national standardization bodies are obliged 
to accept an approved EN standard as a national standard, 
normally within six months - even where the national body 
voted against the implementation of such a standard 
(Wallin 1988).
Whereas EN standards are binding for national bodies in 
the EC, this is not the case in EFTA countries. In these 
countries however it is expected that national bodies 
shall approve and refer to EN standards which have been 
developed by mandate and financed by EFTA. The 
standardization bodies are not obliged to accept standards 
which conflict with national laws and regulations.
3. Consumer influence on standardization
As Sweden is a member of the European standardization 
bodies, Swedish delegations participate in the European 
standardization work on an equal footing, for example, 
with delegations from EC countries. By sending well- 
informed experts/delegates to European meetings, Swedish 
points of view may be presented and will - if well-founded 
- be taken into consideration when drafting EN standards.
However, as regards consumer influence on standardization 
the picture is not very positive. Although the Swedish 
Board for Consumer Policies may participate actively in 
all European standardization bodies, it is not possible to 




























































































committees. It is a matter of having adequate resources 
and competent staff. There are also other problems of a 
more general nature - common to other consumer bodies 
participating in standardization work. Consumer interest 
has to compete with other interests - mainly those of 
trade and industry. When conflict arises and the interests 
do not coincide, the consumers are only represented by one 
voice, which means that all other parties in a committee 
can vote against a proposal, which, arguably, from a 
consumer safety point of view should have been accepted.
The EC has taken a positive step in this regard and has 
issued a recommendation on the involvement and improvement 
of consumer participation in standardization. EFTA has 
also recommended that a similar initiative be taken by the 
Governments of the EFTA countries in order to achieve 
balanced consumer representation from both EC and EFTA 
countries in the CEN/CENELEC work. The EFTA Sub-Commitee 
on Consumer Policy Affairs has recently proposed (May 
1989) the establishment of a Consumer Policy Committee on 
a par with CEN/CENELEC.
At a meeting in Stockholm in March 1988 between the Nordic 
consumer ministers in the Nordic Council of Ministers'*it 
was decided that Nordic harmonization work shojuTd 'be 
undertaken in a way that corresponds with related work Tn 
the EC. In the field of product'safety and new tecffhoTogy 
ft is especially important that the Nordic work is related 
to what is going on in the Community. With the purpose of 
achieving - as far as possible - a common Nordic attitude 
towards the international standardization organizations, 
the Council decided to work towards an increased consumer 
influence in standardization. Furthermore, in May 1988 the 
Nordic co-ordination ministers in the Council stated - on 
the basis of a Nordic investigation (NCM, Norden i Europa, 
1988) - that the Nordic countries should co-operate 
regarding technical barriers to trade in order to reach 
solutions achieving harmonization with those of the EC. At 
the same time however, the present high level of consumer 
protection in the Nordic countries must not be lowered.
Against this background Swedish product safety work and 




























































































4. Present and future consumer product safety legislation 
in Sweden
4.1. The Marketing Act and Guidelines
The Swedish Marketing Act relates to marketing actions by 
a firm or some other trader when marketing goods, 
services, etc.
Article 4 concerns product safety inclusive of services. 
It states that a tradesman who offers to sell to a 
consumer, for personal use, a product whose properties are 
such as to entail a particular risk or personal injury or 
damage to property, may be ordered by the Market Court to 
desist from doing so. The same applies in the event of a 
product being manifestly unfit for its main purpose. Also 
a tradesman who, as a manufacturer, importer or in any 
other capacity, offers a product of the kind referred to 
in the foregoing for sale to another tradesman may be 
ordered by the Market Court to desist from so doing, 
insofar as this is necessary in order to prevent a product 
of the said kind from being offered for sale to consumers 
for personal use. The Article is not to be applied in 
cases where special provisions already exist concerning 
the goods or services.
By virtue of this Article it is possible to prohibit the 
sale of a hazardous toy, for instance, which could harm 
the user, e.g. because of certain mechanical risks. Goods 
which clearly prove to be unserviceable (not fit for their 
main purpose) may also be prohibited. In one case the 
Market Court prohibited the sale of a washing machine 
whose washing effect was practically nil.
Of interest in this respect is that this clause does not 
clearly say what makes a product dangerous. Instead it is 
the task of the Consumer Ombudsman and the Market Court to 
intervene and by negotiations or by a final court decision 
change the trade practice. Initially the Ombudsman and his 
officials negotiate with business enterprises. If the 
negotiations fail, that is if they do not lead to a 
voluntary settlement, the Consumer Ombudsman may bring the 
case before the Market Court and ask the Court by virtue 
of the Marketing Act, for example, to prohibit the sale of 
a dangerous product. Almost all cases have been solved by 
voluntary agreements, but of some 20-25 cases each year 
brought before the Market Court by the Consumer Ombudsman, 




























































































The Ombudsman may request the Court to prohibit the 
business from continuing the practices under criticism or 
from hiring or selling to anyone a harmful or useless 
commodity or service. Where a case requires the inclusion 
of certain information (of a safety character for 
instance) in an advertisement, the Consumer Ombudsman 
requests the Court to enjoin the party concerned to 
provide such information. If the Market Court decides to 
uphold the Ombudsman's request, it issues a prohibition or 
an injunction against the business concerned and normally 
lays down a conditional penalty. There is no appeal 
against decisions by the Market Court.
In matters of minor importance the Consumer Ombudsman may 
issue a prohibition order or an order to disclose 
information (according to Article 3 firms and other 
persons involved in advertising or in any other form of 
marketing may be enjoined to provide information of 
special interest to consumers). If the business against 
whom the Ombudsman's order is directed signs an approval 
of the order, this has the same legal effect as a Market 
Court order. By using his authority to issue prohibition 
injunctions the Ombudsman may prevent, without great 
effort, products from being sold which are similar to 
those the Court has found harzardous and thus prohibited.
It may also be mentioned that the Market Court may issue 
an interlocutory injunction upon the request of the 
Consumer Ombudsman.
As to the distribution of competences between different 
bodies, local consumer counsellors are independent from 
the Board. They help the local consumers in many respects 
and hand over complaints to the Board which ought to be 
dealt with centrally. The Board (whose Director General is 
at the same time the Consumer Ombudsman) collects 
complaints, regarding for instance product safety, from 
consumers, local consumer counsellors, businesses, media, 
the medical profession, police, etc.), investigates 
problems, undertakes surveys and issues information and 
educational material - amongst others - in safety matters. 
The Board negotiates, as has been said above, with trade 
and industry and tries to achieve voluntary solutions. 
Should such a course of action not succeed, the matter is 
taken over by the Secretariat of the Consumer Ombudsman to 
be handled judicially pursuant to the Marketing Act. In 
this respect the Ombudsman has the function of a 
prosecutor before the Market Court. The Court is the 





























































































The Board has for many years given priority to product 
safety. This has taken place through direct intervention 
vagarnst hazardous products, by working out guidelines and 
by 'recording injury rates within various product areas. 
The safety work of the Board takes in a wide variety of 
products. This presumes not only co-operation with various 
organizations and authorities within Sweden but also a 
broad international network of co-operation. Therefore the 
Boar,d participates within the organizations of 
international and European standardization (the ISO, the 
IEC, ‘the CEN/CENELEC) as well as with the OECD, EFTA, the 
Economic Commission for Europe, the European Law Group, 
the European Testing Group (ETG) and with the IOCU, to 
which the 3oard is affiliated as a supporting member. 
Through participation in these organizations the Board can 
contribute to the process of international harmonization 
of methods, standards and regulations in regard to product 
safety.
As regards the New Approach the Board's work on guidelines 
is of special interest. They are of great importance to 
achieving product safety improvements and may be seen as 
both pre-market measures and post-market measures.
The guidelines strive to contain only the main 
requirements regarding, for example, safety in a product 
field. Details as to the specific demands on a product or 
the methods to be used to test the safety characteristics 
are as a rule to be found elsewhere in standards, 
reference to which is made in the guidelines. In this 
respect the guidelines are not dissimilar to the method 
used in the EC New Approach. The difference is that 
guidelines are not legally binding unless the Market Court 
bases its consideration on guidelines in a decision.
If a guideline is not adhered to, the 3oard intervenes by 
contacting the company which is not complying with the 
guideline. As the guidelines are drafted in the course of 
negotiations with trade and industry the resulting rules 
may be seen as agreed upon by the different parties. If a 
company, after negotiation with the Board, persists in not 
adhering to a guideline, the Consumer Ombudsman, by virtue 
of the Marketing Act, can bring an action against the 
company in the Market Court or issue a prohibition or 
information order. The Court, however, normally bases its 
decision on considerations relating to whether or not the 
marketing practices are contrary to the intention of the 




























































































The fact that the guidelines are not legally binding does 
not mean that they are not effective - quite the contrary, 
according to the Board's experience.
Guidelines are the Board's foremost instrument for 
applying pressure on manufacturers and traders. Their 
purpose is to give guidance as to marketing, construction 
and design of products and services. By issuing guidelines 
the Board decides the requirements for safety, function 
and information to be taken into account by trade and 
industry when developing products and services and 
marketing them. As has been stated above, they also serve 
as a basis for the assessment of particular cases under 
the Marketing Act. They are published in a series by the 
Board as a code of regulations (NSBCP, Board Management 
Report 1988:1).
The Board often refers to standards in its guidelines. 
Preferably the Board uses international standards, if such 
exist, otherwise national standards are applied. Where 
international standards can be used, this is to be 
preferred in order to decrease barriers to trade and to 
use their persuasive force to induce trade and industry to 
accept the guidelines. In cases where standards do not 
exist, the Board develops, on its own or through Nordic 
co-operation, suitable methods to be used when measuring a 
product's characteristics, and states the specifications 
to be used when developing the product in question. These 
methods may later be standardized. Developments in Europe 
require the Board as far as possible to participate in the 
CEN/CENELEC work as a representative of Swedish 
delegations to consumer standardization committees.
The guidelines which the Board has issued hitherto in the 
area of product safety reflect products which many other 
countries also have found necessary to observe from a 
safety point of view. From this standpoint at any rate it 
is of utmost importance to follow developments abroad.
As an example of the attention the Board pays at present 
to the New Approach, mention can be made of the work on 
safety of toys. As early as the seventies it was 
underlined by the trade and industry lobby in Sweden that 
guidelines on toys as to requirements on safety had to 
take European developments into consideration, since more 
than 90% of toys in Sweden are imported. In addition to 
work regarding guidelines, at the same time a technical 
committee on toys within the Standardization Commission in 
Sweden drafted standards (first mechanical and physical 




























































































standards take as their point of departure the EN 71:1 and 
71:2 with a few additions from US toy standards. Further, 
the guidelines contain some requirements regarding 
information from other sources. In the guidelines only the 
main requirements are stated, and for detail reference 
must be made to the Swedish standards.
At present the Board actively participates in the CEN work 
on toys and has contributed its experiences especially to 
the drafting process for requirements on mechanical and 
physical properties. The Board is prepared to consider 
participation in other important safety standardization 
committees within the CEN, especially those concerning 
products affecting child safety. That means that New 
Approach projects concerning product safety will be 
considered carefully by the Board with a view to 
participation if resources are available.
It may also be mentioned in connection with the adoption 
of the New Approach in Sweden that in the field of 
electrical products the Swedish controls on such products 
have been surveyed with the purpose of adapting the 
controls to the European Low Voltage Directive. Control 
according to the terms of the new order will take place in 
Sweden from July 1, 1989.
4.2. The future of product safety in Sweden
A new Product Safety Act has been approved by the 
Parliament and will come into force on July 1st 1989. 
During the preparation of the Act, consideration was given 
to work in the EC on the product safety directive.
The new Act will allow for the possibility of product 
recall, and this in different forms; for example, for 
repair, replacement or refund. The new statute contains 
regulations on certain product safety issues which are 
today governed by the Marketing Act, notably sales 
prohibitions pertaining to hazardous products. The Product 
Safety Act purports to prevent products from causing 
personal injury or damage to property. Regarding the 
dissemination of information, the Act distinguishes 
between cautionary information and safety information. 
Warnings aim to protect those who have already acquired a 
hazardous product, and as such differ from safety 
information, which is to be provided at the time of supply 
of products.
It is of interest that the existing statutes governing 




























































































will continue to be applied on a parallel footing with the 
more general provisions of the Product Safety Act, and 
will take precedence over the latter insofar as the more 
specific provisions have the same effect as the Product 
Safety Act. The Act covers all types of safety 
deficiencies. The scope of its application is restricted 
to such goods and services as are supplied in commercial 
activity and which consumers use or may use to a 
considerable extent for private purposes. Thus, it will 
apply mainly to goods and services offered by 
entrepreneurs as part of their commercial activity to 
consumers, for example consumer goods.
The Market Court will settle disputes under the new Act. 
The authority supervising its jurisdiction will be the 
National Swedish Board for Consumer Policies; with 
authority limited however to products which are not 
subject to special regulations. In such a case the 
pertinent special authority will be the supervisory 
authority. If negotiations with companies do not lead to 
solutions, the matter can be referred to the Consumer 
Ombudsman, requesting the latter to apply for an 
injunction or a prohibition before the Market Court. The 
Ombudsman will be authorized to issue information, 
prohibitions and recall injunctions.
A government commission has also presented a proposal to 
the Government regarding export prohibitions for dangerous 
products, which is currently subject to its scrutiny.
An important feature of future product safety policy will 
be a system for reporting injury. At present such a system 
is being constructed by the National Board for Social 
Health and Welfare. This system is, to begin with, 
expected to be launched in three counties from July 1, 
1989. It will form a necessary part of the Board for 
Consumer Policies' future market control.
4.3. The future of product liability in Sweden
A proposal for product liability legislation is at present 
being prepared at the Ministry of Justice. The proposal is 
expected to be presented for examination later this year, 
whence it will be submitted to various interested bodies 
for comments prior to any bill being presented to 
Parliament.
It is not possible at this stage to give any indication of 
the substance of the forthcoming proposal which will - as 




























































































certain exceptions. In relation to consumer interests we 
have, however, expressed our views on what should be the 
content of product liability rules. Sweden strongly 
supports the developments along the lines of the 1985 EC 
directive towards strict liability instead of liability 
based on the old negligence concept of fault which is so 
difficult for the victim to prove.
He are not happy with all the rules of the directive. For 
instance, we see no reason to exclude primary agricultural 
products from the ordinary strict liability. Furthermore, 
it is vital, we think, that the strict liability should 
also include development risks. Also, the period of 
termination of liability should be sufficient so as to 
reasonably cover long-term damage that may result from the 
use of chemicals, medicine, etc.
5. Concluding remarks
The emphasis of work in the field of product safety at the 
National Swedish Board for Consumer Policies is laid on 
post-market control, although the drafting of guidelines 
also requires considerable work. The existence of 
guidelines in different product fields enables the 
Ombudsman and the Board to supervise the market in 
collaboration with the local consumer counsellors and thus 
ensure adherence to the guidelines. These then, together 
with other measures, are important in post-sale control of 
the safety of products. The drafting of guidelines, 
testing of products and risk-assessing involve 
considerable, technical problems, not least the development 
of adequate methods, often in collaboration with the 
national and international/European standardization 
bodies. v
The new Product Safety Act will sharpen the instruments of 
the Board in future and make it possible to have unsafe 
products withdrawn by using the recall possibility. As the 
new Act in many respects seems to be adapted to a future 
general Product Safety Directive in the EEC, the new Act 
thus forms a foundation for a future common European 
collaboration in the planned European Economic Space in 
1992.
At present the Board gives much more attention to the 
international aspects of the product safety work and 
especially in relation to the European standardization in 
order to avoid creating barriers to trade. It will be 




























































































Swedish product safety work not only with the other 
Scandinavian countries but also with the work in the 
remaining EFTA countries and with the work in the EEC in 
order to be prepared for a West European market in 1992.
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I. Introduction
The authors of the German Civil Code of 1900 did not make 
manufacturers liable for damages caused by their 
products . This is in keeping with the international 
legal developments at the turn of the century as can be 
seen from "leading cases" in other countries. Court 
decisions laying down the basic principles of product 
liability law were given in the USA, UK, Switzerland, 
Austria ..and Italy at approximately the same time as in 
Germany early in the 20th century. Initially, there 
were few cases to be decided, although their number has 
since increased. There have been around 100 cases in
38. Cf. Miinch/Komm/Mertens, Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, 
1986, Schuldrecht, Besonderer Teil, 2. Halbband, 
823 Rn. 297.
39. Cf. Frh. Marshall v. Bieberstein, Die
Produkthaftung der USA, 1975, p. 11. The
fundamental court rulings in France related to 
producer liability fall into the period before 
1900, cf. Ferid, Franzosisches Zivilrecht, Voi. 1, 
1971, p. 635; Lorenz, Lànderbericht und
rechtsvergleichende Betrachtung. Zur Haftung des 
Warenherstellers, in: Die Haftung des
Warenherstellers, Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung, 
Bd. 28, 1966, p. 19; Lukes, Reform der




























































































Germany in the last ten years . The recent marked
increase in court cases does not, however, present 
sufficient evidence to judge the development and
importance of compensation for defective products.
Statements by insurers are made in order to publicise 
exceptional cases, rather than to preset a comprehensive 
statistical view of product damages.
The EC commission has instituted a thirty-month model
study 2 with a view to building a common information 
system on accidents occuring while using specific products 
outside professional activities and traffic related 
activities. The authors of this report (7/1/1988)
conclude that consumer goods cause substantial economic 
losses and reductions in GDP. It has been estimated that 
accidents caused by consumer goods alone lead to more than 
30,000 dead and 40 million injured, causing annual 
hospital and treatment costs on the part of the health 
insurance system of more than 30 billion ECU,
notwithstanding losses in production. The majority of 
cases registered by insurers, however, are related to 
damages causeci.by defective products used in a production 
process (75%). This is an indication of the scale of 
losses incurred by member countries as a result of 
defective industrial products. 40% of injuries caused by 
consumer products are the result of design defects, 30%
40
40. Cf. the synopsis by Schmidt-Salzer,
Entscheidungssammlung Produkthaftung, Vol. 1 and 2, 
1975 and 1979. Until 1941 the Reichsgericht decided 
only 21 cases. Between 1950 and 1970 the
Bundesgerichtshof ruled in more than twice the 
number of cases.
41. Cf. Brendel, Qualitatsrecht. Die technisch- 
okonomischen Implikationen der Produzentenhaftung, 
1979, p. 22 also cf. Schvirpf, Produkthaftpflicht 
in multinationalen Unternehmungen, VersWirtsch 
1973, p. 25
42. O.J. L 229/1 and II of August 13, 1981
43. EG-Kommission, Dokumente, KOM (84) 725 endg., Be 4.
44. Op. cit.
45. Briiggemeier/Reich, WM 1985, pp. 149; Schmidt- 
Salzer/Hollmann, Die EG-Produkthaftungsrichtlinie 
1985 und ihr Verhaltnis zur Produzentenhaftung nach 
Art. 823 Abs. 1 BGB, Kommentar EG-Richtlinie 





























































































the result of manufacturing defects and only 20% occur as 
a result of incorrect usage.
The questions addressed here are the following: what are
the incentives associated with different liability rules 
to reduce damage or personal injury, and who should carry 
the risk for such damages? The options are internalisation 
of damages by shifting liability to the manufacturer 
Caveat Fabricator (CF) - , externalisation of damages by 
shifting the risk to the consumer or the industrial user - 
Caveat Emptor (CE) - , and finally, shifting the risk to 
the insurers.
II. Strict liability and liability based on fault or 
negligence
According to the German Civil Code of 1896 the risk of 
suffering damages through a defective product falls on the 
buyer. The manufacturer was liable for damages according 
to Art. 831 BGB if he did not exercise sufficient care in 
selecting his employees or supervising them. However, 
in 1911 the Reichsgericht ruled, that the manufacturer was 
not liable if he exercised due ^gare in the choice of 
managerial supervision of a product.
This allocation of risk was 
liability without fault" (i.e. 
you are at fault in some way) 
reason for liability, but the 
philosophy was that growth 
accompanying general increase
based on the principle "no 
you are not liable unless 
and "the damage is not the 
fault". The general
in the economy and the 
in popular welfare and
46. Cf. Schürpf, Problème und Tendenzen in der 
Produktpflicht und ihrer Versicherung I, 
VersWirtsch 1971, p. 341.
47. The criterion was the care of a respectable father,
Die Beratung des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches in 
systematischer Zusammenstellung der
unverôffentlichen Quellen (edts. Jacobs and 
Schubert), Recht der Schuldverhaltnisse I, paras. 
291 - 432, 1978, p. 238.
48. RGZ 78, 107.
49. H. Ihering, Das Schuldmoment im Romischen 
Privatrecht, 1867, p. 8.; Alternativkommentar/Kohl, 




























































































industrialization would invariably shoulder the burden of 
compensating its victims. The result is the development 
of the general principles of fault-baseed liability, as 
Well as a general principle of non-interference on the 
part of the legislator. However, a few special laws 
calling for strict liability have since been developed to 
take account of the risks of industrialization.
One can identify three stages in the development of 
liability for product defects since the turn of the 
century:
-During an experimental phase the courts explored the 
implications of a hypothetical contract between buyer 
and manufacturer and of general duties of care on the 
part of the manufacturer. However, they proceeded to 
develop negligence duties which became the decisive 
criteria for product liability. Fault was associated 
and later identified with the violation standards of due 
cares .
-During the second phase in the 1950s the courts tended 
to withdraw from the previous position which, relative 
to the Civil Code tended, to emphasise the rights of 
consumers.
-The last phase is characterised by successively more 
stringent duties of care on the part of the manufacturer 
and stricter requirements on evidence submitted in 
court. The burden of proof, however, tends to fall on 
the manufacturer.
The present legal framework is based on the principle of 
liability as a consequence of negligence on the part of 
the manufacturer. There are, however, a number of rules 
relating to the burden of proof and general duties of care 
which put- the position closer to one of strict 
liability.
50. Cf. §1 HPflG; S 7 StVG; § 33 Luftg; §§25, 7, 26 
AtomG; §§ 1, 22 WHG and before §833 BGB. The pet- 
owners' liability under § 833 BGB and the liability 
for water pollution under § 22 WHG are not limited. 
The law which controls the right of the general 
terms of business only came into effect on 1 April 
1977.
51. Cf. Kotz (1988), pp. 156.
52. Cf. v. Hippel, NJW 1969, § 681 and Bruggemeier, 




























































































1. Fault in the conduct of the manufacturer rather than in 
the nature of the product
In order for the manufacturer to be liable according to 
BGB § 823,1 the dangerous product must have been created
in the production process of the manufacturer. The 
injured party needs to prove, that he/she has incurred 
injury while properly using the product. This precludes 
the requirement ,-9f defining what actually constitutes a 
defective product'’ . It is not a product's 'fault' which 
will cause a liability to be incurred, but faulty 
behaviour on the part of the manufacturer. The judiciary 





- product observation duties,
- and duties of organisation.
Duties of design and production
Products need to be designed in an appropriate and 
suitably safe way. What this means in practice is
determined by the "generally accepted technical standard", 
or, more stringently, by the "state of technology", or, 
most stringently by "the state of science and technology". 
It is not clear which of these requirements holds for 
design duties in the context of a manufacturer's
liability.
Proper manufacture
In order to ensure that individual products are properly 
manufactured, the manufacturer needs to take care that 
production processes and the materials used are monitored. 
If the manufacturer can show that this has been done, the 
occasional defective product does not constitute a 
liability. Otherwise strict liability holds.
Faults in instruction and consumer advice

































































































If it is possible that damage occurs in the normal use of 
products, the manufacturer has a duty to give adequate 
instructions to the user, the extent of which.depends on 
how dangerous this product can potentially be.
Product observation
Particularly in the case of mass production, the 
manufacturer needs to have an idea of how a product works 
in practice. He.must to take action if he becomes aware 
of any dangers'1 and must be sure that the product is 
being used properly.
There are difficulties in the case of products which lead 
to damages in the long term. If, objectively speaking, 
potential long-term damages could not.be recognised at the 
outset a manufacturer is not liable. This is the case
for development risks. If risks are recognised, but there 
are no technical means of averting these at present, some 
sort of. a social cost/benefit analysis has to take 
place. Risks which cannot be prevented at reasonable 
cost, given the state of technology, do not lead to 
liability.
Duties of organisation
The manufacturer is required to run his business in such a 
way that faults in construction and planning will not 
occur
2. Caveat Emptor versus Caveat Fabricator
A damage claim against a manufacturer has to be based on 
fault; current rulings have specified that violating one
55. BGH, NJW 1975, 1827
56. Cf. Kullmann, BB 1987, p. 1957; BGH, BB 1981, 
1041; BGH, BB 1987, 717 (Steering wheel cover).
57. Cf. BGH, BB 1970, 1414 (brakes); Schmidt-Salzer, 
Der Fehlerbegriff der EG-Richtlinie Produkthaftung, 
BB 1988, p. 346 (355).
58. Diederichsen (1987), 1275.
59. KG VersR 1975, p. 427 (Thorooplast); Brüggemeier, 
(1986), p. 353
60. Lukes (1979), Brüggemeier, Produzentenhaftung nach 




























































































of the duties of care will suffice for this. Hence, 
courts have interpreted the fault standard of the Civil 
Code as a negligence standard. The required standards of 
the manufacturer's duties of care are stringent. The 
burden of proof has been shifted to the manufacturer. 
This suggests that current German law has moved towards 
the principle of Caveat Fabricator and away from that of 
Caveat Emptor.
Ill. Controlling____behaviour____ by____way____of____ damage
internalisation or by way of duties of care
The economic analysis of liability law is concerned with 
controlling individual behaviour. The hypothesis is 
simple, if there is one actor controlling the risk and one 
party injured as a result of the actor's conduct, then the 
actor is responsible for the damage caused, the injured 
party receives compensation. Since the actor must pay for 
the losses he inflicts on others, the risk externality is 
fully internalized and the rational actor's prevention 
efforts will be optimal. Things get more complicated if 
both parties may be considered as actors, i.e. if both 
parties control the risk. From an economic point of view, 
one would want to induce behaviour in every respect which 
represents optimal levels of care. There is a simple rule 
inducing two parties to behave optimally: the first party 
is held liable for the damage if the other party observed 
the duties of care. The other party would then only be 
liable for damage if he has breached at least one of the 
behavioural rules which represent the duties of care. The 
basic result of economic analysis on the subject of 
liability is that the first party will consider the trade­
off between reduction in liability payments and costs and 
inconvenience of additional care. The threat of liability 
for damages when duties of care are not upheld will cause 
the other party to observe these duties of care. b
If the duties of care completely specify optimal levels of 
prevention, optimal behaviour in the presence of risk can 
be achieved, irrespective of who is the cause of the
61. Cf. the standard work by Shavell, Strict Liability 
versus Negligence, Journal of Legal Studies, 1980, 
p. 1, and Adams, Okonomische Analyse der 




























































































damage or who is the victim. Strict liability and fault- 
based liability may, therefore, serve to control the 
behaviour of the actor and the victim, respectively. The 
combination of incentives breaks down where duties of care 
cannot be specified for all aspects of behaviour which 
will affect risk.
There is no general theory laying down the conditions 
under which the concept of care used by the courts differs 
from the economically optimal concept of care. The 
starting point for such theory has to be the definition of 
negligence. In many cases the "Learned Hand Test" will 
suffice; this involves comparing the effort required to 
achieve greater safety with the reduction in potential 
damages thereby made possible. The degree of caution or 
care has to be increased as long as the marginal effort 
required to prevent damage is less than the damage which 
can be prevented. This test cannot be applied if 
different levels of care are associated with not only with 
different costs but also with different utility levels on 
the part of the actors. If one is comparing the costs of 
prevention and the consequent reduction in damages, one 
may assume that cost and damage functions will be similar 
for homogeneous population groups, and that therefore 
there is an optimal level of care. However, the levels of 
utility associated with different levels of care may vary 
widely, so that an optimal level of care cannot even be 
defined for small subgroups of the population. Evidence 
of this problem is given by the fact that courts have 
developed elaborate standards for non-negligent driving,
i.e. safe, speeds on roads but they did not develop a 
standard for miles driven per year although with respect 
to prevention of accidents, driving fewer miles per year 
may be, more beneficial than reducing the average 
speed .
Analogous problems arise in the context of product 
liability based on negligence. The courts tend to 
characterise the manufacturers' duties in the sphere of 
the production process by a general duty of care. The 
manufacturer of a product is liable if he has not paid 
attention to the necessary duties of care, in all other 62
62. Cf. Finsinger/Pauly (1988), section 2. Cf. also 
Faure/Van den Bergh (1987), pp. 97/98. When entry 
into on activity matters negligence standards may 




























































































cases the buyer is liable. The difficulties in
characterising a situation which constitutes negligence is 
apparent in the case of design defects.
Given that there are n different ways of designing a 
product where these ways are ranked according to the 
increasing safety of the resultant product, the expected 
damages associated with the product designs S.,...,S 
constitute a declining series. Safer designs are mori 
costly. Therefore, the respective production costs
K.,...,K represent an increasing series. The Learned 
Hand Test for negligence6 requires that the optimal 
construction process i minimizes the sum of production 
costs K. and expected damages S.. Construction processes 
resulting in goods which are l4ss safe would then be 
considered negligent according to this test. This test is
only adequate if the utility associated with the use of
the product is independent of how it is designed; this 
will only rarely be the case. This means that this test 
for optimality should take into account the different 
levels of utility U.,..., U associated with the n
designs. A design would, howev§r, be truly optimal if the 
difference between the user's utility from a given
product, and production and expected damage costs, U. - K.
- S. is maximised. 1 11
In practice, the courts find it difficult to conduct such 
a test of optimality and determine the ideal level of 
care. A kind of partial analysis is therefore used. On 
the one hand, courts will orientate themselves according 
to the current state of science and technology. On the 
other hand, the cost of safety precautions and the varying 
levels of utility will also be considered. The comparison 
of utility and costs can only be an incomplete one and 
will not lead to a definition of optimal duties of care. 
Furthermore, the availability of information is crucial. 
What then is the second-best alternative that can be 
achieved? This is the topic of the following analyses.
The principle of strict liability has gained importance in 
a number of areas: traffic, drugs, and atomic energy. The 
legal reason for this is that whoever benefits from 
creating a source of risk should be liable for the damage 
it may cause. The economic reasoning employs a different 63




























































































rationale, based on the realisation that the control of 
these risks, by way of standards of care, tended to be 
inadequate. This is particularly obvious in the case of 
traffic. In this area risks have increased in direct 
proportion to increased driving and disparity in 
incentives has arisen in its relation to the increasing 
volume of traffic. The incentive disparity is due to the 
impossibility of defining standards of due care for the 
frequency of driving.4 In an economy without strict 
liability, the risks of driving would have become too 
great.
There is not clear cause for the change in court decisions 
in the area of product liability. Possible causes could 
be attributed to the following:
-the courts need technical knowledge to adequately define 
standards of care. In civil proceeding, both parties will 
have an incentive to provide the courts with this type of 
information, and experts may be used. This way of 
proceeding has generally been successful. However, the 
trend towards stricter liability represents evidence of 
the difficulty to define standards of due care. Indeed, 
where complex products and production processes are 
involved, the courts may not be in a position to draw the 
line between non-negligent and negligent manufacturer 
behaviour such that optimal product safety is provided.
-The victims of product construction faults, however, have 
generally not been in a position to prove negligengg 
etc., since they have not had access to the companies. 
This has led to a change in the burden of proof.
IV. Caveat Emptor versus Caveat Fabricator 645
64. Cf. Finsinger/Pauly, 1988.
65. This argument was given by the court, Cf. BGHZ 51,
91 (Hiihnerpest). Checking of defective parts by
the supplier excluding the producer, Cf. BGH, 
VersR 1972, 560; BGHZ 67, 359 (SCHWIMMERSCHALTER):
The responsibility was located in the area of the 
producer, who alone could control design and 





























































































The 19th century Civil Code tended to emphasize the 
freedom of choice and action on the part of each 
individual. Corresponding to this, there was also the 
principle "Let the loss lie where it falls" in the UK, in 
France, and in Germany. This principle implies that a 
seller is only liable for product attributes which he has 
contractually guaranteed. It is the principle of Caveat 
Emptor. The duty of the courts is to enforce freely 
negotiated contracts.
Under the principle of strict liability, the burden of 
liability is transferred from the buyer to the producer. 
Only if the buyer himself caused the damage is he liable 
for it, otherwise the manufacturer will be liable. This 
is the principle of Caveat Fabricator.
The two types of liability are compared in the following 
paragraphs. Initially, we assume that all actors are risk 
neutral and, for the time being disregard problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. Later on we introduce 
risk aversion and the demand for insurance, as well as 
moral hazard problems. The starting point is the 
assumption that product risks do not affect bystanders. 
From there we suggest rules for internalisation of this 
externality.
1. Well-informed consumers and the pronciple of Caveat 
Emptor (CE)
Well-informed consumers are aware of the characteristics 
of products and their inherent hazards. They can avoid 
these hazards by not purchasing a product or they can 
choose an optimal price versus safety ratio and buy a 
level of safety where the costs of additional safety and 
the benefit from this safety are exactly equal. Free 
contracts in a market economy will therefore lead to an 
optimal allocation
66. The reader, interested in a formal argument, should 
consider purchase decisions under perfect 
competition. Let the average cost of a product 
with safety q be denoted by C (q). In equilibrium 
the price of the product p will be equal to average




























































































2. Caveat Fabricator (CF)
In the case of strict liability the manufacturer has to 
pay for all damages caused by his product. Under the term 
damage we also include immaterial damages, so that if a 
buyer is reimbursed fully he is indifferent as to whether 
or not the damage occurs. This means that when a product 
is being purchased the buyer need only take into account 
the price of the product and its characteristics other 
than safety characteristics.
If damage payments are made by the manufacturer, it is he 
who will compare expected liability claims and the added 
cost of improving product safety. This internalisation of 
damages can lead to the same choice of product safety as 
will occur under the liability principle of CE.
The differences between the considerations made by the 
buyer and the manufacturer under the-principles of CE and 
CF respectively are the following : under CE the buyer
optimises the ratio of price and safety taking into 
account his expected damages which are contingent on his 
individual risk situation. Under CF the seller optimises 
the ratio of costs and safety taking into account the 
average damage to consumers. Any additional costs caused by more stringent safety requirements will be passed on to 
the consumer. The resulting allocation will only be the 
same one if all buyers are identical. Generally, using an 
average level of damage will lead to different decisions
(Footnote continued from previous page)
cost, therefore we have p (q) = C (q). The basis 
for the purchase decision is not the price p (q) 
but the sum of this price and the expected damage 
denoted by S (q). Clearly, if products are 
identical in all respect except for the safety 
level q then a rational consumer will choose the 
product with safety level q* for which p (q) + S 
(q) is minimal.
67. Cf. Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, Bell 




























































































ft 8on the level of product safety than that which would 
have been made by the individual buyer. The result is a 
tendency towards products with a medium level of safety; 
very safe.or very unsafe products will disappear from the 
market.
This tendency to an in some sense average level of safety 
produces a misallocation. Whereas, under CE, consumers 
would buy products which correspond to their own personal 
potential for damage, under CF, a large number of 
consumers are forced to buy products with either too low 
or too high a level of safety. Since manufacturers will 
pass the costs of safety on to consumers, consumers with a 
low risk potential are forced to subsidise those with a 
high risk potential. The principle of CF thus leads to 
redistribution and an undifferentiated supply of products. 
Indeed it is possible that the total of damage caused 
increases.
Conclusion: CF leads to an efficient resource allocation
only if consumers are homogeneous.
68. To See this, denote the expected damages of 
consumer i by S. With the annotation of footnote 
26, the decision problem of the producer can be 
represented as the minimization of the expected 
average cost for all safety levels q: 
n
Min C (q) + 1/n d (q) 
q i=l
where n denotes the number of buyers. If the
expected damages of all consumers are equal, i. e .
if S. = S, then the decision problem of theproducer reduces to
Min C (q) + S(q), which is equivalent to the choice 
of consumers under CE
q




























































































The tendency by manufactures to find new market segments 
will tend to work against the trend to products of 
average safety. This is particularly important in another 
context. Traditional opinion believes that the principle 
of CF leads to the development of safer products. 
However, all that can be said theoretically is that the 
incentive to be innovative will be reduced. CF does not 
permit the manufacturer to introduce new products whose 
safety characteristics are difficult to assess to that 
part of the market where consumers have a low damage 
potential, since he cannot rely on the self-selection 
mechanism operating among consumers under CE. Recall that 
under CE consumers with large expected losses buy safe 
products. Rather, the manufacturer has to select his 
buyers himself and is only partially able to do this 
through the process of market segmentation. It becomes 
more difficult to test inventions and their number will 
consequently decline.
In the case of development risks one would prima facie 
expect that a manufacturer who will have to pay damages 
for development faults has a greater incentive to avoid 
errors than a manufacturer who is not liable. This 
conception is however based on the assumption that the 
demand for product safety under CE does not create the 
same incentive as the liability of the manufacturer under 
CF. This would be the case if consumers were less well 
informed about development risks than manufacturers.
3. Consumer liability - contributory negligence
Under the principle of CE the buyer carries the product 
risk. He will take the level of care necessary for the 
marginal utility of the damage he has avoided to equal the 
marginal cost of care.
Under the principle of CF the buyer no longer has an 
incentive to reduce his risk; external controls need to be 
put in place. This is done by taking into account 
negligence on the part of the consumer when the division 
of liability is established in court. A simple rule would 
then provide that the liability of the manufacturer is 
removed completely if the buyer was negligent. 
Negligence on the part of the consumer is present if the 70
70. The German Law, however, provides a 





























































































consumer has not exercised the "commonly recognised 
necessary degree of care". Ideally, this level of care 
should be defined for each aspect of the consumer's 
behaviour and should be equal to the optimal level of 
care. This is not possible for three reasons:
a. The courts will not be able to obtain sufficient 
knowledge about a number of aspects of the consumer's 
behaviour;
b. 'Optimal' behaviour is very much linked to an 
individual person; courts, however, can define due 
care levels only for groups of individuals.
c. Both the level of care in the use of products as well 
as the frequency of use will have an effect on 
expected damage. However, the courts cannot set due 
care levels with respect to frequency of use.
Conclusion: It is more efficient to control behaviour of
rational and well-informed consumers via damage 
internalisation under the principle of CE, than via the 
definition of due care levels.
4. Superiority of strict liability in cases where 
consumers incorrectly assess risk
The assertion that consumers systematically over- or 
underestimate the risk they subject themselves to, changes 
the conclusions substantially. An underestimation of risk 
will lead to a higher than optimal exposure to risk and 
vice versa.
This effect will not be present if there is a strict 
liability on the part of the manufacturer (CF) . If 
damages are fully compensated, consumers will behave as if 
they were purchasing a safe good. It is the producer who 
chooses product safety by considering the trade-off 
between more safety i.e. less liability payments and the 
accompanying higher production costs. However, there is a 
potential for misallocation if consumers are 
heterogeneous.
Conclusion: Strict liability tends to be superior to
liability based on fault or negligence if consumers are 
systematically misinformed. However, misallocation may 
result if consumers are relatively heterogeneous. 5*





























































































If risk is perceived incorrectly on the part of 
manufacturers only, the principle of CE is superior to 
strict liability (CF). There is, however, a tendency for 
some correction in the perceptions of the manufacturers 
since they will by7.necessity be gathering information 
about damage claims.
6. Product risks affecting bystanders
Product risks affecting bystanders can be regarded as an 
externality. As such all that is required in principle is 
internalization. Under the rule of CE the owner of the 
product would have to be held liable for all accidents 
affecting third parties. Clearly, CE calls for strict 
liability of the product owner. A legal system based on 
negligence such as the delictual liability in the FRG does 
not provide adequate internalization of products risks 
under CE. A negligence standard would have to define what 
kind of behaviour and corresponding product risks would 
lead to liability with respect to third party losses. 
Other risks would be acceptable and corresponding losses 
of third parties would not be compensated. However, such a 
negligence standard would only be efficient if it was 
specified for all dimensions of product risks including 
the frequency of use and if the corresponding duties of 
care were clear to owners and to third parties. Clearly, 
this would require the courts to act like some sort of 
product safety agency. The third party risk control would 
be incomplete because monitoring of behaviour would 
necessarily be incomplete, but it would also be inflexible 
much like product safety regulation. Furthermore, 
complete control via negligence standards would require to 
specify duties with respect to frequences of use, 
otherwise, CE under the tortious liability law of the FRG 
would be inefficient.
In the case of CF, it is consistent to shift liability for 
third party losses to the producer. Duties of care for 
third parties or more precisely criteria for contributory 
negligence would have to be developed. It seems that this 
would be a relatively easy task for courts.
V. Liability and Insurance 71
71. The German courts have been aware of this fact for 




























































































The principle of CF is similar to a system of forced 
insurance against damages occuring as a result of product 
faults. The potential misallocation described in section
IV.2. is generally the result of a compulsory system of 
insurance with uniform premiums. Every customer, 
irrespective of this person+s risk characteristics, 
receives exactly the same insurance cover at the same 
price. This is a moral hazard situation, since the insured 
party has no incentive to modify his behaviour when this 
does not affect the price he pays for insurance ' .
At any rate some form of insurance is demanded by risk 
averse buyers. But there are problems associated with this 
line of reasoning.
(1) Risk aversion can only lead to a demand for 
compensation of damages which are not already insured 
through the health and social security system. Risk 
aversion alone is not enough to create a general 
demand for the compensation of immaterial damages.
(2) The manufacturer is not the only source of insurance. 
A better solution may be if the buyer insures product 
risks.
Ad (1)
Two types of losses need to be distinguished; those which 
generally lead to a demand for compensation in risk averse 
individuals, and those which do not, even for individuals 
who are risk averse. The demand for insurance is a result 
of the aim to maximise expected utility under conditions 
of uncertainty. An insurance contract generally transfers 
money from a situation where there is a lot of wealth to 
situation where there is low wealth. Perfect insurance 72
72. This situation can typically be found in regulated 
insurance markets, when insurance contracts and 
premiums are insufficiently related to individual 
risks. In Germany contracts for non-commercial 




























































































73compensates exactly this wealth differential. 
However, the loss of irreplaceable commodities or the loss 
of people may not affect the wealth at all. Hence, 
insurance may not be required. In these cases, the 
optimal level of insurance depends on the types of product 
risks, and the user concerned. A standardized level of 
insurance will not do justice to the complexity of the 
problem. It is however not clear whether under CE buyers 
would be able to purchase their preferred type of cover in 
the market.
Ad (2)
It is appropriate to differentiate between the private and 
the industrial use of products. The private user can buy 
protection against some consequences of product risks 
(car, health, and unemployment insurance, for instance), 
but a number of other risks cannot be insured against. The 
situation is different for an industrial user of a 
product. In the case of CE, the source of risk (e.g. a 
boiler in a laundry) can be pinpointed exactly and 
insurance taken out against a specific incident with 
specific consequences occurring. In a situation of CF, the 
manufacturer has to take account of a multitude of risks 
resulting from the many uses of his product. Furthermore, 
there is no means of monitoring the behaviour of the user 
(adequate maintenance etc), and thus no means of avoiding 
the problems of moral hazards. The manufacturer is faced 
with risks which are difficult to assess and which are 
larger than the risk insured by the user of the product 
under CE. 734
73. Strictly speaking, it is the marginal utility of
money which matters. Insurance transfers money so 
as to equalize the marginal utilities in different 
states of the world. If an irreplaceable loss does 
not affect the marginal utility of money, then 
there is no demand for insurance. However,
irreplaceable losses may affect the marginal 
utility in ways such that there is demand for 
overinsuring, for full insurance, for less than 
full insurance or even for the opposite of 
insurance i.e. claims when no loss occurs and the 
payment of "premiums" when a "loss" occurs.
74. Cf. Cook and Graham, The Demand for insurance and
Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities,




























































































There is another problem. A manufacturer is not in the 
same position as a specialised insurance company which can 
group together a number of similar risks which will 
average out in some way. Rather, one would suspect that 
product faults are related, so that individual risks are 
positively correlated. The manufacturer therefore requires 
double insurance to cover this risk. The crisis in the 
product liability system in the US demonstrates that the 
total risk in the case of CF may turn out to be 
uninsurable.
VI. Economic analysis of the EC Product Liability 
Directive (PLD) and its incorporation into German Law
The EC PLD postulates strict liability75 76 for the
manufacturer. The principle of CF is, however, encountered 
in major areas. Furthermore, the definition of what 
consitutes a faulty product is open to ..interpretation. A 
number of distinguished commentators ' therefore do not 
foresee any major changes to the German legal position. 
This is because duties of care on the part of the 
manufacturer are reintroduced by means of the term 
'product defect'; these duties had previously constituted 
negligence according to Art. 823,1 BGB. In the following 
paragraphs we will show that economic analysis suggests a 
different interpretation of the term 'product defect', one 
which corresponds better to the intention of the PLD. 
Furthermore, we show that not all of the depatures from 
the principle of CF contained in the PLD in the Product 
Liability Law (PLL) have a sound economic basis, but that 
on the other hand, other approaches do not go far enough.
1. Freedom of contract and the PLD
Article 1 of the EC Directive states that:
The producer shall be liable for damage caused by a
defect in his product.
75. Cf. Taschner, Die kiinftige Produzentenhaftung in 
Deutschland, NJW, 1986, p. 611.
76. Schmidt.Salzer, Der Fehlerbegriff der EG-
Richtlinie, Produkthaftung, Betriebsberater, 6,
1988, pp. 349-356 also Schlechtriem, Angleichung 
der Produkthaftung in der EG, Versicherungsrecht, 





























































































The liability of the producer arising from this 
Directive may not, in relation to the injured person, 
be limited or excluded by a provision limiting his 
liability or exempting him from liability.
Arts. 1,1 and 14 of the PLL translate these regulations 
into German law without modifications.
In future, the buyer will not prima facie be able to 
subject himself to certain risks, even if he were prepared 
to do so in full knowledge of all circumstances. This 
limitation on the freedom of contract would seem to imply 
that certain dangerous products will no longer be offered 
in the future. Whether or not this will be the case 
depends on how the term 'defective' interpreted.
2. The term 'defective'
Article 6 of the EC directive states:
(1) A product is defective, when it does not provide the 
safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking 
all circumstances into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected 
that the product would be put;
(c) the time when the product was put into
circulation.
(2) A product shall not be considered defective for the 
sole reason that a better product is subsequently put 
into circulation.
The German statute implementing the Directive differs from 
this formulation without constituting a major change in 
content. ' In the PLL, Art. 3 Defect, it is stated:
(1) A product is defective, if it does not offer that 
level of safety which can be expected, taking into 
account all circumstances, in particular
a) its presentation,
b) the use to which it can be expected to be put,




























































































c) the time at which it was introduced into the 
market.
(2) A product is not faulty simply because an improved 
produce was later introduced into the market.
The definition of product defect in la) and lb) gives the 
manufacturer the opportunity to exclude liability by 
presenting the product in a suitable way and by including 
warnings regarding any product risks. However, this is 
only true to the extent that the legal position depends on 
the conscious perception of the user. If the courts oblige 
the manufacturer to take into account duties of care which 
require a higher standard of product safety, irrespective 
of presentation and notices, this defence to liability is 
no longer open to the manufacturers. This issue also 
constitutes the main interpretational problem in the 
context of what is a faulty or defective product. Is the 
product defect term exclusively related to the safety 
expectations of the user in relation to the actual safety 
and the intended use of the product, or alternatively, 
could duties of care on the part of the manufacturers 
influence the interpretation of the term 'defective'. This 
latter interpretation would imply that a manufacturer+s 
care would have to be measured against a concept of 
negligence. This being the case, the EC Directive will not 
have brought about strict liability.
3. Interpretation of term 'defective'
Neither the EC Directive nor the German PLL give any 
indication, whether liability should be determined by the 
reasonable expectations of the user or the reasonable 
expectations of the manufacturer. If both are relevant, 
there is no indication of their relative importance.
7 8Schmidt-Salzer (like other commentators) claims that 
the expectation of both interested parties are relevant, 
and suggests using the defect term employed in the context 
of US product liability law in order to assess their 
relative importance. In the US, a product is considered 
defective if it is unreasonably dangerous. It is therefore 
not the fact that a product is dangerous per se, but that 
it is unnecessarily so. This 'unreasonableness' will 
primarily have its cause in the sphere of control of 
manufacturers. This provides a link to the established



























































































German view in the context of liability for negligence, 
which is based on the duty of the manufacturer to exercise 
due care. Thus, product hazards can only be regarded as 
unnecessary or unreasonable in the general context of the 
design and the production of a product, in particular its 
cost and price, and the situation in which it will 
forseeably be used. According to Schmitd-Salzer, courts 
will have to assess the trade-off between technically 
possible standards of safety on the one hand and costs on 
the other hand. They will also have to assess the validity 
of manufacturers' expectations in relation to the intended 
use, misuse, or incorrect use of the product.
Where the question of who is responsible for how a product 
is used is concerned, manufacturers' and users' interests 
are no longer equally important, according to Schmitd- 
Salzer. Users need ask themselves, what use they can 
"reasonably" make of a product. The basis for a conclusion 
would be the justified expectations of the manufacturer. 
Only if the manufacturer has to expect a certain use, does 
he have to ensure the necessary safety of the product in 
such circumstances. It is only this extent of safety 
which the user can rely on. The safety standards of a 
product which can reasonably be expected on the part of 
the user will be limited by manufacturers' expectations of 
the uses to which this product will reasonably be put.
If the courts were to follow this interpretation of what 
constitutes a defective product, considerations would have 
to be extremely complex. Moreover, although we have an 
indication of which factors should be considered, their 
relative importance remain unclear.
81Schlechtriem takes a slightly different position.
According to him, what is important in the context of 
product safety is what is generally expected and what can 
generally be expected. This formulation - he claims - 
could be interpreted as duties of care on the part of the 
manufacturer as under present law.
4. The 'information defect concept' as suggested by 
economic analysis
79. Cf. Schmidt-Salzer, (1988), p. 355.
80. Schmidt-Salzer, (1988), p. 353.
81. Schlechtriem, Angleichung der Produkthaftung in der
EG, Versicherungsrecht, Voi. 41, 1985, pp. 1033-




























































































There are three situations in which the principle of 
Caveat Fabricator is superior to the principle of Caveat 
Emptor:
(1) If buyers incorrectly assess the dangers associated 
with a product, they can be protected by the liability 
of the manufacturers.
(2) If buyers cannot insure product risks in the insurance 
market, there is a need for insurance through the 
manufacturers.
(3) Given the delictual law of the FRG basing claims of
bystanders on negligence, their„_ risks are not
appropriately taken into account.
If it is not the case that at least one of these 
conditions is present, then strict liability on the part 
of the manufacturers cannot bring buyers any advantages.
The lack of insurance protection, condition (2) does not 
require the introduction of the principle of Caveat 
Fabricator, i.e. compulsory insurance on the part of the 
manufacturer. Rather, it would make sense to provide 
general insurance against product risk. Thus illness and 
social security insurance could be augmented by a product 
insurance policy. The fact that such a policy is generally 
not for sale might indicate that either demand for such a 
policy is not high, or that because of moral hazard and 
adverse selection effects the premium cannot be calculated 
or would be too high. It is also possible that such a 
policy is not for sale, because manufacturers at present 
tend to carry the liability burden themselves anyway.
Consequently, the most important reason why the principle 
of Caveat Fabricator would be superior -will be the 
perception of risk on the part of the buyer. From the
point of view of economic analysis a system of liability 
would be ideal which only in this case removes autonomy 
from the contract parties and lets the manufacturer be 
strictly liable for damages and accidents in the use of
82. Cf. Epstein, Modern Products Liability Law, 
Westport, 1980, pp. 59-60.
83. More generally there is a trade-off between welfare 
losses due to incomplete information and the 
welfare looses due to heterogeneous consumers 
discussed in section IV.2. In this paper it will be 
argued that consumers are relatively homogeneous 
while industrial user are relatively heterogeneous. 




























































































products. The term +product defect' according to the PLD 
and the PLL would then be interpreted as follows: A
product is defective if the actual safety of a product 
does not correspond to that level of safety which is 
expected by a sufficiently well-informed gijyer who is 
concerned with the proper use of the product.
The 'informational product fault' concept has the
following characteristics:
(1) The manufacturer can exclude liability for product 
risks by concisely pointing these out, provided the 
sufficiently well-informed consumer can digest this 
information. Misleading advertising on the other hand 
will automatically lead to liability.
(2) Buyers can still buy unreasonably dangerous products. 
If product risks have been pointed out to them, and 
they still persist in buying the products, they carry 
the consequences of their actions.
(3) Faults in production and usage instructions lead to 
the liability of the manufacturer, because of the 
divergence between expectations of users and the 
actual safety of products.
(4) Dangerous design will lead to liability on the part of 
the manufacturer only if the reasonable user 
underestimates the risks inherent in a product.
(5) The buyer or user of products is required to inform 
him/herself about product risks, since liability will 
not depend on his/her particular level of information, 
but on the information available to a sensible 
consumer whose aim is to use the product in a careful 
manner.
What then are the advantages of such an 'informational 
product defect' concept? This concept results in a change 
in the system of liability exactly at the moment where the 
application of Caveat Emptor no longer leads to an optimal 
allocation, and the principle of Caveat Fabricator lead to 
a better allocation. For non-defective products we have 
Caveat Emptor, for defective products we have Caveat 
Fabricator. In view of condition (3), a consistent 
interpretation of the informational product defect concept 
requires that the buyer/owner of a non-defective product is strictly liable for product risks affecting bystanders. 
For a non-defective product is one whose risks can be




























































































expected to be known to the product user. Hence, the user 
should be held liable for resulting losses.
The informational 'defect term' also sheds light on the 
issue of liability for products in industrial use and 
liability for development risks.
5. Industrial use
The industrial use of products is characterised by the 
fact that the use to which products are put is 
heterogeneous. Thus an electric switch can be used to 
switch on an office lamp or to switch on an emergency 
power generator. The consequences of a product defect 
substantialy vary. In particular, in the context of 
material damages it seems than in the case of industrial 
use of products is more differentiated that their private 
use. In section IV.2 it was explained that in the presence 
of heterogeneous buyers the principle of Caveat Fabricator 
leads to misallocations. Also, one can expect that 
industrial users will be able to come to a better 
assessment of the risks of certain products than private 
buyers. The informational product defect term would 
therefore imply that when products are used for industrial 
purposes, the buyer or user would generally have to carry 
the risk of damages. The informational product defect term 
thus corresponds to the definition of damages in the PLD, 
Art 9). This states:
For the purpose of Article 1, 'damage' means:
(a) damage caused by death or by personal injuries;
(b) damage to, or destruction of, any item of property 
other than the defective product itself, with a lower 
threshold of 500 ECU, provided that the item of 
property:
(i) is of a type ordinarily intended for private use 
or consumption, and
(ii) was used by the injured person mainly for his 
own private use or consumption.
85. The European Court in Brussels ruled 
commercial buyers of insurance can be 
make well-informed choices and that 





































































































This ArticLe shall relate to non-material damages without 
prejudice to national provisions.
Article 9 was included in para. 1,1 of the PLL:
If a person is killed, or harmed in body or in 
health, due to the defective nature of a product, or 
similarly, if an object is damaged, then the 
manufacturer is obliged to remedy the resulting 
damage. In the case of material damages, 
compensation must only be paid if another object 
other than the defective product has been damaged, 
and this other object is normally used for private purposes and has been used in such a way by the 
injured party.
Even if the Directive and PLL remove in part industrial 
sphere from the liability of the manufacturer, the 
industrial user still has the opportunity to claim damages 
by way of para. 823,1, which deals with delictual 
liability. One should therefore consider whether this 
option should be limited or ruled out in the case of 
industrial use of products in order to achieve a more 
efficient allocation.
6. Development risks
Article 7e) of the PLD states:
The producer shall not be liable as a result of this 
Directive if he proves that the state of scientific 
and technical knowledge at the time he marketed the 
product was not such as to enable the defect in the 
product to be discovered.
The EC does give Member States the option, however, to 
make manufacturers liable for development risks. The 
German PLL does not take up this option. In para. 2,2(5) 
it is stipulated:
Liability for damages is ruled out, if the fault 
could not be recognized, given the state of science 
and technology at the time the product was put into 
circulation.
Development risks can thus be characterised by the 
condition that neither the user, nor the manufacturer 
recognizes the risk of a product. A product is faulty, if 
it does not display that level of safety which the 




























































































Consequently, the EC directive recognises a cause for 
liability which is removed by the inclusion of Art 7e).
The economic reasoning for this exclusion could be as 
follows. Imposing liability on the manufacturer can only 
prevent damages occurring if the manufacturers' assessment 
of the advantages of increased safety and the 
disadvantages of greater costs takes place under a 
situation where the buyer is given improved information. 
Where this asymmetry is not present, the principle of 
Caveat Fabricator will not lead to a more advantageous 
allocation.
Two other issues need to be taken into account, however. 
In general, buyer and manufacturer expectations with 
respect to development risks are not symmetrical. The 
manufacturer who is concerned with the design of a product 
generally has more information as to where risks may be 
present. Furthermore, under the principle of CF the 
manufacturer collects information on incidents of damage 
or injury involving his products and can assess 
development risks at an early stage. This is the principle 
of self-correction following fault perceptions on the part 
of the manufacturer. This self-correction will not take 
place as long as dangers are only latently present and do 
not lead to claims by injured parties.
Secondly, the incentive to develop new safety techniques 
is not necessarily optimal. This incentive is a result of 
the advantages over competing producers which can be 
gained by developing new safety precautions. Such an 
advantage can only be gained if the new safety precautions 
are correctly assessed by buyers. Incorrect perceptions on 
the part of the buyer with respect to the risks and their 
possible reduction will not lead to a efficient 
incentive to develop safer products. Also, this incentive 
may disappear if competitors can copy new developments.
86. Indeed, this suggests that a product can be
defective and the producer can be held liable even 
if he excercises proper care. Thus, the
interpretation of the notion of the product defect 
by Schmidt-Salzer (1988) or by Schlechtriem (1986) 
is not consistent with the logic of the EC- 
Directive .
87. When risks are over-estimated, the incentive to 




























































































Patent law and its effectiveness is clearly important 
here.
VII. Limitations of product liability
From the point of view of economic analysis we have shown 
in the previous section that the optimal product liability 
laws should be neither of the strict liability type, nor 
should they be based purely on liability for negligence. 
Only a hybrid system can satisfy the requirements of a law 
which will influence the economy in a range of ways. 
Wherever rules must be combined in complex ways, however, 
there is the danger that the influence of special interest 
groups will lead to discrepancies between the best
possible formulation of a law and its formulation in 
practice. The result will be laws which will uphold 
particular interests to the detriment of the rest of the 
economy.
1. The limitation of damages 
Article 16 of the EC PLD states:
(1) Any Member State may provide that a producer's total 
liability for damage resulting from a death or 
personal injury and caused by identical items with the 
same defect shall be limited to an amount which may 
not be less than 70 million ECUs.
(2) Ten years after the date of notification of this 
Directive, the Commission shall submit to the Council 
a report on the effect on consumer protection and the 
functioning of the common market of the implementation 
of the financial limit on liability by those Member 
States which have used the option provided for in 
paragraph 1. In the light of this report the Council, 
acting on a proposal from the Commission and pursuant 
to the terms of Article 100 of the Treaty, shall 
decide whether to repeal paragraph 1.
Article 16 (1) was included following the wishes of the 
Germans against the majority of member countries. 
Liability for serial damages can thus be limited. The 
argument used by the Germans was that the possibility of 
insuring against product risks would only be possible if 
there was some sort of a limitation to damages. Other 
countries, such as France, argued that it is possible to 




























































































reaching product risk liability. The argument put 
forward by the German side is wrong in principle, however. 
If liability is unlimited, insurance with limited cover 
will be more easily available and most likely cheaper, 
because the producer bears the upper tail of the risk and 
thus has an incentive to avoid large losses. Why should 
liability principles be limited by the extent to which the 
associated risk of being held liable can be insured? 
Companies are also liable for pgpfits and losses although 
these risks cannot be insured.
The PLL limits liability to 160 million DM in para. 10:
§10 Limitations to damages
(1) If death or bodily harm are caused by a product or by 
products with the same fault, the responsible party is 
only liable up to a maximum sum of DM 160 million.
(2) If damages to injured parties exceed the amount 
stipulated in (1), individual damage payments will be 
reduced pro rata.
The maximum sum of damages generally puts a ceiling on the 
potential liability of a company, not only in the case a 
serial product defect case. This risk, however, is
already limited by the capital base of a company (in the 
case of a property liability company). This means that 
larger companies with a large capital base will profit 
from this regulation. Firms with smaller capital base than 
the limit do not have an advantage. This implies that a 
maximum sum discriminates against medium-sized and smaller 
companies.
The generai criticism voiced against maximum damages is 
that it remains unclear how this maximum sum should be 
divided among claimants if there are a series of claims 
which only become apparent after a long time. It could be 
the case, for example, that the total sum of damages 
cannot be established for half a century or more.
88
88. Cf. Finsinger, Verbraucherschutz auf
Versicherungsmàrkten, München, 1988, Chapter 2, pp. 
20-23. The German Office for Insurance Regulation 
holds that insurers should not be allowed to 
provide unlimited cover.
89. The same argument is at present being used to limit 
liability for environmental damages.
90. It will have to be seen whether this is consistent 




























































































From the point of view of economic analysis, the following 
aspect seems to be more important. The manufacturer should 
be liable in those areas where he is in a better position 
to assess risks than a buyer. The assessment of the 
manufacturer should then replace the assessment on the 
part of the buyer. The manufacturer's assessment, however, 
can only then lead to the correct decision relating to 
product safety, if he compares the total expected costs of 
damages with the cost of reducing these by implementing 
safety precautions.
This argument only holds true if there is an information 
asymmetry between producer and buyer. If the buyer is 
fully informed about the risks he is taking and, if 
furthermore the buyer can foresee the pro-rata division of 
the maximum damages between different claimants, he/she 
can accomodate the insufficient expectation (because it 
neglects the tail end of the distribution) on the part of 
the manufacturer by adding this risk to the purchase 
price. As long as buyers take into account the effects of 
limitations in liability in their purchases, there is no 
loss in allocation. A type of Coase Theorem of Liability 
is borne out.
2. Non-material damages and the bagatelle clause
91According to Art 9 of the EC directive , the 
administration of non-material damages is left to national 
law. In a number of EC countries, such as Germany, non­
material damages can only be claimed in part. In other EC 
member countries the conditions for claiming damages are 
more favourable. The remaining national differences 
conflict with the aim of the directive to unify liability 
law.
As has been shown in section V, there are a number of 
reasons why compulsory insurance of non-material damages 
on the part of the manufacturers may not be warranted from 
a theoretical point of view. The same arguments apply, 
however, as far as the manufacturer's incentive to compare 
safety and costs is concerned, which have been made in the 
context of maximum damages. If buyers are well-informed, 
they can arithmetically divide expected damages into non­
material and other damages and calculate any expected 
damages. This would enable them to choose the optimal




























































































level of protection via their product purchase in spite of 
the fact that maximum damages are limited. The irrelevance 
of liability ceilings does not stand up if buyers 
incorrectly perceive risk, i.e. ' if there is asymmetric 
information. These same theoretical arguments can be 
applied to the case of the bagatelle clause which 
postulates that the first 500 ECU of damages are carried 
by the injured party. The PLL states in §11:
In the case of damage to property, liability is 
limited to claims in excess of 1125 DM.
We only need to add, that buyers should easily be in a 
position to take into account this personal contribution 
in their purchasing decision. Buyers' 'calculations' are 
in this case simpler than in the case of a maximum sum of 
liability. The full personal contribution is, however, DM 
1125 plus the non-material damages which are not 
compensated.
3. The exception of agricultural products
According to Article 2 of the Directive:
For the purpose of this Directive 'product' means all 
movables, with the exception of primary agricultural 
products and game, even though incorporated into 
another movable or into an immovable. 'Primary 
agricultural products' mean the produce of the soil, 
of stock-farming and of fisheries, excluding products 
which have undergone initial processing. 'Product' 
includes electricity.
Since no common consensus could be found within the EC 
whether it is consumers or these sectors who are more in 
need of protection, the following option was included in 
the Directive:
Article 15, 1. (a) :
1. Each Member State may:
(a) by way of derogation from Article 2, provide in its 
legislation that within the meaning of Article 1 of 
this Directive 'product' also means primary 
agricultural products and game.
The Germans have not used this option. This may mean that 
from the German goverment's perspective consumers of 
foodstuffs are less in need of protection than any other 




























































































well-informed about the dangers inherent in certain foods. 
Indeed, the government proposing the PLL seems to believe 
that the contamination of food with dangerous substances 
is as well known to consumers as it is to the producers 
who are responsible. If consumers still insist on 
purchasing sprayed, hormone enriched, conserved, dyed, and 
radiated foodstuffs, this must be their own free^ecision 
in the market? Some weight was given to arguments^* such 
as the idea that agricultural products are perishable and 
deteriorate easily, that there are risks in agriculture 
over which the producer has no control. Furthermore, it 
was recognized that the distribution system makes 
identification of the producer difficult and it may be 
costly to inform buyers of produce about its contents or 
contamination and the resulting health effects. The 
exclusion of agriculture is in line with the general 
policy of taking away risks from agriculture and with the 
tendency to regulate this "industry" rather than relying 
on decentralized market mechanisms.
§ 2 of the PLL states:
A product in the sense of this law is any moveable 
object, even if it is a part of another moveable 
object or an unmoveable object, as well as 
electricity. Exceptions to this definition are fruits 
of the earth, animals, fishery and hunting produce, 
as long as they have not been subjected to an initial 
production process.
92. Similar arguments were presented by the Scottish 
Law Commission before the Consumer Protection Act 
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PART FOUR : THE EUROPEAN ISSUES
SETTING UP A COMMUNITY PRODUCT SAFETY POLICY: 
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
Marc Fallon
There are several ways of analysing the setting up of a 
Community product safety policy. On the one hand, rules 
have to be adopted, whose aim to ensure the marketing of 
sufficiently safe products; on the other hand, the respect 
of these rules by the producer ought to be controlled, in 
order to ensure their efficiency.
In strictly institutional terms, the first aspect does not 
present any new problem today. The Community's power to 
adopt harmonization measures, in the broadest sense - 
since the adoption of the Single Act -, is unquestionable, 
not only in relation to the directive of 25 july 1985 on 
products liability, but also the general statement on 
product safety, proclaimed in Council Resolution of 25 
june 1987.
The setting up of a common safety control process is more 
complicated, however, because it is a new conception. One 
wonders whether an authority could be created at 
international or Community level to control individual 
observance of Community safety legislation.
It is well known at present that most legislative 
instruments, at both Community and national levels, 
concern prevention in a global sense and compensation. 
Prevention policy takes into account the protection of 
users in the definition of marketing norms for products, 
and imposes as well certain safety duties on the State or 
the producer. These duties are diverse. As regards the 
producer, he can be asked to ensure that the products are 
safe for a normal use, and to inform public authorities of 
the arrangements made for this. The State has to ensure 
application of Community law, and to cooperate with the




























































































Commission by transmitting informations^to him about 
dangerous products and accidents occurred.
But not one of these enactments really concerns a decision 
process implying that measures be taken in order to 
prevent or limit injurious effects of an accident that is 
foreseen or actually occurs. In such cases, the State has 
in accordance to certain Community acts, only to transmit 
all relevant information to the Commission. Thus, the 
"Seveso" directive, relating to major industrial 
accidentsl, and the directive relating to the control of 
transfrontier shipment of hazardous waste, only provide 
that Member States take "all necessary measures" 0 in 
the case of an accident.
More generally, actual secondary Community law leaves the 
task of intervention to Member States, limiting the 
establishment of "Community control processes" to a 
duty to "cooperate" and inform the Commission. At first 
sight, it seems clear that there is no political intention 
to go further; this can been read in the preamble of the 
Council Resolution of 25 june 1987 relating to civil 
protection. In some areas however. Community 
institutions directly control the application of Community 
law by individuals. The case of competition policy is an 
often cited example, but one can consider also the powers 
conferred in the field of fisheries, of anti-dumping 
control and, in the particular context of the Euratom 
Treaty, of nuclear energy. None of these cases concerns a 
field covered by a common policy in the sense intended by 
the treaties.
This study supports the view that the implementation of a 
general common control process of product safety in 
Europe, giving intervention powers to a common organ, is
94. See Council Decision 84/133 of 2 March 1984,
O.J.E.C., 1984, L 70/16; Council Decision 85/138 of 
22 April 1986, O.J.E.C., 1986, L 109/23. 1 82/501,
24.06.1982, O.J.E.C., 1982, L 230. 2 84/631, 
6.12.1984, O.J.E.C., 1984, L 326/31.
95. See also in this sense, Council Decision 86/85 of 6
March 1986, O.J.E.C., 1986, L 77/33, in the field
of sea polution.
96. Term used by the Court of Justice in case 42/82,
22.03.1983, "Italian wine".




























































































possible and appropriate from a legal perspective. It does 
not analyse the opportunity or effectiveness of such a 
process.
This statement needs to be answered by considering the 
following two questions : what could one envisage as the 
basis for such intervention powers in Community law? What 
would be the institutional constraints in this context?
S I . -  Basis for Community powers
Without considering here the American experience in the 
field of multistate safety policy, one can foresee in the 
long term at least that the existence of a common control 
process in Europe is unavoidable for two reasons. First of 
all, the increase in multistate operations, due to the 
completion of an internal market, will require a 
multistate control of those aspects involving health and 
safety in so far as such operations can endanger people or 
properties across the frontiers, while national 
sovereignty, with the power of coercion, is limited to the 
frontier of the State (A). Secondly, the implementation of 
a common postmarket control authority, technically, is in 
accordance with the establishment of a Community safety 
policy (B).
A. - Limits of national jurisdiction in international 
cases
There are general principles of private, administrative or 
penal international law wich lead to the conclusion that, 
even in Europe, the State is not able to take all 
necessary measures in order to prevent an act wich 
occurred in its own territory having injurious effects 
abroad. Enactment of common provisions only, be it by way 
of treaty or of binding Community provisions, can ensure a 
multistate enforcement of such measures.
To support this statement one must respond no two 
objections, relating, respectively, to the effectiveness 
of State intervention and recent developments in the field 
of recognition of foreign safety standards.
1) The principle of territoriality
From a legal point of view, national authorities have the 
power to intervene with efficiency in order to control the 




























































































According to international law, no foreign State has any 
authority to use force on another State's territory 
without its consent. It falls to national authorities 
alone to decide whether a foreign act or decision may have 
an effect on its territory. Accordingly, only national 
decisions can benefit from enforcement in a given case. 
One must add that obviously, only local authorities are in 
a position to take measures requiring a nexus between the 
administration and the individual, such as is the case for 
inquiries.
On the other hand, by virtue of the E.E.C. Treaty, Member 
States have assumed certain duties, expressed in the 
general terms of article 5, on the basis of wich the Court 
of Justice has developed the duty to cooperate as a 
general principle of Community law. It means that the 
State has a duty to ensure execution of Community law, but 
also application thereof by individuals. Considering 
current institutional law, it is clear that national 
autorities appear as executive authorities of the 
Communities. Most Community instruments dealing with 
harmonisation of safety provisions, especially in relation 
to provisions implying certain duties in this field for 
undertakings, express the duty of the State to take all 
measures, be it by way of criminal sanctions*gin order . to 
ensure the respect of harmonized provisions.
These statements do not prevent national decisions having 
effect abroad, nor Community institutions being also the 
executive organs of Community law. Executive powers of the 
State are only subsidiary and prevail in so far as they 
are not superseded by a corresponding power attributed to 
such institution, be it the Council or the Commission. 
This statement is well established in areas covered by a 
common policy, for instancg agriculture, where States act 
only on Community's behalfy and have to seek harmony 
between divergent national executive decision-making 
processes. Even in other areas subject to the general
98. See for example Directive 75/319 of 20 May 1975
concerning medicinal products, O.J.E.C., 1975, L 
147/13; Regulation 2785/80 of 30 October 1980,
O.J.E.C., 1980, L 288/13, relating to the water
content of poultry.
99. Case 804/79, 5.05.1981, United Kingdom.





























































































provisions relating to free movement of goods, State 
intervention remains under Community law control, as will 
be seen below.
The absence of effects 
explanations.
abroad requires two types of
(a) No international effects of a criminal or
administrative decision
Municipal administrative or criminal decisions cannot lead 
to an order abroad, for example on admissibility of 
evidence, conceding a product recall or to obtain payment 
of a fine. It is only possible to take into 
consideration such a foreign decision : in this particular 
instance, a case brought before a national autority tends 
to receive a criminal sentence for example, but the 
criminal law applied by this autority must take into 
consideration, as a mitigating factor against the penalty, 
the existence of a foreign condemnation.
Recognition of foreign decisions is possible on the other 
hand in commercial and civil matters, even without a 
treaty, under the conditions edicted by the State where 
enforcement must take place. Most countries admit this 
possibility, subject to two types of conditions, 
substantive - as the control of public policy -, and 
procedural - the exequatur procedure. The Brussels 
Convention of 27 September 1968 illustrates general rules 
in force in several European countries in these matters. 
Thus, an injunction or a daily fine decided by a civil 
jurisdiction on behalf of an individual plaintiff, must be 
enforced in other Member States according to the 
conditions, such as the conformity to public policy, 
provided by this Convention.
An international instrument, such as a treaty, can 
facilitate the enforcement of foreign decisions. At the 
present time however, coercive measures cannot be based on
101. See recently, in the United Kingdom, United States 
of America v. Inkley, C.A., 25 March 1988, 3 W.L.R. 
(1988) 304; D. FLORE, "Le jugement r pressif au-
del des fronti res nationales", Annales de droit 
de Louvain, 1988, 105-145; F.A. MANN, "L'ex cation 
internationale des droits publics", Rev. crit. dr. 




























































































the foreign decision itself, but rather on the coercive 
effect of a national decision giving the exequatur to the 
foreign measure, after control of some substantive 
conditions. This is the case even for the Brussels 
Convention of 27 September 1968 concerning civil and 
commercial matters. In the field of administrative or 
criminal decisions, some treaties introduce a cooperation 
mechanism between national authorities but, conforming to 
the above mentioned principle, do not permit direct 
international enforcement.
By way of contrast, one can find some unilateral Community 
statutes providing for such direct international effect. 
Thus, the Directiye_73/239 of 24 July 1973 in the field of 
direct insurance1 provides that withdrawal of an 
agreement to furnish insurance services by the State of 
control of the company, obliges the State where services 
are furnished to withdraw its own agreement (art. 22,1 ).
(b) Extraterritorial application of national law
It is true that a State can decide to apply national 
provisions, even in administrative or criminal matters, to 
acts or facts occurring partially abroad. Such a provision 
would not violate a so called extraterritoriality 
principle , since - as far as such a principle could exist 
in international law -, applicability of the rule is based 
on a territorial.factor, whether or not part only of the 
relevant conduct. For example, Belgian law can impose a 
fine in cases where a producer established in Belgium 
proceeds to export and/or commercialise unsafe products in 
a foreign country. A conviction in this sense would have 
executive effect in Belgium, vis- -vis the Belgian 
producer and his properties located in Belgium.
As a matter of fact, most market rules of industrial 
countries, including Community rules, do not provide as 
yet for their application to exportations. This extension 
remains exceptional, and is rather the result of pressures 
of public opinion or international organisations, as the
102. O.J.E.C., 1973, L 228/3.
103. About this widely discussed question on 
extraterritorial application of law, see recently 
the answer given by the Court of Justice, case 





























































































Nevertheless, even if the law provides for its application 
to facts abroad, nothing can be done to prevent foreign 
marketing from taking place. In such a case, the 
imposition of a fine in the State of origin does not imply 
by itself a parallel conviction in the exporting State. 
Indeed, neither the administrative or criminal law of the 
first State, nor administrative or criminal decisions 
based on it in this State, are enforceable as such in a 
second State.
To this extent, a mere recommendation of the Commission of 
the European Communities to Member States to consider or 
to respect measures taken by a State, seems to be 
unsufficient, because such an atypical act, without 
binding effect, could not by itself give any effect abroad 
to national measures. It seems doubtful whether, given the 
present state of Community law, the general duty to 
cooperate, in the sense of article 5 of the E.E.C. Treaty, 
implies by itself such enforcement without any control of 
national authorities concerned.
By comparison, a Community individual act could be 
enforceable ipso facto, conforming to Art. 189 of the 




act or decision. But a distinction has to be
If said decision is addressed to the State and not to
individuals, it has no direct effect on individuals. If 
the State does not comply with the Community decision, a 
consumer could not invoke, by virtue of Community law, 
this decision to obtain a measure be taken concerning the 
product. He can only use legal mechanisms provided for by 
national law, in particular a State.liability regime in so 
far as it is organized by this law. s
104. See recently Regulation 1734/88 of 16 June 1988, 
O.J.E.C. 1988, L 155/2, in the field of environment 
protection.
105. By way of contrast, such decision has effect vis- - 
vis each authority of the State, be it 
jurisdictional or administrative, whose function is 
to ensure the application of law. See Court of 





























































































If a Community decision is addressed directly to 
individuals, i.e. to undertakings involved in the 
production or marketing process of a product, and this 
decision contains a pecuniary obligation, such as a fine, 
in the sense of Art. 192 of the E.E.C. Treaty, it is 
directly enforceable in any Member State, under the purely 
administrative conditions of the executory procedure 
provided by this Article. However, the standing - in a 
procedural sense - of users about this decision is not 
obvious. They could hardly ask for an annulment by the 
Court of Justice, following present case law of the Court. 
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether they could request 
enforcement, in the sense of article 192 of the E.E.C. 
Treaty, by national authorities.
2) Limits of the new approach relating to standards
The new perspectives offered by, respectively, recent 
developments of the European Court case law, the new 
approach relating to standardisation and the Single Act, 
do not suffice to affect the present state of 
international enforcement of national measures.
The Court of Justice's interpretation of Art. 36 of the 
E.E.C. Treaty, more precisely the proportionality 
principle, indicates that an importing State can proceed 
to make controls in individual cases based on legitimate 
interests, such as the protection of health, by way of 
sampling, even when regulation in the exportinijj0gtate can 
be considered equivalent to its own regulation. If an 
undertaking has obtained a conformity certification from 
the exporting State, i. e. an individual administrative 
decision of national character, the importing State still 
has jurisdiction to control the conformity of this product 
to its own standards on safety grounds, in order to uphold 
prosecution of infringements of national or Community
106. See for example Court of Justice, case 42/82,
22.03.1983, "Italian wine", and the position of the 
Commission as described by S. LECRENIER, "Vers 
l'achèvement du marché intérieur : l'évolution des 
procédures de contrôle prévues par la directive 






























































































The Council Resolution of 7 may 1985 confirms the
latest case law of the Court of Justice, stressing State 
intervention by affirming its general power to control by 
way of sampling, in accordance with its new responsibility 
concerning putting into circulation of products. It only 
excludes a systematic control, prior to marketing.
According to the said Resolution, safeguard clauses enable 
States to take all measures, such as recall orders, with a 
view to ensuring safety of persons, animals or goods. Such 
measures have to be transmitted to the Commission, wich, 
if it considers the measure to be well-founded, extends to 
other States a so called duty also to forbid the
marketing of such product. But the text of the Resolution 
does not explain the nature or the origin of this duty. In 
any case, it could not be based on any principle of 
international law. Nor could a mere recommendation or 
notification from the Commission suffice to raise such a 
duty to cooperate in the sense of art. 5 of the E.E.C. 
Treaty, unless a liberal interpretation is given to mutual 
assistance between States in this context. If non­
binding, such recommendation cannot even lead to an 
annulment procedure before the Court of Justice. A 
decision merely containing information cannot have the 
same mandatory effect as an order to enforce a foreign 
national decision without allowing for control.
In Art. 100A, the Single Act confirms the right of the 
State to adopt general measures (§ 4) or individual
decisions (§ 5), subject to the control of Community law, 
in order to ensure safety of consumer products.
107
108
107. E. Regulation 359/79 of 5 February 1979, O.J.E.C., 
1979, L 54/136, concerning cooperation between 
national autorities to verify compliance with 
Community and national provisions in the wine 
sector; Directive 84/631 of 6 December 1984 
relating to the control of transfrontier shipment 
of hazardous waste, O.J.E.C., 1984, L 326/31,
admitting that exportation can only occur if the 
producer obtained an autorisation from the State of 
destination : this implies that the authorization
of the exportating State does net suffice.




























































































For all these reasons, there seems to be a need for some 
Community system ensuring uniformity of decisions for 
unsafe products. Such a system could be based on a common 
rule of recognition and enforcement of foreign 
administrative or criminal decisions, similar to the 
Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 relating to 
commercial or civil matters. Instead of limiting the 
intervention process to national measures only, this 
system could also adopt a proper Community process, 
centered on real Community decisions directly enforceable 
in all Member States, addressed either to States, either 
to individuals concerned. On an efficiency point of view, 
it could lead to intervention on an earlier date in the 
whole Community in emergency cases.
3. - Completion of a Community safety policy
The establishment of a proper Community intervention 
process in order to take preventive measures concerning a 
particular unsafe product, seems coherent with the 
completion of a Community safety policy, and even with the 
Community's free movement of goods regime.
In so far as several Council resolutions have formulated a 
consumer policy of the European Communities, namely in the 
field of the protection of the safety of persons and of 
goods, such implementation normally supposes that 
decisions could be taken at this Community level by an 
organ whose responsibility is to conduct such policy,*i.e. 
to organize a safety system and to control its efficiency.
Furthermore, a full regime of free movement of goods 
necessarily includes considerations relating to the social 
effects of production and marketing. Article 36 of the 
E.E.C. Treaty illustrates this statement largely about the 
protection of health and safety, and in the 1980's the 
Court of Justice added to such legitimate aims the 
environment protection. The Single Act also confirms 
this general statement about environment, and imposes on 
the institutions a duty to ensure a high level of 
protection concerning safety of products (Art. 100A, § 3).
Considering the control of the application of Community 
safery regulations by individuals, the State, it is true, 
is entitled - and even obliged, as seen above - to enact




























































































sanctions, for its own territory. This does not imply, 
however, that such powers belong to the State by virtue of 
national law, and that Community institutions cannot claim 
such powers as their own. This concern relates to 
execution of Community law, and it can be stated that 
States powers in this area are not exclusive, but rather 
subsidiary to,.a corresponding intervention of Community 
institutions.
§ 2. - Institutional requirements
If the implementation of a special multistate organ in 
Europe is deemed to be feasible from a legal point of 
view, taking into consideration present state of Community 
law and international administrative or criminal law, this 
perspective leads to three types of questions, namely, 
which organ could be designated, what types of powers and 
acts could be attributed and enacted, and to what extent 
might such an organ be controlled?
These questions require answers from a Community law 
perspective. Other questions may arise considering the 
general structure of European economic - i.e. substantive 
- law. Thus, one wonders about the extent to wich it is 
convenient to consider some control processes adopted in 
other areas of Community law, e.g. safety of machines or 
toys, sanitary aspects of social policy, environment 
protection.
A. - Determination of a competent organ
A common control process must take into account the 
requirements of the institutional structure created by the 
Treaty, especially the balance of powers given to the 
different institutions.
This is especially true for the principles governing 
application and execution of Community law. The two 
concepts are not distinct in Community practice, despite 
the theoretical distinction established by Article 155 
concerning the attribution of powers to the Commission.
The attribution of executive powers and the implementation 
of a supervisory system for the application of Community





























































































law by individuals, must follow precise conditions, and 
new Article 145 makes them even stronger.
Since the Community powers are limited, there is no 
question of derogation or of adding on.
One can imagine several types of control organs, either a 
multistate agency without any Community interference, 
either a special comittee distinct from the Council and 
the Commission, or the Commission itself. It is also 
possible to modify national procedural laws in order to 
give the Commission prosecution powers before national 
courts. This formula seems politically unfeasible and does 
not reach an international efficiency objective, leaving 
the responsibility of coercive measures to the State.
3efore surveying these different proposals, it is useful 
to point out the general rules governing execution and/or 
application of Community law.
1) Principles governing the execution of Community law
In current Community law as updated by the Single Act, 
executive powers belong to the Council (Art. 145, E.E.C. 
Treaty). The latter can retain such powers in exceptional 
cases, but normally it must give an habilitation to the 
Commission, pursuant to the conditions set up by Council 
decision 87/373 of 13 July 1987, laying down the
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers 
conferred on the Commission.
There can be no delegation to another organ, except under 
a series of strict conditions..as is stressed by the Court 
of Justice in the Meroni case1 , and confirmed in opinion 
1/76 of 26 April 19771 relating to the "Fonds europ en 
d ’immobilisation de la navigation int rieure". Such
delegation may concern only strictly defined executive 
powers giving no discretion to the organ, so that no 
decision of substantial effect taken by such organ can 
supplant decisions to be taken normally by the institution 
designated by the Treaties, under the responsibility of 
the latter.
111. 0.J.E,•C., 1987, L 197/33
112. 9/5 6, 13.06.1958.




























































































Delegation may not imply any transfer of liability, so 
that powers transferred are strictly delineated and under 
control of the delegating institution. As a result, the 
creation of an autonomous organ cannot affect the 
jurisdictional control of the Court of Justice for said 
interventions.
2) Multistate agency
At first sight. Member States could decide to create by 
way of an international treaty an autonomous agency, being 
an international organization. This agency would receive 
the power to take measures in order to prevent or to limit 
damageable effects of an accident.
Such a perspective seems to be unrealistic, however, for 
several reasons.
From a practical point of view, this agency should be 
common to all Member States, and not only to some of them. 
Furthermore, to be able to intervene, it should have all 
useful informations relating to dangerous products at its 
disposal. It would lead to an administrative process 
parallel to the Community one. If such a process implies 
disruptions in the cooperation between Member States and 
the Commission in this respect, there could be an 
infringement to Article 5 of the E.E.C. Treaty. One should 
then consider the involvement of the Commission in the 
multistate process, and the treaty should describe the 
Community as a contracting party.
From a strictly legal point of view, the creation of such 
an agency does not itself seem incompatible with the 
E.E.C. Treaty, as long as the Council does not retain 
executive powers for itself or does not give any 
delegation to the Commission. In so far as national 
measures do not imply a market organisation in a field 
covered by a common policy in the sense of the Treaties, 
e.g in the case of agriculture, Member States have power
114. Contra : I. SCHWARTZ, "Le pouvoir normatif de la 
Communauté, notamment en vertu de l’article 235 
une compétence exclusive ou parallèle", Rev. M. C., 
1976, 280-290, but recognizing the possibility of a 
treaty between States when the Community
institutions do not deem their action as




























































































to take measures under the general requirements of the 
regime of free movement of goods. As has been seen before, 
this regime allows interventions in order to ensure safety 
of persons, if they are not discriminatory and respect the 
principle of proportionality.
The mere implementation of a multistate agency, however, 
could hardly reach the legally expected results. Indeed, 
the Treaty should provide for international efficiency of 
enforceable decisions taken by the agency. According to 
the present state of international law, this condition 
seems difficult to fulfil. As has been said above, even in 
treaties relating to commercial and civil matters, a 
foreign decision must be controlled by a national 
authority, whose decision confers enforceability to it, 
and such enforcement can still be refused if it is 
contrary to the public policy of the State. Multistate 
cooperation does not lead to the direct international 
enforcement of foreign decisions.
3) Community agency
Implementation of a Community agency has to take into 
account two principles of Community law, namely the 
principle of institutional balance between the Council and 
the Commission, and the restrictive conditions of the 
delegation of powers regime set up by the Court of 
Justice.
Under present Community law these conditions imply that, 
besides the Council, only the Commission has power to 
manage a safety policy implying enforceable interventions 
based on an appreciation power in the individual case.
Such habilitation could occur by way of a decision or of a 
regulation, instead of a directive. Considering the 
general nature of the provisions to be taken, namely when 
defining the substantial powers of the Commission, a 
regulation seems more convenient. As far as this basic 
regulation should go beyond a mere approximation of laws, 
Article I00A of the E.E.C. Treaty does not seem to serve 
as an appropriate legal basis. Therefore, Article 235 
should oe invoked.
B. - Determination of the powers of the organ
Giving intervention powers to the Commission, with 




























































































individual cases of accidents due to an unsafe product, 
necessitates answers to the following questions : what 
types of powers could be given to the Commission? What 
types of act, in a formal sense, could the Commission 
issue? What sort of cases could such intervention take 
place?
To answer these questions one must consider the functional 
objectives of the implementation of a Community 
intervention process in the field of product safety, i.e. 
setting up a rapid system leading to immediate uniformity 
of results. This implies a relatively simple procedure, 
opened in international cases only, where an immediate 
uniformity is required.
Community law gives some illustrations of the Commission's 
intervention, namely in the field of the competition 
policy or anti- dumping policy. For practical reasons and 
the coherence of the global process of application of 
Community law as well, it seems convenient to consider 
these experiences when implementing an intervention 
process in the field of products safety.
1) Types of acts
Without considering here the real content of intervention 
measures which could be taken or the way these powers 
should exactly be described in the basic delegation 
instrument, one can distinguish several types of measures 
and the form of acts to be adopted.
If the purpose is to give to the Commission the power to 
control the application of Community law through the 
producer, and more precisely to take measures in order to 
prevent damages or to limit the effects of an accident 
which has occurred or is likely to occur, the final 
decision could tend to forbid the marketing of a product, 
or to require its recall.
These measures would be surrounded by much collateral 
intervention, in the context of opening a procedure 
warranting a proper examination of the case and the 
effectiveness of orders taken, and considering the 
possibility of a parallel intervention in another State. 
Thus, as is the case in the field of competition or anti­
dumping policy, a decision to initiate a procedure would 
be taken. In the course of this procedure, a broad 
investigative power should permit a due examination of all 
the facts of the case. Furthermore, temporary safety 




























































































final measure is taken, the Commission should have the 
power - under the conditions set up by the basic 
habilitation regulation itself - to ensure its 
effectiveness by imposing a fine on undertakings that did 
not follow the enactments.
In relation to the form of the acts to be taken, the anti­
dumping policy shows that the Commission could use both 
the regulation and the decision.
A regulation seems to be the relevant instrument necessary 
to lay down general terms relating to the measures to be 
taken about a product or a category of products. Indeed, 
such measures can concern a wide range of undertakings,
i.e. the whole chain of production and of distribution of 
the product, or all producers of a finished product 
containing an unsafe substance. Therefore, a general 
instrument is to be preferred. Furthermore, such an act 
would by immediately applicable by any national authority.
A decision would be the appropriate instrument for 
investigative measures in the premises of an individual 
undertaking, or for the possible imposition of a fine to 
ensure proper execution of the regulation.
2) Types of intervention
It does not seem necessary to distinguish between an a 
priori intervention of the Commission, and an a 
posteriori intervention, i.e. after a State decided to 
take measures on its own territory. Indeed, for other 
States, the Community measures to be taken afterwards 
would have an a priori aspect. Furthermore, a proper 
safety policy at Community level implies that the common 
organ can initiate proceedings without any prior 
initiative from a Member State. The right for users and/or 
for users associations - if such right is recognized - to 
take action before the competent organ should be pointed 
out in the basic regulation. Of course, interrelation of 
existing national procedures and the initiation of a 
Community one, should be preferably delineated.
The cases for and method of intervention should be 
properly determined by the basic regulation. Indeed, the 
purpose could not be to substitute the power of the 
Commission for the action of national authorities in each 
case concerning product safety, and intervention such as 





























































































The basic delegation instrument should thus give a 
definition of the Community concern.
First of all, as the common process tends to ensure 
uniform intervention in international cases, it seems 
appropriate to take inspiration from the general terms of 
the Dassonville case. Intervention of the Commission 
would then occur where the production or marketing of an 
unsafe product or substance has an effect, direct or 
indirect, actual or possible, on the health of persons or 
the integrity of properties in several Member States.
Secondly, Community interventions would be limited to 
those cases where an immediate uniformity of results is 
required, but out of reach on basis of current 
international law. This implies the use of a criterion for 
emergency.
It does not seem that those criteria should receive 
further precisions. Habilitation to the Commission for the 
control of the application of Community law in other areas 
shows that some powers of appreciation is inherent to such 
process, while it is subject to a jurisdictional control 
by the Court of Justice
The intervention process should affect all products, 
nowithstanding the existence of sectorial policies in 
Community law, namely agriculture, transport, social 
policy or environment protection.
Until now, as long as no corresponding sectorial 
intervention system is implemented, such process would not 
interfere with present legal enactments particular to 
these areas, which leave to Member State the 
responsibility for controlling the correct application of 
Community law within its own territory. For example, 
several directives concerning dangerous products - as the 
Seveso Directive or the Directive on transport of wastes - 
only detail general preventive measures prior to the 
occurrence of an accident, but not after an accident has 
occurred. Obviously, information and experience collected
115. Case 8/74, 11.07.1974 1 Case 5/71, 2.12.1971,
Schèppenstedt; case 54/76, 4.10.1979, Dumcrtier;
case 115/77, 5.12.1979, Amylum. 2 Case 5/66,





























































































by special services in these sectorial contexts should be 
at the disposal of the intervention authority, in order to 
appreciate correctly and quickly the cases submitted to
it.
If special intervention processes were implemented in 
sectorial contexts, normally these special procedures 
would prevail. However, such multiplicity would create 
conflicts in fringing occurrences, and impede a fast 
decision in a specific case.
C. - Jurisdictional control of the organ
Respect for rule of law, in particular for the 
jurisdictional protection of individuals, is central to 
Community law. As has been said above, this principle 
limits the possibility of delegation of powers to an 
autonomous organ. It also excludes any waiver clause in 
the above described delegation instrument in order to 
remove all or part of the jurisdictional controls 
established by the Treaty.
Thus, intervention measures relating to the safety policy 
would be subject to the general mechanisms of 
jurisdictional control set up by the Treaty, as is also 
the case for measures concerning the competition or the 
anti-dumping policy. It means that individuals affected by 
a regulation or by a decision could, under the general 
prevailing conditions, bring a case before the Court of 
Justice to obtain the annulment of it (Art. 173, al. 2), 
oppose the illegality exception (Art. 184) or seek to 
obtain compensation in the sense of Article 215.
Appeal by individuals to the Court of Justice against a 
regulation relating to an unsafe product, raises the 
question of direct and individual interest of the claimant 
in the sense of Art. 173, para. 2. However, this question 
would not be particular to this new field, and could 
receive the same answer as the one given by the Court 
about anti-dumping regulations.
With regard to the civil liability of the Community, it is 
certain that the new powers conferred could lead to claims 
before the Court. As is well known, the probability of the 
claimant obtaining compensation is rather slight, when the 
damaging act is not of a purely administrative nature but 
concerns the conduct of a policy, i.e. an activity of 




























































































Thus, the claimant would have to prove the damage, the 
damaging fact and a causal relationship between these 
elements. According to the Court of Justice, the act must 
violate a superior principle of specific protection of the 
individuals, and this violation must be sufficiently 
characterized, manifest and gravel. So far, there could 
not be any liability when the authority acts with an 
appreciation power. Nevertheless, it is incumbent on the 
competent authority to examine conscientiously a case 
submitted to it as the "guardian" of the Treaty in the
sense of Art. 1552. On the other hand, criteria of
specificity and gravity require that the damage affects a 
determined category of operators and exceeds the normal 
risks of economic activities.
From a procedural point of view, the Single European Act 
provides for the creation, by the Council, of a Tribunal
joined to the Court of Justice. According to the terms of
new Art. 168A of the Treaty, proceedings can be initiated 
at the Tribunal by individuals and it seems competent to 
judge all cases requiring an appreciation of full 
jurisdiction, namely the calculation of a fine in the 
sense of Art. 172 or a claim for civil liability. It can 
also examine claims introduced by individuals for the 
annulment of a decision or regulation, namely in the field 
of competition or anti-dumping policy, and in the present 
field as well.
Conclusion
The analysis of the implementation of a Community product 
safety policy in institutional terms reveals that such 
policy would be incomplete without the implementation of a 
common process ensuring uniformity of interventions in 
case of an accident creating a risk of damages to persons 
and/or properties in several Member States.
As is linked with the establishment of a general Community 
rule providing for the duty to put into circulation safe 
products, such process concerns the control of the 
application of Community law. As yet, it is incumbent to 
States to provide for all necessary measures in order to 
ensure this application.
The limits of State jurisdiction in international cases, 
following present international administrative or penal 
law, suggest, however, the necessity to derive a common 
control process. Such a process should allow for the 
> intervention of Community institutions and, according to




























































































law, mandatory powers besides the Council could be 
attributed to the Commission only.
The Commission could receive the power to take all 
measures in order to prevent the marketing of an unsafe 
product, including the possibility of fines in case of 
violation of said measures by individuals concerned. These 
powers, however, would come under the jurisdictional 
scrutiny of the Court of Justice. They would be provided 
for by a general delegation instrument. This regulation 
should define the procedure of intervention, but also the 
cases for intervention. For the latter, it could have 
recourse to the concepts of emergency and of community 
interest, as developed in other areas of Community law.
This process should take into consideration existing 
preventive measures, aiming to give the Commission all 
useful information about dangerous products and accidents. 
It should also establish cooperation with national 
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IN EUROPEAN PRODUCT SAFETY LAW
H.-W. Micklitz
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I An Alternative Introduction
II The Right to Safety
1 . statement of aims
2. primary Community law
3. secondary Community law
Ill The Right to be Heard
1 . statement of aims
2. primary Community law
3. secondary Community law
4. requirements concerning the content of procedural
participation in the statndardisation process
5. requirements for the content of a 
participation in post-market control
right to
IV Objections to the Extension of Procedural Participation
1. based on the structure of European standardisation
2. based on the nature of consumer participation
3. based on the internal structural deficiencies in 
the organisation of consumer participation





























































































I. An Alternative Introduction
In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), product 
liability cases are brought before the special chamber of 
the Federal High Court (Bundesgerichtshof BGH), with 
jurisdiction for product liability cases. Judges sitting 
in this court have in addition to their vocation already 
earned themselves a reputation in legal writing. Yet even 
these judges get into difficulties when they have to 
decide whether the producer has complied with necessary 
technical precautions in protecting the user from injury. 
This requires a degree of outside assistance which is to 
be found in technical standards. Infact there are several 
thousand of them, and judges find it hard to know whether 
they actually reflect the present state of art, or have 
since become obsolete; whether perhaps they will be 
contested by technical experts or consumers. Thus, a 
Federal High Court judge has to keep informal methods 
close at hand and does not rely exclusively on expert 
advice. By simply picking up the phone, the judge is in 
contact with the person responsible for employment 
protection at the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office. In 
product liability circles people know each other, and 
their reputations. Informal conversation determines the 
bounds of arguments made in a given case and the judge 
will obtain all the background information necessary to 
the procedural process, on an informal basis, which 
appears in the written judgment, if at all, in coded form.
My point here is not to claim that such conversations are 
unprofessional. The small, but everyday affairs can 
illustrate much more about the role technical standards 
play (or can play) in practice, where they supposedly play 
no role. It therefore becomes all the more important to 
find procedures which guarantee third party (in our case 
consumer) influence in the development of technical 
standards - giving consumers a formal guarantee of 
participation in standard-setting procedure, whose 
standpoint could then take effect directly through the 
producer - likewise participation in post-market control. 
The terms 'procedure' and 'participation' are couched in 
the sense used in the debate on the role of the consumer 
in product safety law. This refers to the inclusion of 
the consumer in the standardisation process, in post­
market control, as a person with no direct interest, but 
who represents the public interest. As can be seen then, 





























































































My starting point is that consumer .participation is 
deficient at both levels of regulation. I would go
further in stating that existing fundamental principles of 
EC law, provide basic elements for the development of' a 
procedural right to participation, which should be founded 
as an extension of the right to safety. In the long term, 
any such EC-based procedural right needs to be founded on 
consumer participation in the processes of standardisation 
and post-market control.
My considerations for this stem from two diverse sources: 
firstly, from a debate concerning the constitutional 
grounding of the participation of environmental 
organisations, or third parties, in cases where the safety 
or environmental impact of industrial plants is considered 
in the approval procedure;^ alternatively, from a 
typically German perspective, where procedural rights are 
comprehended as complementary to basic constitutional 
rights, and not as an integral part of the democracy. 
Here, I intend to put safety law and industrial sites 
planning law on an equal footing. This approach may seem 
surprising, in view of the different perspectives, 
procedural regulation and product regulation1 , given 
the multifaceted developments or risk-based arguments, and
116. The state of consumer participation in 
standardisation and decision-making over post-sale 
control is described in the expanded German script.
117. My considerations are based largely on a study 
written for the European Commission, Die Sicherheit 
von Konsumgiitern und die Entwicklung der 
Europâischen Gemeinschaft, Ch. Joerges/ J. Falke/ 
H—W. Micklitz/ Gert Brüggemeier; Baden-Baden Nomcs 
1988.
118. For a comparison between safety policy in factory 
planning law and product safety, see 
Sicherheitsregulierung und EG Integration, 
Brüggemeier/ Falke/ Holch-Treu/ Joerges/ Micklitz, 
ZERP DP 3/84 p. 23 et seq.
119. Neumann in Demokratischer und Autoritarer Staat, 
1957 p. 20 et seq.
120. For this distinction and its meaning for product 





























































































clearly requires an explanation. In industrial sites
planning law, participation in the administrative 
decision-making process and participation in the standard­
setting process are distinguished. The processes of
development of technical standards are identical in 
principle; in both areas of law, problems of access to 
jurisdiction and participation resemble each 
throughout and can be discussed alongside each other.
By contrast, it seems that participation in the approval 
procedure for the construction of a site of potential 
danger to the environment can hardly be compared with the 
possibility of consumer participation in post-market 
control procedure. This is because, in industrial sites 
planning law, the danger to the environment originates in 
the plant itself, the consumer cannot avoid exposure to 
danger. In product law on the other hand the situation is 
quite different. In this case, the consumer seems to 
imperil himself, since he makes a decision to purchase a 
product. He exposes himself to risks..which first appear 
through the marketing of a product. It is therefore a
121
121. In this respect see E. Gurlitt, Die
Verwaltungsoffentlichkeit im Umweltrecht 1989, p. 
131 et seq., who tries to found a similar
interpretation for the admissibility of product law 
(for medicine and chemicals).
122. Also G. Winter, Die Angst des Richters bei der
Technikbewertung, ZRP 1987, p. 247.
123. Besides, there are limits: it is precisely the
reticence of German administrative courts to
develop procdural rules for the calculation of 
technical standards which supports the 
administrative checking systems, cf. Winter op cit. 
FN 122 p. 427, mit Nwen aus der Rechtsprechung und 
der Literatur. There is no approval procedure. 
This is very different from product safety law. 
This may help to explain why civil courts have far 
fewer difficulties than administrative courts in 
laying down the meaning of control in relation to 
technical standards.
124. Such an approach is supported by the attempts of 
Laubinger, Grundrechtsstrukcur durch Gestaltung des 
Verwaltungsverfahrens, in VerwArch 73 (1982) p. 76, 
who likes to differentiate between "the gravity of 
the action, the probability of injuring a person’s 
rights and the degree of legality cf the action 




























































































valid exercise to call to mind the fundamental basis of 
procedual participation. In industrial sites planning 
law, this ought to make it possible for the individual to 
effectively defend his constitutionally protected rights, 
for example, life and health. In industrial sites
planning law, the public duty of protection is based on 
the principle that the .State takes on a joint
responsibility for risks. There is nothing more to
product safety law in this sense. In so far as the 
marketing of a product is coupled to statutory approval, 
the public duty is obvious. Technical consumer goods, 
however, are not submitted for statutory approval; in this 
case, however, the state has the task of guaranteeing 
protection of the individual through an effective post­
market control system. Thus far, the post-market control 
procedure is functionally equivalent to an administrating 
decision for the approval of an industrial site. 
Despite these arguments, the objection remains that, in 
product safety law, the consumer exposes himself to the 
risk of damage to health through his choice of purchase. 
The acceptance of such risk would only be conceivable 
where a consumer makes a decision knowing of the risks 
involved. In reality, the consumer has no choice and no 
possibility of making an informed decision. The decision 
is taken away from him by standardisation organisations, 
who define the level of safety required. The consumer 
himself is symbol-orientated. Seen in this light, it 
appears possible to make generalisations on the 
constitutional debate concerning procedurally guaranteed 
participation. Intellectually speaking, we can refer to 
Article 2(2) Basic Law (Grundgesetz GG), guaranteeing the 
right to life and procedural protection through the legal 
opinion of the German Constitutional Court
125. See III 2 with reference to the Miilheim-Karlich 
decision, BVerGe 53, p. 3C et seq.
126. This begs the question whether, in relation to the 
formulation of post-sale control, consumers should 
be granted a priori legal protection simply be 
exercising their right to a hearing - for 
comparison with the GSA see Joerges et al., op cit. 





























































































II. The Right to Safety
1. Statement of aims
Since President Kennedy's message to consumers in 1962, 
the right to safety has been neatly dovetailed into the 
mainstream of consumer policy objectives. The European
Community has likewise demanded,
"an effective protection from dangers in the 
interests of health and safety of consumers", .
in its two consumer policy Programmes of 1976 and 1981.
A long-awaited third consumer policy Programme has still 
to appear. 'The New Impetus for Consumer Protection 
Policy' 1985, however, lays down Community objectives for 
a safety policy. The policy of completion of the internal 
market has to be achieved through a general safety duty 
valid throughout the Community,. In a Communiction to 
the Council, 8th May 19871 , entitled 'The Safety of
Consumers' - which the Council acknowledged and approved 
on 25th June 1 9 9 1 ^ - the first conceptions towards a
general product safety duty are developed. Programmes, 
impetus and communictions are not legally binding,
although their precise legal effect is open to
127. Winter, op cit. FN 122 p. 427; BVerGe 53, 30 (65),
see esp.. the far-reaching statement of aims of OVG 
Liineburg, NVwz 1985, 357 (Buschaus) as well as
Judges Simon and Hausler in the Special Chamber cf 
the BVerGe 53 p. 30 et seq. (Mulheim-Xarlich) 77.
128. Reprinted by Ev. Hippel, Verbraucherschutz 3. 
Auflage 1986 p. 281 et seq.
129. Details from N. Reich, Forderung und Schütz, 
diffuser Interessen durch die Europaischer 
Gemeinschaften, Baden-Baden 1987, RZ 58 p.160
130. 23 July 1985 COM{85) 314 final, aporcved by Council 
26 March 1986 OJ C 167 5 July 1986'
131. COM(87) 209 final




























































































question. No-one would dispute every collateral
function of the programmes and formulations which lend 
support to the case argued.
2. Primary Community law
'The basic right of the Community consumer to health and 
safety' may be deduced through the decisions of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), based on the relationship 
between Articles 30 and 36, and the principle .of 
proportionality. This was first conceived by N. Reich.1 
Such a basic right might be understood as an 'immanent 
barrier .tp Community action in the sphere if integration 
policy'. Infact, the ECJ is trying to maintain the
compatability of the objective of free movement of goods 
with the duty of Member States to protect its citizens 
from dangerous goods. The method of the ECJ is similar., to 
that of the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVG)."
It extends the effect of Article 30, 'measures having 
equivalent effect’ - equally the laws of Member States 
governing social protection tend to be regarded as 
barriers to trade. Alongside the extension of the field 
of application, howewer, the ECJ broadens the conceivable 
legal justifications. The ECJ is developing a right to 
safety as a defense for Member States against the 
predominantly internal market aims of the Commisson. 
Article 100(a) (iv) employs, such a conception, at least 
indirectly. Within the limits of applicability of Article 
100 (a), para. 1, Member States are empowered to reject
harmonisation rules which are entirely based on internal 
market considerations, thereby denying Member State
133. See Mertens AG 1982, 29 et seq., the legal validity
of the international code of conduct was vehemently 
disputed, Horn (ed.) Legal Problems of Codes of 
Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, Vol. 1
Studies in Transnational Economic Law, Kluwer 1980; 
recently the teaching of the sources of law has 
grown in importance, see Pflug, Status und Kontrakt 
im Recht der AGB, 1986, as to the lecal validitv of 
the AGB.
134. op cit., FN 129, RZ 120 D. 227-229
135. op Cit., FN 129, RZ 175 p. 301
136. In this respect, Dennincer, Verfassungsgerichtliche 
Schlüsselbegriffe in Festschrift, R. Wassermann 
1985, p. 269 et seq.



























































































responsibility in j^ety matters, through a special 
safeguard procedure.
The problem of developing a basic right to safety as a 
defensive right lies in its coupling to the objective of a 
uniform internal market. Such an approach complies with 
the logic of the development of the relationship between 
the movement of goods and product safety. It is confirmed 
by the readiness of the Commission to understand the 
harmonisation of product safety as a matter of Community 
concern, since a further division of the market is 
foreseeable as a result of divergent national post-market 
control decisions. This approach, however, limits ths 
conception of the right to safety. This can never become 
more than a right annexed to Article 30, and is always 
faced with the threat of being 'crushed' by the wheels of 
the internal market machinery.
A starting point for a fundamentally different 
understanding of the right to safety, independent of the 
internal market approach, could be taken through Article 
130 (r) paragraph 1. Article 130 (r) assimilates 
environmental protection to the inventory of objectives of 
primary Community law, a privilege - as it is well known - 
which is denied to consumer protection. Yet before we 
turn to the content of Article 130 (r) para. 1, it is 
necessary to enquire into the meaning of consuy^g 
protection pursuant to the Single European Act (SEA).
The latter only appears in Article 100 (a) para. 3, and is 
also subordinated to the aims of internal market policy. 
In order to deduce a right to safety independent of the 
internal market. Article 100 (a) para. 3 therefore offers 
no foothold, chiefly because it addresses only the 
Commission and this could probably not be submitted to the 
jurisdication of the ECJ.
It is worth mentioning that Article 100 (r) para. 1 
extends into environment issues, since a detailed 
definition of protection of health is presented as an aim
137. Also Reich, op cit. FN 129, RZ 176 p. 301
138. See esp. the position of the European Consumer Law 
Group, Consumer Protection in the EEC after the 
Ratification of the Single Act, in JCP Vol. 10 No. 
3 (Sept. 1987), p. 319 et seq., mainly written by 
Reich.




























































































of environmental policy. Theoretically, the right to 
safety could be incorporated into health protection, and 
accordingly be brought under the expansive and protective 
wing.of environmental law as a constitutional right of the 
EC. The problems of coordination between Articles 130 
(r), 100 (a) and ,100 have triggered off discussions on 
their interrelation. One could almost say that there 
is some agreement to subordinate internal market 
orientated health regulations. Articles 100 and 100 (a) 
respectively, and only comprehend such regulations within 
the framework of Article 130 which pursues genuine health 
policy objectives. For our purposes, the distinction 
is like the opposition of chalk and cheese. Admittedly, 
it is realistic, but it destroys the chance of giving new 
meaning to a concept of health without it being merely 
annexed to the movement of goods. Ana this is precisly 
the point. To date, the conception of product safety, and 
equally that of a right to safety, focus on possible risks 
which result from the circulation of goods. Both neglect 
the conditions of production and removal of these 
products. A change in approach is required, equally 
'infecting* product safety law with environmental law 
considerations. Statements are to be found in D-G XI 
preparatory work on a directive product safety in which
140. Also N.C.D. Ehlermann, The Internal Market 
Following the Single European Act, CMLR 1987, pp. 
361 382 et seq., who want to see environmental 
protection regulation limited to procedural 
regulation. This however, once again heightens the 
disparity between factory planning law and product 
law which we believed we had already overcome in 
our arguments, above III.
141. For an overview, see Joerges et al., op cit. FN 117
pp. 374-375; Kramer, The Single European Act and 
Environmental Protection: Reflections on Several
New Provisions in Community Law, CMLR 1987 659 et
seq.; Reich, Schutzpolitik in der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaft im Spannungsfeld von Schutznormen und 
institutioneller Integration, Scnri f te.nreihe der 
juristischen Studiengesellschaft, Hannover, Heft 
17, 1988.
142. In this respect, Kramer, op cit. FN 141; Reich co 
cit., FN 141.
143. See Winter, Perspektiven des Cmweltrechts, DVB 




























































































14 4waste should be considered as a problem of regulation. 
Article 130 (s) should become the key to understanding
safety policy and safety law in terms of environmental 
policy and environmental law. For this to be the case, 
however, one still needs a dogmatically conceived legal 
understanding of the interrelationship between the
provisions.
3. Secondary Community law.
The Directive on product liability completes the safety 
policy conceptions of the New Approach. It is not 
incidental that the approval of the directive and 
adoption of the New Approach come together in the Council 
at the same time. The safety policy programme of the 
Community, 'credo', was timed to run from the middle of 
1985 in the following way: post-market control falls to 
Member States, the EC limits itself to the organisation of 
exchange of information and the coordination of regulatory 
actions; the directive on product liability aapplies 
indirect pressure on the manufacturer to produce safe 
products only and protects the integrity interests of the 
Community consumer. I do not believe that the policy of 
the time was already directed 'towards the creation of a 
right to safe products for all consumers' by simply using 
the notion of 'defective products' in the directive as a 
common basis. b The unilateral alignment of compensation 
for damages, as well as its incorporation into the safety 
policy of the New Approach weighs against that idea. The 
gaps in safety policy can only be closed by a separate 
directive, which imposes a duty on the producer to bring 
only safe products into circulation. In the meantime,
a first proposal has been developed which will soon be 
published in the Official Journal. The chances of the 
project being achieved is quite another question. Only, 
it has become clear that the safety policy conception in
144. Ch. Joerges and the author are members of a 
formally constituted working committee of DG XI.
145. 3ut see Reich op cit. FN 129, RZ 120 p. 228
145. In this respect, Joerges et al., cp cit. FN 117 p. 
447 et seq. See Communications(89) 162-SYN 192,
Vorschlag fur die Richtlinie des Rates zur 
Ausgleichung der Rechts- Verwaltungsvorschriften 





























































































the New Approach needs to be supplemented. This is
central to our hypothesis because a definitive basis of 
the right to safety is linked to the adoption of a special 
directive on product safety.
1 4RIII. The Right to be Heard
147
Both Senates of the Consitutionai Court have derived a 
duty to observe procedural formalities, based of Article 2 
para. 2 of the Basic Law (GG), which excludes, as far.as 
possible, injury to the party protected by the Law. 
Underlying this is the idea that the State must honour its 
protection duties by providing procedural guarantees. It 
seems to me that the essentially German idea of procedural 
rights flowing from basic rights, still has a role to play 
despite all reservations about transferring the German 
model to the creation of a Community right to procedural 
participation. This is because, according to
'productivist concepts of the EC',1 integration is to.be 
achieved through the concept of negative integration.
The political impetus of Member States has not sufficed 
for the formulation of democratic rights in Treaty and the 
SEA. For this reason, the démocratisation of the
movement of goods must be deduced as a necessary 
consequence of of productivist concepts.
1. Statement of aims
147. This is a further opinion expressed in our book, 
Joerges et al., FN 117 p. 431 et seq.
148. By way of clarification: we are not concerned with 
legal redress of citizens/ consumer organisations 
in this context.
149. BVerGe 53 p. 31 et seq. (55 et seq.) (minority 
vote).
150. Reich, op cit. FN 129, also Th. Bourgoignie/ D. 
Trubek, Consumer Law, Common Markets and Federalism 
in Europe and the USA, 1987, p. 99 et seq.
151. Reich treats the shortcomings of this concept in 
relation to consumer and environmental orotection, 
op cit. FN 129.
152. Alternatively, the EP draft, references 






























































































'The right to be heard' lies at the heart of consumer 
policy, as does the right to safety. It is different to 
the right to safety, however, in that it has never been 
concretized in legal terms. Its expression15;n the 
consumer programme has remained purely placatory. The
programmes insist on participation in relevant political 
decision-making processes. This may lie in the 
concentration of consumer policies on the enforcement of 
substantive rights. The interventionist approach to 
consumer law, however, has come to a halt. The prevalent 
policy of incentives and cooperation in itself should 
allow room for the development of a policy on consumer 
participation, yet hitherto it has not come to this.
2. Primary Community law
Renewed statements on procedural developments can be found 
in the decisions of the ECJ based on Article 30. This 
grants the consumer the right to choose and freedom of 
choice with respect to his need for satisfaction for his 
products. 3 The acknowledgment of such a right, first 
and foremost, brings a change in perspectives: consumers
are not only indirectly affected by the free movement of 
goods, they are consignees and consignees have 'rights'; 
consumers can only choose when they have alternatives and 
when they are informed about the possible alternatives. 
Alternatives create obligations, that means retaining. 
competitive market and not restricting the consumer; 
information about alternatives signifies making demands on 
the producer or possibly the 'State', which are aimed at 
the consumer receiving help in finding his way about the 
market. In the broadest sense, a process for the 
dessemination of information must be founded. The right 
to a market-informed decision not only offers the consumer
153. See the second Community consumer programme, 
Bulletin EC 4/79 18 et seq.
154. As far as can be seen, the BEUC has likewise not 
systematically grasped the concept of consumer 
participation at various levels. for an overview 
see Kramer, EWG - Verbraucherrecht, 1986, RZ 46 et 
seq.
155. This is emphasised by Reich, op cit. FN 129, RZ 14
p. 52, citing Steindorff ZKR Ï.48 ( 1984) 338 and
Donner SEW 1982, 362 et seq.
156. Here Reich has in mind the parallel imports urged 




























































































the opportunity for active participation, it also burdens 
him with the responsibility of participation, or of mere 
passivity. In this sense. Article 30 engenders a right to 
participation or a right for participants, from which 
concrete requirements can be developed. Thus it
follows: (1) Article 30 is not only aimed at Member
States and producers, rather it provides the consumer with 
a legally guranteed position in relation to the movement 
of goods, and, (2), a role which the consumer can only 
fill if producer and Member State take the necessary 
procedural precautions. To this end, the decisions of the 
ECJ based on Article 30, show tendencies comparable to 
those in Constitutional Court decisions, setting aside a 
procedure for the basic rights flowing from Article 30 and 
guaranteeing the exercise of those basic rights. Since 
the Cattenom decision, it should have become clear that 
ECJ considers formal competence to be a minimal 
requirement for procedural rights.
3. Secondary Community law
The prospects for a concrétisation of procedural
participation seems to be out of the question. In recent 
years, the Commission has certainly laid the foundation 
stones for environmental law and consumer law. In spite 
of a dearth of regulation, one can easily identify the 
impetus of EC policy: procedural participation in post­
market control, the administrative approval procedure 
respectively only comes into question at national level. 
Procedural participation in European standardisation takes 
place, however, not only at national level but notably 
also at Commuity level.
Thus, Article 4 of the Advertising directive* contains
157. I attempted this approach for the right to general
Community provisions, my interpretation of Article 
30 should allow the consumer to elect his best 
right: H.-W. Micklitz, Der Schuts des Verbrauchers
vor unlauteren Allgemeinen Geschaftssbedingungen, 
Typescript 1988.
158. Decision of the Court, 22 September 1988, Case 
187/87.
159. Guidelines 84/450 EWG 10 September 1984 on The 
Approximation of Laws and Regulations of Member 





























































































procedural stipulations to be followed before national 
authorities or jurisdictions; a parallel provision is 
planned,- for the draft directive on unfair contract 
terms. b0 It imposes a duty on Member States to take 
appropriate procedural measures without specifying what is 
to be understood by this. Strictly speaking, the 
directives are significant since they oblige Member States 
to set minimum standards for post-market control.
However, they neglect to lay down any concrete provisions 
concerning the role of the consumer. Consumers may be 
entitled to take a joint (class) action as in the FRG, 
thus post-market control itself becomes privatised; 
equally they can be excluded from post-market control only 
if the authorities are present.,.to undertake the 
supervision of pertinent laws. Here again, the
provisions remain obscure regarding their objectives. The 
fact nevertheless remains that the consumer/third party 
must be included in the procedure. The shift to Community 
level offers far lesser prospects. In the EC, consum|g^ 
are not included in the vast majority of committees, 
which in fact pave the way for the formation of the EC's 
own administration, be it in the form of pre or post­
market control. There are no exceptions to the rule that, 
consumers/third parties have no access to proceedings 
negotiated there, nor to information exchanged. A little 
information is given to them, as is the case for the 
general public, in the form of often delayed and 
incomplete reports and committee activities.
With this in mind, it is amazing to have to acknowledge 
that consumer participation in standardisation at a 
European level was generally thematised and 'regualated', 
even if both documents could not easily be assigned to 
secondary Community law. The agreement of the Commission 
on collaboration with CEN/CENELEC1 is admittedly, 
formally legitimated by the Council Decision 16th July
160. DG XI/124/87 - EN, Further Draft Articles for 
Discussion on Unfair Contract Terms, June 1987.
161. Council Guidelines 27 June 1985 on the verification 
of compatibility of certain oublie and private 
projects (85/337/EWG); OJ 175/40, 5 July 1985.
162. In this context, see Kramer, op cit. FN 154, RZ 63, 
o page 48 he estimates the number of committees to 
be 200.




























































































16 41984, yet equally it is doubtful whether the Commission 
can conclude legally binding contracts which provide for 
the delegation of Community. ...authority to private 
standardisation organisations. Leaving aside legal 
quality/nature, it still remains a fact that, according to 
the agreement, the circles working in that field ought to 
be included, and that the Commission will 'contribute to 
the ascertainment of suitable arrangements according to 
the circumstances'. A right to participation is 
acknowledged, but concrete provisions for the form of 
participation are completely absent.
The official communication of the .Cgmmission of 11th 
December 1987, is hardly more helpful. 6 It concretises 
general principles. Its legal quality is therefore tied 
to the estimation of its worth. The Commission is urging 
for increased consumer participation at national level to 
ensure that consumer interests are injected into 
CEN/CENELEC in the form of national representation. Just 
how this is to projected at a European level remains open 
to speculation. 1 The Commission wants to 'have a new 
agreement with CEN/CENELEC concerning new working 
techniques'.The Commission is free to take the initiative. 
In accordance with the Council Decision, it has a 
political mandate which it is only carrying out very 
hesitantly. The problems would therefore seem not to lie 
in the lack of will on the part of Member States - they 
have carried out the formal requirements of the Council 
Decision - but in the engagament of the Commission, where 
conceived, and possibly in its own conception, as the 
joint . European administrative organ. 
Secondary “Community law points towards the existence of 
a right to participation, but leaves its form undisclosed. 
In this analysis we therefore come back to primary 
Community law to consider the questions which can possibly
164. Printed in DIN-Mitt. 63 (1984) 681
165. See also Joerges/ Falke/ Micklitz/ Briiggemeier op 
cit., FN 117 d . 403
166. COM (87) 617 final 11 December 1987.
167. There are informal ideas for this, whose actual 
value is difficult to assess, see Joerges et al., 
FN 117, p. 427.
168. I use the term in parenthesis, because it is not 
used in the traditional sense of Community law, and 





























































































be resolved there; whether or not concrete requirements 
can also be deduced on procedural form from the 
acknowledgment of the right to participation.
4. Requirements for the content of procedural
participation in the standardisation process.
Again, light may be thrown on the problem with an 
introductory survey of German constitutional debates. G. 
Winter1 a is of the opinion that the development of 
procedural requirements in the standardisation process is 
for 'mainly terra incognita' in German administrative and 
constitutional law. This opinion holds true as long as it 
refers to the Miilheim-Karlich decision of the 
Constitutional Court. In this case, the majority of the 
judges finally decided to leave the decisive questiog 
unresolved and follwed established legal requirements.1 
It must also be stated that, at a lower jurisdictional 
level, there are voices which urge for a much more 
tangible procedural form for the standardisatign process. 
Here one could mention the OVG Luneburg,^ which 
introduced the concept of legitimation through procedural 
requirements, without defining, however, what the term 
really means. The dissenting opinions of judges Simon and 
Heussner are more informative in the Miilheim-Karlich 
decision of the Constitutional Court, since they refute 
the possibility of deriving 'procedural form by direct 
application of objective fundamental criteria embodied in 
Article 2, para. 2 Basic Law on a case by case basis; on 
the other hand they state the case for a 'higher degree of 
State responsibility.... both in relation to the normative 
form of the procedural right, and for its application. 
They consider the verification of the constitutionality of 
the commission responsible for the development of
technical norms to be valid, and similarly the
verification of certain procedural provisions used in the 
drafting of standards.
It is certainly true that a complete statute containing 
rights and duties for participants cannot be deduced from 
the constitutional right to be heard. At the same time,
169. op cit., ?N 122 p. 427
170. BVerGe 53, 30 et seq., 66
171. NVwZ 1985, 357 (Buschhaus)





























































































however, one can imagine the development of procedural 
principles to be observed in accordance with the 
constitution and which cannot be undermined by the 
'tricks' of procedural technicalities. Accordingly, a 
step in this has been taken by the Constitutional Court in 
a key decision concerning the procedural rights of asylum- 
seekers. ' Following this decision, both the rights of 
audience of the interested party and the formal decision 
of competence to take jurisdication belong to the central 
body of procedural rights. The limits of the general 
principles of procedural participation, valid for 
technical standards, arise from the function of 
participation in procedure in a democratic society. Its 
most important aspect consists in increaseing public 
awareness, it does not amount to taking over £h<| role of 
spokesman for the economy or government, and can 
neither be brought in a decisive context into the realm of 
protection of individuals.
- The formal shaping of procedure: the content of basic 
rights is empty if the participants have no idea 
whatsoever about what facilities are available to them. 
Thus, it is necessary to define and set forth rights and 
duties in written form.
Access to information: rules of procedure must endure 
that consumers receive all the information necessary to
173. BVerGe 56, 216 et seq., 242 et seq., also Gurlitt, 
FN 121, 134 et seq.
174. This seems now, as was previously the case, to be 
the position adopted by the BVerGe and at least 
partly the OVG, see BVerGe 53 31 et seq. (63 and 
64); also Winter op cit. FN 122, p. 427. The 
criteria developed by courts giving legal 
protection at administrative hearings are very 
general and basically apply in the form of 
procedural rights.
175. In relation to the function of a hearing procedure 
for a democratic polity see, once again Gurlitt, FN 
121, 47 et seq.. In a nutshell one could say that 
the right to be heard legitimates the outcome if 
the decision was based on public procedure. On the 
other hand, procedural rights need to be assured by 
special jurisdictions, if the outcome hs already 




























































































make a choice. One must strive for equality._of 
information for all the parties involved in procedure.
Access to allocation and distribution systems: 
procedural rules must guarantee that the consumer can form 
his own opinions and viewpoints in the distribution 
system.
Coordination of committees: consumers have a claim to
appropriate participation. The number and eligibility of 
the representative is to be determined by the type of body 
constituted.
Reimbursement of expenses: the basic principles seem
capable of being generalised beyond national boundaries.
5. Requirements for the content of a right to a hearing in
post-market control.
If we are right in assuming that the idea that post-market 
control represents the equivalent for the approval of a 
plant which constitutes an environmental risk, then there 
is nothing to contradict the transfer of basic principles 
concerning valid minimum standards developed from 
procedural law into the from of consumer participation in 
post-market control. Literally speaking, this could not 
occur since the areas of applicability are distinguished. 
It should be possible, however, to develop fundamental 
principles for procedure. It is therefore a worthwhile 
exercise to bear in mind the varying roles which consumer 
participation could play in post-market control: they
could produce public awareness of negotiation processes 
which typically take place to the exclusion of third 
parties; but they could equally assume the role of taking 
the initiative for administrative control - that would 
make the consumer the 'enforcer' of control authorities. 
Similarly, they could also open the way for consumers to 
construct their own information system enabling them to 
vent their grievances without engaging the authorities.
176. The problem of protection of secrets seems to have 
no bearing on the standardisation of consumer 
goods. Perhaps this is because technical standards 
for consumer goods only have to correspond with 
"generally applied technical rules' (Joerges et 





























































































In this sense, they would no longer be the 'enforcers', 
but the 'watch-dogs' of international, or at any rate, 
European movement of goods. However, consumers could only 
play an active role; if their rights and duties were 
written down; if they had access to the information of the 
authorities, and when represented in the decision-making 
bodies,_so that they could be given the opportunity to be 
heard.1'7
IV. Obstacles to the Extension of Participation in 
Procedure
My concern here is not to map out the political 
perspectives of a right to health or a right to 
appropriate participation in procedure. The current 
discussion is more orientated towards a consideration of 
the difficulties inherent in consumer participation in 
standardisation and equally post-market control.
1. Based on the structure of European standardisation.
CEN/CENELEC is the umbrella organization name for national 
standardisation bodies in the EC and EFTA countries. 
National standardisation bodies send representatives to 
the technical committees instituted by CEN/CENELEC. If 
consumers are to be able to take part in standardisation 
at a national level, then delegated representatives ought 
likewise to be able to formulate a joint position through 
national bodies in relation to its field of activity. 
CEN/CENELEC fear a doubling of consumer participation 
which would be incompatible with the sketchy structure of 
European harmonisation. Nor, it would seem, is there any 
representation of industry groups at the meetings of the 
technical committees. In fact, the aim of this critique 
is to lay bare a structural weakness. This is because the 
secretariat for coordination, the current 'Organisation 
for European Consumer Participation', has a structural 
advantage over European industry in relation to all
177. A synopsis of national reports on post-sale in 
Member States, Australia and USA will make it 
possible to give a firmer basis to the requirements 
of participation, report for che Commission, H-W. 
Micklitz (ed.), Nachmarktkontrolle über
Verbrauchsgiiter in den Mitgliedstaaten der EG, to 




























































































deficiencies. Ideally, it is more suited to injecting a 
real European input into the standardisation process, a 
capacity which national industrial bodies are far from 
able to achieve. In other words, the process of arriving 
at a consensus, which national industries must first bring 
about through technical committees, has already been 
achieved by the observers at the secretariat for 
coordination, when they take their places on committees. 
It nevertheless remains that no objection can be raised in 
principle against European consumer participation based on 
structural divergency. Increasingly, at European level, 
consumers are gaining ground in the process of political 
coordination, which national industries have been 
organising effectively for a considerable period of 
time. It is fair to say then that, theoretically, 
consumers go into negotiation with a consensual advantage.
2. Based on the type of cinsumer participation.
National bodies delegate technical experts to the 
CEN/CENELEC committees, which are often members of 
interested business concerns. Consumer participation in 
European standardisation is fed from preferred sources:
(i) technical experts from relevant consumer advisory 
councils or consumer committees for national 
standardisation bodies; (ii) technical experts from 
national consumer and usually verification bodies; and 
(iii) independent experts from research organisations and 
laboratories etc.. The first group of technical experts 
from national consumer advisory-bodies is not integrated 
into consumer participation. ' The representatives of 
the second and third groups look upon it as unlikely 
consumer representatives, despite holding their expertise 
in good18gsteem, but fear creating ’fraternity of 
experts’ amongst those responsible for drafting 
standards. One can therefore also accuse European 
standardisation of being politial rather than technical 




See W. 3rinkmann, Die Verbraucherorganisationen in 
der BRD und ihre Tatigkeit bei der 
iiberbetrieblichen technischen Normung, 1975 
Joerges et al., op cit. FN 117, p. 414 et seq.
F. Wagener, Der òffeniliche Dienst im Staat der 





























































































consumers should therefore be seen as. the true reason for 
CEN/CENELEC's policy of obstruction.^
3. Based on internal structural deficiencies in the 
organisation of consumer policy.
Alongside all the obstructions blocking the way to the 
development of efficient participation of third parties 
Member States, Commission, industry and standardisation 
bodies - the consumer bodies themselves create their own 
obstacles. Here one could mention above all the problems 
in relation to the organisation of coordination between 
the consumer advisory committee and the four European 
consumer organisations. The present situation is that, in 
four years, the parties concerned have not managed to 
agree a clear organisational structure concerning the 
division of competences, with which they could launch an 
offensive against the Commission. The dual role of the
secretariat between the Consumer Consultative Committee 
(CCC) and European standardisation bodies weakens the 
position of consumers. There is no conception of how to 
purposively make use of the organisational advantage and 
tap the abundant resources of the national consumer 
bodies. This would require a systematically constructed 
system fog recording and processing information for 
consumers. As long as these twofold difficulties are
not thrashed out, European consumer participation will in 
its present form continue to have to fight for its own 
survival.
4. Based on the administrative practice of post-market 
control.
We have seen that post-market control, despite all the 
différencies in regulation, points to a common end - the 
'decision to control' is negotiated informally with the
181. Moreover, which for their part could be promoted by 
industry. Paradoxically, dependency on the 
fleshpots of the Commission is accompanied by a 
growing independence of the industrial decision­
making framework.
182. On ohe underlying quarrels, see Joerges et al., op 
cit. FN 117, p. 412 et seq.
183. cf. my suggestion, Data bank on Product Safety, 





























































































producer concerned and is never officially made public. 
Thus, the formal assurance of participation through the 
hearing procedure can only fall short. This does not make 
the demand for appropriate participation obsolete. Only 
the question has to be raised, how the right to 
participation ought to be shaped in order not to allow 
participation to dry up despite its factual exclusion from 
formal decision-making. In this context, it is helpful to 
reiterate the varying forms of participation in post­
market control.
Consumers can only assume the task of taking the 
initiative if they are in a position to compel 
authorities to take action against defects and make them 
account for their actions. Therefore procedural 
guarantees must be coupled with the right to a fair 
hearing. One could also infer the imposition of 
constraints on the authorities to justify the adoption of 
informal measures of control. The turning point and 
crucial point of procedural participation is 
understandably the producer's fear of having to accept 
damage to his reputation through adverse publicity. This 
is an argument of only limited validity because an 
enterprise can incorporate consumer comg^|ints about 
unsafe products into a selfish market model.
European consumer organisations can only work as 'watch­
dogs' of the free trade of goods, if they build their own 
system for recording and processing information. Their 
participation in State post-market control mechanisms 
would more than anything have the function of feeding its 
own information system with the relevant data from the 
authorties. An important function could be taken over by 
the testing institutions, whose know-how has as yet not 
been put to use in the organisation of consumer 
participation. As a final remark, a certain degree of 
parallelism in post-market control between authorities and 
consumers would be desirable, as it would also be in 
relation to the standardisation process.
184. For similar assessments of undertakings in 
marketing, cf. Bruhn, Kcnsumentenzufrieden and 
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See document, p. 56.
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